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ABSTRACT 
Law and morality have long ensured that the killing of innocent people is prohibited. However, in 2000, 
the English Court of Appeal in Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] Fam 147 
sanctioned an operation to separate conjoined twin babies Jodie and Mary, an operation that would give 
Jodie a normal life, but would result in Mary's instant death. Left conjoined both twins would die within 
six months. 
Through in-depth case analysis, this thesis explores how and why each judge who considered this case 
found resoundingly in favour of the operation. In this exploration the three separate means used to justify 
the killing - self-defence, necessity, and the finding that there was no intention to cause death - are found to 
be highly questionable; longstanding precedent is evaded and the traditional boundaries of the law are 
expanded. This thesis finds such strategies a natural result of the moral attitudes towards life that are 
revealed within the judgments. Each judge through utilitarianism and an evaluation of the potential quality 
of the girls' lives, fmds that the operation is morally justified, and works towards fmding that it is also 
legally justified. 
The core of this thesis is that these attitudes to life, which amount to a very personal - and arbitrary -
judgement of the comparative worth of each girl's life, are contrary to the inherent equal sanctity of all 
human life. This intrinsic value provides the foundation to the murder laws and is affirmed by the judges in 
Re A. It is found that the judges wrongly claim that their judgments respect the intrinsic value oflife. 
In its conclusion, this thesis does not pass judgement on the moral aptitude of the decision that was made. 
However, it does conclude that the application of the law was unsatisfactory, and that this could have 
widespread influence. This is likely to be felt throughout the common law world, and accordingly this 
thesis considers the position in Queensland where Re A has already been followed, and the position in New 
Zealand should the situation arise there. Throughout, this thesis canvasses the potential effects of Re A; 
upon other conjoined twins cases, upon the scope of the defences of necessity and self-defence, and upon 
the way that human life is valued. 
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On September 22nd 2000, the English Court of Appeal held that the active intentional 
killing of Mary, an innocent baby, was justifiable.1 This decision allowed the separation 
ofMary from her conjoined twin Jodie.2 
The girls were very different. At two weeks Jodie was described by the medical 
professionals as sparkling and alert, 'very much a with it sort of baby', with the prospect 
of normal brain development.3 By comparison Mary had a 'primitive' brain, abnormal to 
a very severe degree.4 At four weeks her only expression was a grimace, whether in 
response to a pinprick or to gentle stroking.5 It was thought that she would never make 
any development or progress. 6 
Each girl had her own vital organs. Jodie was born in perfect health, but Mary's heart 
and lungs were 'too deficient to oxygenate and pump blood through her body'.7 She was 
alive because blood oxygenated by Jodie was being supplied to her through a common 
artery. However Jodie's heart could only sustain the two of them for a limited time. The 
1 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] Fam 147. 
2 The real names of the twins are Rosie and Gracie Attard. Mary and Jodie, the names used in the court's 
judgment will be used in this thesis for the sake of simplicity. 
3 ReA at 160. 
4 ReA at 161. 
5 ReA at 170. 
6 Re A at 169. 
7 Re A at 155. 
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prognosis was that in six months8 Jodie's heart would fail due to overwork and the twins 
would die simultaneously. 
The crucial question for the girls' parents and doctors, and for the court, was whether they 
should be surgically separated. The result of separation would be immediate death for 
Mary, and a predominately 'normal' life for Jodie. The twins' parents could not bring 
themselves to agree to intervention that would kill one of their daughters. 9 However the 
doctors felt that the best course of action was to save at least one girl. After questioning 
firstly whether the operation was in each girl's best interests, and then whether it was 
legal, the court of appeal judges - Ward, Brooke and Walker LJJ - agreed with the 
doctors. The operation was carried out on November 6th 2000 with the expected result -
Jodie survived and Mary died. 
The twins' situation did, and will continue to engender opposing opinions; 'there are 
those who believe ... that it would be an immoral act to save Jodie, if ... one must end 
Mary's life ... But there are also those who believe ... that it would be immoral not to 
assist Jodie ifthere is a good prospect that she might live a happy and fulfilled life' .10 
However the ultimate decision-makers - the judges - could not simply make a moral 
decision, they were bound by the constraints of the law. The prohibition of intentional 
killing is 'the cornerstone of law and social relationships.' 11 Even in the most compelling 
circumstances, the intentional killing of an innocent person has never been allowed in the 
common law world. 12 Why intentional killing was allowed in the conjoined twins' case 
is a question this thesis attempts to answer. It is discovered that the morality of the 
8 All the medical experts were agreed that the twins had a very short life expectancy if left conjoined -
some said death may occur in weeks or months, and the more generous estimates were not more than a few 
years: Re A at 162-4. 
9 The fact that the court overruled the parents' refusal and the related issues are beyond the ambit of this 
thesis. For some discussion on this aspect, see Michael Freeman "Whose Life is it Anyway?" (2001) 9(3) 
Med L Rev 260; Andrew Bainham "Resolving the umesolvable: the case of the conjoined twins" (2001) 
60(1) CLJ 49. 
10 Re A at 239. 
11 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics HL Paper 21-I of 1993-94, at para. 237. 
12 In R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273, extreme hunger after a shipwreck led to killing and 
cannibalism, yet this was not condoned by the law. Killing in wartime may be seen as an exception, 
however the origin and implications of this exception are beyond the realms of this thesis. 
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judges, the manner in which they valued human life, rather than a strict application of the 
law, was critical to the resolution of the situation. 
It is established in Chapter II that the law prohibiting active intentional killing of innocent 
people is based on the recognition that all human life has equal intrinsic value. The 
judges in Re A clearly accept this. Due to the legal distinction between acts and 
omissions, the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is regarded 
differently from intentional active killing. The former is allowed under the law if 
treatment is considered futile or not therapeutic. Theoretically, decisions to withdraw 
treatment should not be based upon any judgement of the worth of the life that is being 
allowed to end - to do so would fundamentally undermine the premise that all life has 
intrinsic equal value. However, as Chapter II shows, decisions to allow the withdrawal of 
treatment have in fact been made in court on the basis of whether a life is worthwhile. 
The approach taken in the withdrawal of treatment cases provided a basis for the moral 
justification of the separation of Jodie and Mary. This thesis, especially Chapter Ill, 
reveals that the intrinsic worth of each girl's life is not given the respect demanded by 
law; rather, the decision in Re A is reached largely through application of utilitarian 
principles and judgements about the quality and worth of each girls life. 
Given that the judges morally justify the operation that will cause Mary's death, and see it 
as the desirable course of action, it is perhaps natural that they should apply the law in a 
manner that supports their morally predetermined conclusion. However when measured 
against traditional applications of the law, the legal justifications of Mary's killing are 
surprising. Ward LJ portrayed her as an aggressor and therefore justified the killing on 
the basis of self-defence. Brooke and Walker LJJ turned against longstanding precedent 
to apply the doctrine of necessity to the situation. Walker LJ also justifies the operation 
upon the basis that there is no intention to cause Mary' s death. The validity of these 
justifications is explored in Chapters IV, V and VI. 
This case has attracted abundant commentary, which is tribute to its importance, and 
perhaps its remarkable departure from precedent. This was the first time such a situation 
had been fully considered by a court of law. In 1977, twins in a similar predicament to 
Mary and Jodie were being cared for in Philadelphia Children's Hospital. The matter was 
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briefly brought before the court by Dr. C. Everett Koop, the hospital's chief of surgery, 
who successfully obtained an order protecting him from criminal liability if he performed 
a sacrificial separation operation on the twins. 13 Rabbis, who had been approached by the 
parents of the twins, discussed the issues at length, and the operation went ahead with 
rabbinical and parental approval. 14 In 2001, a similar situation arose in Australia; 
conjoined twin girls Alyssa and Bethany, like Mary and Jodie would both die if they were 
to remain conjoined. Their separation would save Alyssa but kill Bethany. 15 The 
situation was brought to court to obtain an order permitting the separation surgery. The 
case, Queensland v No/an, was considered by the Supreme Court of Queensland. 16 The 
judgment of Re A was relied upon, 17 and the go ahead for the operation was given - again 
the decision was made that an innocent could be lawfully killed. Undoubtedly both the 
Australian and the English decision would be hugely influential should a similar situation 
come before the court in other common law jurisdictions. The New Zealand position on 
the issues will be examined throughout this thesis. 
Ward LJ described this case as being 'very unique', emphasising that this decision was 
only authority for circumstances of this exact nature. This case is without doubt 
important to the lives of twins born in a similar situation to Mary and Jodie. However, 
the coherence of the decision also has an impact on the general development of the 
principles that shape self-defence and necessity, and provides an enlightening insight into 
the worth the court of appeal places on human life. This case may be an important 
13 The matter was heard before a three-judge panel of the Pennsylvania Family Court on October 10 1977. 
See Donald C Drake "The Twins Decision: One Must Die So One Can Live" Philadelphia Inquirer, 
October 16, 1977; republished as, Donald C. Drake "Siamese Twins. The Surgery: An agonizing choice-
Parents, Doctors, Rabbis, In Dilemma" (2001) 4(1) ASSAI, the Internet, 
http://www.daat.ac.iVdaat/kitveyet/assia englishldrake-l.htm information accessed 3 June 2003. 
14 Baby A died as expected during the operation, and sadly baby B died three months later from liver failure 
and overwhelming infection. 
15 Bethany had no kidneys, and Alyssa's one kidney had enabled both girls to survive for the first few 
weeks of their lives. Sadly, Bethany's condition rapidly deteriorated to the point where her death was an 
immediate prospect. If Bethany had died while joined to Alyssa, Alyssa would also have died. 
16 State of Queensland v Alyssa Grace No/an (an infant, by her Litigation Guardian, Shaun No/an) and 
Bethany Rose No/an (an infant, by her Litigation Guardian, Shaun Nolan) [2001] QSC 174. 
17 Due to the differences between the applicable criminal law, the legality of the operation had a different 
basis; see Chapter IV, pp 50-2. 
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indicator of the direction in which future life and death decisions will proceed in the 
common law world. 
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II 
LIFE'S VALUE: LAW AND MORALITY 
There is no doubt that our society values human life, but what exactly is it that is held so 
sacred? When a life and death decision has to be made, when the moral approach to 
valuing life will affect the fate of a human being, is life in itself valued or do 
considerations of quality and worth of life influence the decision making process? 
There are two main situations where these issues may arise in the court: Firstly when the 
intentional killing of a person is being considered. This usually arises through the 
prosecution of a killing that has already been committed; however the conjoined twins 
situation caused the court to undertake the unusual deliberation of a killing that was yet to 
be performed. A more common decision that the court is asked to make is whether a 
person can be allowed to die through the withdrawal or withholding18 of medical 
treatment. Cases of this type constitute a large part of the legal and moral environment in 
which Re A was decided. 
2.1 THE LEGAL APPROACH 
The active intentional killing of an innocent person is prohibited throughout the common 
law world. 19 In England this is established through the common law; in Airedale NHS. 
Trust v Bland it is stated that 'the principle of the sanctity oflife ... forbids the taking of 
18 From this point onwards, a reference to the withdrawal of treatment encompasses also withholding 
treatment. The position is taken that there is no valid distinction between them in this context, and it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into debate on this issue. For support of this position see Airedale 
NHS. Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 866-7 and 875. 
19 This is expressed by statute in New Zealand; see the Crimes Act 1961 ss 158, 160 and 167. The judges in 
Re A acknowledge that the right to life is recognised in art 2 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. 
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active measures to cut short the life of a terminally ill patient. '20 The principle is 
expressed in a similar way in R v Howe, where Lord Griffiths said that 'the special 
sanctity that the law attaches to human life . . . denies . . . a man the right to take an 
innocent life'. 21 
Although active killing is prohibited, it is considered acceptable in some situations to 
make a decision not to save a person's life. The law does not impose a general duty to 
save,22 and in the medical context it has long been accepted that one 'need'st not strive 
officiously to keep alive. ' 23 Medical professionals are not obligated to do everything 
within their power to extend life as long as possible - they may sometimes decide to 
withhold life prolonging treatment from a patient, thus allowing nature to take its 
course.24 
20 Bland at 859 per Lord Keith. Bland was a case which concerned the treatment decisions of a patient, 
Anthony Bland who was in a persistent vegetative state. He would have lived for many years if tube 
feeding were sustained; however his parents and doctors decided that it was in his best interests to cease 
feeding and allow him to die, and the court agreed. 
21 R v Howe [1987] 1 AC 417 at439. 
22 For a discussion of the legal duties which arise in this case, see below, Chapter V, pp 75-83. 
23 Arthur Hugh Clough "The Latest Decalougue" in Shirley Chew ed Arthur Hugh Clough; Selected Poems, 
(1987, Carcanet) at 51. Peter Singer in Rethinking Life and Death (The Text Publishing Company, 1995) at 
194, points out that this poem has traditionally been used to justify the omission to strive to keep patients 
alive, (for example see Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at 46, where in fact 
the poem is clearly satirical of such actions, as is shown by the context of the poem: 
Thou shalt have one God only; who 
Would be at the expense of two? 
No graven images may be 
Worshipped, except the currency: 
Honour thy parents; that is, all 
From whom advancement may befall: 
Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive 
Officiously to keep alive: 
24 That they have the court's authority to do this is clear from the cases discussed below, pp 11 - 17. This is 
of course subject to any duty of care they may be under. 
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2.2 MORAL FOUNDATIONS: THE SANCTITY OF 
LIFE 
As is clear from the quotes above, in both Bland and Howe, the fundamental principle 
that underlies the prohibition on intentional killing is the sanctity ofhuman life. This is a 
good representation of the general legal approach. However what the sanctity of life in 
fact means is an easier question to ask than to answer. 
The judges who decide Re A portray the sanctity of life as centring on the concept that 
'every life has an inherent equal value.'25 Ward LJ's judgment on the issues arising in 
this chapter and the next also represents Brooke LJ' s views, and references to Ward LJ 
throughout these chapters should be read as referring to Brooke LJ also.26 Ward LJ said: 
'What the sanctity of life doctrine compels me to accept is that each life has inherent 
value in itself and the right to life, being universal, is equal for all of us.'27 Ward LJ's 
stance on these issues draws heavily on an article by John Keown. 28 Walker LJ affirms 
that 'a profound respect for the sanctity of life is embedded in our law and our moral 
philosophy',29 and acknowledges that both girls have a right to life, which Ward LJ 
rightly describes as essentially the right not to be intentionally killed. 30 Walker LJ denies 
that we can ever choose one life over another on the basis of an evaluation of those lives: 
'The notion that the court should ever undertake the evaluation of the lives of two 
innocent human beings, with a view to deciding which should live and which should die, 
25 Re A at 188. Similar sentiments can be found in Walker LJ's judgment at 243. The equal value that is 
placed on each life may be motivated by religion, a primeval instinct for self-preservation, or a combination 
of both. The theological aspect encompasses both the idea that human worth sterns from the fact that God 
created us, and also the thought that our bodies are on loan from god and that only he has the right to revoke 
that loan, and end our lives on earth. The Bible directs us that we may not kill in Exodus 20: 13. For a 
discussion on the roots of the sanctity of life principle, see Edward W. Keyserlingk Sanctity of Life or 
Quality of Life (Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1979) at 9- 18. 
26 'If this appeal had been concerned only with difficult issues of family law, I would have been content if 
the judgment of Ward LJ, with which I agree, had been issued as a single judgment of the court.' Re A at 
205 per Brooke LJ. 
27 Re A at 186. 
28 John Keown "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" (1997) 113 LQR 481 at 
485. 
29 Re A at 243 per Walker LJ citing Bland. 
30 Re A at 186. Ward LJ's analysis is drawn from John Keown's discussion. 
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could not be reconciled with the law's respect for the sanctity (or inviolability) of human 
life. ' 31 
If, as Ward LJ recognised, 'the indispensable foundation of justice is the basic equality in 
worth of every human being', 32 then the corollary is that life and death decisions cannot 
be based upon an evaluation of the worth of life; the extrinsic qualities of a particular life 
should not influence decision making.33 Ward LJ stated that '[l]ife is worthwhile in itself 
whatever the diminution in one's capacity to enjoy it and however gravely impaired some 
of one's vital functions of speech, deliberation and choice may be. ' 34 In the words of 
Brooke LJ, despite Mary having a 'useless brain, a useless heart and useless lungs', she 
still has the right to be protected by the murder laws. 35 
The judges rightly recognise that 'Mary's life, desperate as it is, still has its own 
ineliminable value and dignity. '36 If the worth of her life, or any life, were valued 
according to its extrinsic qualities, all life would not be deemed equally valuable, some 
may be considered not worth living, and, according to Ward LJ, 'any principled basis for 
objecting to intentional killing' would be forfeited.37 
Intrinsic and extrinsic considerations are mutually exclusive in this context; if the quality 
of a person's life is decisive, then what role is the intrinsic value of life playing? In a 
practical view it does nothing at all. It could be said that life has intrinsic value as long as 
31 Re A at 243. 
32 Re A at 188 per Ward LJ, quoting from the written submission of the Archbishop of Westminster. 
33 See Peter Singer Rethinking Life and Death for the promotion of an approach that recognises that the 
worth of human life varies. 
34 Re A at 188. Again, similar sentiments can be found in Walker LJ's judgment at 243. 
35 ReA at212. 
36 Re A at 188. 
37 Re A at 187. This is part of Keown's argument, which Ward LJ fmds very persuasive. However, it 
should be noted that valuing life according to individual quality would not necessarily result in a forfeit of 
any principled basis for objecting to intentional killing: It may be logical to hold that some human lives are 
more valuable than others, but that even the least valuable should be protected by law. Also it is possible 
for intentional killing to be prohibited simply to maintain coherence in our society. 
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it is of the right quality, however such sophistry undermines the very basis of intrinsic 
value; that all human life is equally valuable regardless of quality. 
2.3 THE WITHDRAWAL OF TREATMENT 
The ineliminable value of life that underlies the prohibition of active intentional killing 
should in theory similarly restrict the circumstances in which life-sustaining treatment can 
be withdrawn. This leads to the conclusion that, as Ward LJ recognises in Re A, decisions 
about whether to withdraw such treatment should always focus on the worth of treatment, 
rather than any judgement about the worth of the life in question.38 
The issue of whether life-sustaining treatment is worthwhile has been expressed in 
different ways. 39 In Re A Ward LJ acknowledges that 'in Roman Catholic moral theology 
one is justified in declining 'extraordinary' treatment where the prospective benefits of 
treatment do not clearly warrant the burdensome consequences' .40 In Bland Lord Goff 
says that '[i]t is the futility of the treatment which justifies its termination.' The decision 
may depend on whether the treatment is in the best interests of the patient.41 In deciding 
Mary's best interests Ward LJ weighs harm against benefit and considers all Mary's 
needs and interests. He applies the test expressed in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation): 
'The operation . . . will be in their best interests if, but only if, it is carried out in order 
either to save their lives, or to ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in their 
physical or mental health. ' 42 Whether life is not worthwhile, futile, extraordinary or not 
in the best interests of the patient will depend upon an evaluation ofthe patient's quality 
of life. Ward LJ agrees with Keown's statement that in order to ascertain whether the 
treatment is worthwhile, it is necessary and legitimate to 'ascertain the patient's present 
38 Re A at 187. 
39 See Edward W. Keyserlingk Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life at 107 - 118 for a discussion of the terms 
'ordinary/extraordinary' and the 'reasonable person standard'. Also see John Keown "Restoring Moral and 
Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" at 485. 
40 Re A at 187. 
41 In Bland the question is posed in terms of whether the treatment in is the patient's best interests; see for 
example Lord Keith at 959. 
42 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 55, cited in Re A at 184. 
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condition and consider whether and to what extent it would be improved by the proposed 
treatment. ' 43 
However due to this necessary focus on the quality or condition of life, it may be easy for 
an evaluation of the worth of treatment to become, in practice, an evaluation of the worth 
ofthe persons life.44 For instance, if the treatment would create an 'improvement' in the 
patient's condition, then the treatment is considered worthwhile, or in the patient's best 
interests.45 Obviously under such an approach, the decision-maker must assess the 
patient's condition to predict whether the treatment would improve that condition. 
However exactly what parts of their life are assessed, may result in either the life, or the 
treatment being judged. Take for example an extremely severely disabled patient who 
needs life saving treatment for a condition unassociated with their disability. If only the 
improvement in the condition is taken into account, clearly the decision would be based 
on a judgement of the worth of the treatment. However if all aspects of the patient's life 
are taken into account, this may result in a judgement of the worth of the patient's life: 
Some decision-makers may decide that although the particular condition is improved by 
treatment, the patient's overall condition- taking into account their extreme disabilities-
would enjoy no or minimal improvement, and therefore the treatment would not be 
justified. Such a decision would be essentially based upon a judgement that the life of 
that patient was not of a quality that is worthwhile saving. 
Bland was a case in which the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a 
patient was made on the basis of a judgement of the futility of life, rather than the futility 
of treatment. Specifically, the central issue was whether tube feeding of a patient, 
Anthony Bland, could be stopped, thus causing his death. Bland was in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS). PVS arises from the destruction of the cerebral cortex (which 
controls cognitive function and sensory capacity), but the retention of brain stem function 
43 John Keown "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" at 486; see Re A at 197 for 
Ward LJ's agreement with Keown's formulation~ 
44 Indeed some people may fmd it difficult to identify the difference between worth of treatment and of life. 
John Harris, in discussing the distinction between the assessment of the value of the treatment, and the 
assessment of the value of the person's life, found it 'astonishing that anyone should entertain this supposed 
distinction for a moment.' John Harris "Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical 
Analysis of the Judgment in Re A" (2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 221 at 225. 
45 The formulation of Keown and the test in Re F both use the term 'improve'. 
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(which controls reflexive functions of the body, such as breathing and heartbeat). A 
patient cannot be pronounced clinically dead if the brain stem continues to function, and 
therefore Bland was considered to be alive, despite the fact that he could not 'see, hear or 
feel anything ... the consciousness which is the essential feature of individual personality 
has departed for ever. '46 He had been in this state for three years following prolonged 
deprivation of oxygen as a result of injuries sustained in the Hillsborough football 
stadium disaster. He would have lived for many years if feeding were sustained. His 
parents and doctors wished to cease feeding and allow him to die. The Judges allowed 
this, acknowledging that the intention was that death should occur. They found that 
continuing the treatment (feeding) was not in his best interests, and that there was 
therefore neither a duty, nor indeed a right to continue feeding. 47 
As is well illustrated by Keown, it becomes apparent from the judgments that the judges 
consider Bland's life to be futile. Several judges express the view that 'the time has come 
when Anthony Bland has no further interest in being kept alive' .48 Lord Keith clearly 
believes Bland's life is meaningless, saying that for a time after the accident there must 
have been some hope that Bland would recover sufficiently to 'live a life that had some 
meaning'. 49 Lord Goff considered that the treatment - in Bland the provision of nutrition 
and hydration - would be futile if 'the patient is unconscious and there is no prospect of 
any improvement in his condition.' This is based on a judgement that the patient's life is 
really not worth living, which is clearly shown if the following example is considered: A 
patient, severely disabled to a degree considered intolerable to some, tube fed, but not 
terminally ill, is allowed to starve to death on the basis that the nutrition treatment would 
never lessen her disabilities. There can be no doubt that such a decision would depend on 
a judgement of the worthlessness or futility ofher life. 
46 Bland at 856. 
47 There may be problems with this case- see John Keown "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the 
Law after Bland", and J M Finnis "Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?" (1993) 109 LQR 329. However clearly 
this case represents the law, and has been applied in later cases; see NHS Trust A v M, NHS Trust B v H 
[2001] Fam 348. 
48 Bland at 898 per Lord Mustill. Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 885 echoes this sentiment, saying 'it is 
perfectly reasonable for the responsible doctors to conclude that there is no affrrmative benefit to Anthony 
Bland in continuing the invasive medical procedures necessary to sustain his life.' In a similar vein Lord 
Keith at 859 says that 'existence in the persistent vegetative state is not a benefit to the patient'. 
49 Bland at 857. 
13 
Similarly, in other cases where the courts have made a decision about the withdrawal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment on behalf of a single incompetent patient, it is evident 
that the decision making has turned on the worth of that patient's life, as assessed by the 
quality of their life. 50 
Re B51 concerned a baby born with Down's syndrome and an intestinal blockage. The 
blockage could be easily cured, but left untreated would cause death within a few days. 
Her parents refused to consent to the operation to remove the blockage. The case went to 
the High Court in the morning, and was decided by the Court of Appeal the same 
afternoon. 52 
The crucial question was 'whether the life of the child is demonstrably going to be so 
awful that in effect the child must be condemned to die'. 53 
The Court of Appeal decided that the life saving operation was in B's best interests. The 
deciding factor was that the extent of her disability could not be established until she was 
about two years old. Therefore the future quality of her life could not be established and 
she had to be put in the same position as any 'Mongol child'. Templeman J was of the 
opinion that 'it is not for this Court to say that life ... [with the quality of a normal 
mongol person] ought to be extinguished'. 54 He says that 'there may be cases, I know 
not, of severe proved damage where the future is so certain and where the life ofthe child 
is so bound to be full and pain and suffering that the court might be driven to a different 
conclusion. ' 55 This case clearly makes a treatment decision on the basis of whether the 
child's life will be worth living. 
50 See John Keown "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" at 499 - 500 for 
criticism of some of the following cases. 
51 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
52 Noted in Re A at 185, per Ward LJ. 
53 Re Bat 1424 B. 
54 Re B at 1424 E. This unlikely to indicate an opinion that the court ought not to make life and death 
decisions based upon the relative quality of life, being more likely that it simply means the judge thinks that 
'normal mongols' have a quality of life which should be given every chance of continuance. 
55 Re Bat 1424 B. 
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The same is true in Re C. C was a baby born with congenital hydrocephalus. Her 
disabilities - mental and physical - were such that she was given a prognosis of 
'hopeless'. She was made a ward of the court for unrelated reasons. The question was 
what treatment should be provided to her if 'she suffered some infection or illness over 
and above the handicaps she was already suffering'56 
Ward J in the High Court - whose general approach was approved in the Court of 
Appeal57 - directed that the doctors be given leave to treat her in such a way that allows 
her to die. 58 In Re A he assessed his approach in Re Cas containing twin strands: 'firstly 
that no treatment would alter the hopelessness of the child's position and, secondly, that 
in so far as I was able to assess the quality of life 'which as a test in itself raises as many 
questions as it can answer' I judged the quality of her life to be demonstrably awful and 
intolerable following Re B' .59 
The first strand holds that since baby C became terminally ill before she was even born, 
then treatment is not worthwhile because it could not possibly improve her condition. 
However the second strand of his approach shows unarguable judgement of the worth of 
Baby C's life. 
Re J was a case in which the court decided it was in the best interests of a baby not to be 
resuscitated if he stopped breathing. He was 'gravely damaged' but not terminally ill. 
56 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990] Fam 26 at 32. 
57 Re Cat 38. 
58 Ward J had originally 'failed to express himself with his usual felicity'; directing that 'leave be given to 
the hospital authorities to treat the ward to die; to die with the greatest dignity and the least of pain, 
suffering and distress' (my emphasis). Both formal order and Judgment contained the phrase 'treat the 
minor to die', and both were amended to 'allow her life to come to an end', and 'treat in such a way that she 
may end her life; see the Court of Appeals judgment in Re Cat 35. There are some indications in other 
withdrawal of treatment cases that the true motivation of the decision is to intentionally end those lives that 
are not considered worth saving. In Re B at 1423 Templeman J says that the question to be determined is 
whether it is in the child's interests 'to be allowed to die'. However at 1424 he says the court has to decide 
whether the child 'in effect be condemned to die', whether the life 'ought to be extinguished'. In Bland at 
881 there is also some suggestion that the purpose of the operation is to bring about death. 
59 Re A at 185. 
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It was submitted that J's quality of life had to be 'intolerable' following Re B, before the 
court could withhold treatment. The court declined to view Re B as setting down an all-
embracing test, but they seem to accept the underlying idea.60 
Lord Donaldson says: 'As this Court recognised in In re B., account has to be taken of the 
pain and suffering and quality of life which the child will experience if life is prolonged. 
Account also has to be taken of the pain and suffering involved in the proposed treatment 
itself. ' 61 Presumably he means these to be two different things, and that the first involves 
a direct evaluation of the worth of the baby's future quality of life. He applies this to the 
situation of Baby J, considering the possible distress of treatment and also the extremely 
poor quality of life at that time. The judges emphasise that how tolerable the life is should 
be judged from the point of view of the patient, not of the decision-maker. 62 
These cases show some situations where life prolonging treatment may lawfully be 
withheld.63 They are all based on an evaluation of the worth of the life in question, 
however based on these cases it is difficult to ascertain exactly when a life will be of such 
poor quality that it is unworthy of prolongation. Two categories of cases emerge; Re B, 
Re C and Re J all focus on whether the life is tolerable. It is clear that being terminally ill 
is not necessarily a decisive factor, and that levels of pain and suffering will be taken into 
account. The life of an 'ordinary mongol child' would not be considered intolerable, 
however such a child with additional disabilities may be. Bland exemplifies a different 
category of cases. Since Bland could feel nothing, the decision to allow his life to end 
could not be made on the basis that his life was intolerable to him. The key factor in 
Bland is that the life simply has no meaning any more, it is a living death- that the 
quality of Bland's life simply did not justify keeping him alive. It is probable that this 
category would include not only patients in PVS, but also those whose 'quality of life is 
no different from a person in that condition. ' 64 Another possible explanation of the 
60 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) at 46. 
61 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) at 46. 
62 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) at 46. It should be noted that in reality the prevailing 
view is the decision-makers idea of whether the life in question is tolerable. 
63 Clearly there will be many other circumstances when life-prolonging treatment may lawfully be withheld. 
64 Re G at [ 1997] 2 NZLR 201 at 211. In this case the court gave consent for life-sustaining treatment, 
including the artificial provision of hydration and nutrition, to be withdrawn from a patient, Mr G. He 
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reasoning behind the PVS cases is that being in such a condition is considered intolerable 
to the standards of the reasonable person; perhaps most people, if asked, would wish to be 
allowed to die if they were ever in Bland's position. In both categories of cases, the 
outcome is largely dependent on the individual decision-maker's interpretation ofwhether 
the life in question is worth sustaining. 65 
The decisions made in the first category of cases (and perhaps the second), are based on 
compassionate responses to people who exist in situations which are beyond what is 
humanly bearable. It may seem right to make such decisions on this basis. Indeed where 
competent people make decisions for themselves about whether to accept life-sustaining 
treatment, their assessment of the quality of their own lives is surely influential. However 
a judgement that a life is intolerable or unbearable is in this context considered equivalent 
to a judgement that a life is futile or unworthy. It is recognised that the words intolerable 
and unbearable, unlike futile and unworthy, carry the implication that the judgement is 
made out of compassion or kindness. However it would not be comforting to someone 
who is being taken off life support against their wishes, to be told that their life is not 
considered unworthy, simply unbearable. Both approaches make a judgement about 
whether treatment should be discontinued, and thus a life allowed to end, based on the 
extrinsic attributes of that life. In the name of consistency with the murder laws and the 
intrinsic value of life, a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment should not be made 
on the basis of the worth of life. If such decisions are made on this basis, a possible result 
is that this attitude may be used in other life and death situations, such as that into which 
Mary and Jodie were born. 
sustained injuries in a motor accident and was left in a state very similar to PVS. The fact that his quality of 
life was considered no different from a person in PVS, was seen as a relevant factor in the decision to 
withdraw treatment. 
65 If the decision-maker is the court, the outcome will surely be influenced by the medical opinion. In Re A, 
Bland, Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), and Re C the decision made accords with the 
prevailing medical opinion. However Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242 
should be noted. In this case a decision not to give life saving treatment was made in the face of medical 
opinion in favour of the treatment. The fact that the patient's mother, a trained medical professional, was 
deeply opposed to the treatment was considered decisive to the child's best interests. This case is further 
discussed at pp 25 - 6. 
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Ill 
MORAL POSITIONS IN RE A 
The approach to the life and death decision making that is reliant on the worth of the life 
in question, strongly influenced the outcome of Re A. This is despite the judges' 
acknowledgement that the law protecting lives from active intentional killing is based on 
the intrinsic worth of life. Throughout this thesis it will be seen that each judge makes 
value judgements about the twins' lives. Each, at different times, values life according to 
its intrinsic existence, its quality, and upon utilitarian factors, 66 which begs the conclusion 
that the girls' fate heavily depended upon the individual morality of those upon whom the 
decision fell. 
3.1 BEST INTERESTS 
This chapter will establish each judge's moral position as shown by their assessment of 
the girl's best interests. The open-ended nature of the best interests inquiry facilitates 
identification of individual approaches to valuing life. 
Throughout the common law world, when a Court decides any question about the 
upbringing of a child, that child's best interests (or welfare) is the paramount 
consideration. 67 Of the four judges who considered this tragic situation (including the 
judge in the High Court, Johnson J68), all, unsurprisingly, found that the operation was in 
66 For a discussion of utilitarianism, see Chapter V, pp 71-4. 
67 The case was brought under both the Children Act 1989 (Eng), whereby s 1(1) sets out the premise that 
the child's welfare is the paramount consideration, and the inherent jurisdiction of the court where the 
paramount consideration is the same; see Re A at 180. In New Zealand this finds form primarily ins 23 of 
the Guardianship Act 1968. 
68 Central Manchester Healthcare Trust v Mr & Mrs A and Re A Child umeported, HC Family Division, 25 
August 2000. 
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Jodie's best interests. Opinions were divided when it came to Mary. Two -Walker LJ 
and Johnson J- found that it was in Mary's best interests, while the other two -Ward and 
Brooke LJJ- decided that it was not in Mary's best interests. However Ward and Brooke 
LJJ found that they could balance the girls' interests against one another, and concluded 
that overall the operation was in the best interests of the girls. 
So the judges all concluded that the operation was allowable given the best interests of 
the girls. The different routes by which they reached this conclusion were caused by 
different approaches to valuing life being used at different times. There is conflict both 
between the judgments and within the judgments as to the basis on which life is and 
should be valued. This is evident in both the assessments ofthe girls' individual interests, 
and of their overall interests. 
3 .1.1 The girls' individual best interests 
(i) Being Mary: A fate worse than death? 
WalkerLJ 
Walker LJ largely acquiesced with Johnson J's view as to Mary's best interests. Johnson 
J found that the operation was in Mary's best interests because her continued life was not 
simply worth nothing to her, but indeed would be hurtful to her. Walker LJ says that he 
does not differ from Johnson J's conclusion that Mary's continued life would be to her 
disadvantage. 69 He states that continued life would hold nothing for Mary except possible 
pain and discomfort. 70 
In essence both Johnson J and Walker LJ are saying that the operation is in Mary's best 
interests because her life is worthless. 
69 Re A at 246. 
70 Re A at 259. 
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Walker LJ's decision that the separation is in the best interests of the girls is also due in 
large part to the fact that the operation would give each girl bodily integrity and 
autonomy. He says that the separation is in Jodie's best interests, but more 
controversially goes on to state that the 'surgery ... would be in the best interests of 
Mary also, since for the twins to remain alive and conjoined in the way they are would be 
to deprive them of the bodily integrity and human dignity which is the right of each of 
them.'71 
In support of this, Walker LJ cites72 Thomas J in Auckland Area Health Board v 
Attorney-General who said: 'Human dignity and personal privacy belong to every person, 
whether living or dying.' 73 However Thomas J said this in the context of a discussion of 
Nancy B v H6tel-Dieu de Quebec,74 a case concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment. The patient was suffering from Guillain-Barre syndrome. She was being kept 
alive by a respirator and was incapable of movement, but her mental capacity was 
unaffected and she wished to be disconnected from the respirator. Thomas J's comment 
about human dignity sprang from the idea that the invasiveness of the respiration 
treatment, the manipulation of the human body and the degradation and the pitiful 
dissolution of all bodily functions, all things that the patient did not wish to endure, 
constituted an invasion of her dignity and privacy. The sentiment expressed is 
undoubtedly true; however in the present circumstances Walker LJ uses the right to 
dignity and bodily integrity as a reason to take life, rather than a reason not to interfere 
with another person's body. 
Walker LJ is proposing that beingkilled to achieve bodily integrity is in Mary's best 
interests. He does not recognise the irony in this: Firstly, the bodily integrity that every 
person has a right to - no matter what their bodily structure75 - and which ensures 
71 Re A at 258. 
72 Re A at 258. 
73 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 at 245. 
74 Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385. 
75 Being born with an 'abnormal' physical conformation does not indicate a lesser right to bodily integrity. 
Conjoined twins may have to allow their twin to do things that would ordinarily be an invasion of bodily 
integrity. However neither their twin or anyone else is given any additional right to invade their bodily 
integrity by virtue of their physical conformation. 
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protection against invasive procedures, will be impinged upon by the separation surgery 
through which Mary will attain the bodily integrity of a singleton.76 Secondly, obtaining 
bodily integrity and autonomy is meaningless for Mary because she will never live to 
enjoy it.77 Bodily integrity is undoubtedly important even after death.78 However killing 
in order to achieve bodily integrity is quite a different matter from desiring bodily 
integrity to be maintained even after death. 
Using the attainment of 'normal' bodily integrity as a reason to kill has no precedent in 
law or medicine.79 It would involve valuing 'normal' bodily integrity above Mary's 
bodily integrity as a conjoined twin, and indeed above being alive. Bodily integrity 
would become a quality of life factor, and far from respecting the inherent equal value of 
each life, this would undermine it. 
WardLJ 
In deciding Mary's best interests Ward LJ weighs harm against benefit and considers all 
Mary's needs and interests. He agrees that the operation would only be in her best 
interests if it is carried out in order to save her life, or to ensure improvement or prevent 
deterioration in her physical or mental health. ' 80 He sees the gaining of bodily integrity 
76 Barbara Hewson shows that the judges' reasons were profoundly influenced by the 'monster factor'. The 
intolerance shown towards the twins' existing bodily integrity suggests the influence of the underlying idea 
that conjoined twins are monstrous; Barbara Hewson "Killing OffMary: Was the Court of Appeal Right?" 
(2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 281. Also see George J Annas "Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other" 
(1987) 17(2) Hastings Center Report 27 at 28. 
77 Although Mary would not benefit from bodily integrity, clearly those left behind may get some 
bittersweet satisfaction. The twins' father was reported as saying that it 'was good to hold her. It was the 
first time we could cuddle her because she was always joined. Although she was dead, she was free at that 
time.' Sandra Laville "Mary was freed by death, says father", the Internet, 
http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/main. jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2000%2F 12%2F07%2Fntwin07 .xml 
information accessed 15 April2003. 
78 As was clearly illustrated by the parent's reactions over the removal, retention and disposal of organs and 
tissues without consent from babies following post mortem examinations in Bristol Royal Infirmary and 
Alder Hey Children's Hospital in Liverpool. 
79 An example of the absurdity of this is 'an operation to straighten the spine of someone with osteoporosis 
which would kill the patient in the process'; Helen Watt "Conjoined Twins: Separation as Mutilation" 
(2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 238 at 239. 
80 Re A at 184; test drawn from Re Fat 55. 
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as a wholly illusory goal since Mary will not live to enjoy it -her ability to enjoy her 
right to life depends on her not having 'normal' bodily integrity.81 
He posed the question like this; 'is it in Mary's best interests that an operation be 
performed to separate her from Jodie when the certain consequence of that operation is 
that she will die?' 82 He recognises that one 'cannot blind oneself to the fact that death for 
Mary is the certain consequence of ... this operation. '83 He finds that the operation is 
not in Mary's best interests because her life, 'desperate as it is, still has its own 
ineliminable value and dignity. ' 84 
It may be possible that Ward LJ's approach allows for a different answer in different 
circumstances. He does in fact search (although fruitlessly) for benefits to Mary resulting 
from the operation. He talks of needs - be they 'social, emotional, psychological, or 
whatever' 85 -which may be met by the operation. If the twins were older then perhaps 
the operation could be justified as being in Mary's best interests should she draw 
psychological relief from knowing that she would not cause hbr sister's death. Further, 
there seems to be no reason for precluding the avoidance of pain and ending life with 
dignity as needs that may be met by the operation. 
However it appears from Ward LJ's judgment that such benefits would never be relevant 
to the best interests assessment when the treatment is intended to end life. He asks 
whether it is 'in Mary's best interests that an operation be performed ... when the certain 
consequence ... is that she will die', and finds that there 'is only one answer to that 
question. It is: no'. 86 
81 Re A at 184. However see below at p 31 where it is pointed out that Ward LJ uses Mary's claim to the 
dignity of independence in the balancing scales to ascertain the twins' overall best interests. 
82 Re A at 190. 
83 Re A at 184. 
84 Re A at 188. 
85 Re A at 184. 
86 Re A at 190. 
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It is evident that the different approaches to valuing life have led to different conclusions 
about Mary's best interests. Ward LJ's approach is based on the premise that Mary's life 
is inherently valuable. Conversely Walker LJ's approach is based on the worth ofMary's 
life as assessed by its qualities. Valuing life according to its quality, as Walker LJ does, 
is harmful because it shakes the very foundations upon which stand our laws against 
murder. Holding that one life is worth less than another because of incapacity or 
infirmity, and can therefore be ended, goes against the premise that each life has its own 
ineliminable value and has been described as the first step on a very dangerous road, 87 a 
road upon which Walker LJ has dared to tread, and a step which Ward LJ says he is not 
willing to take. 88 
(ii) Jodie: A life worth saving 
The question in assessing Jodie's best interests was whether life saving treatment should 
be given.89 Her chances of surviving the operation were 94 per cent.90 It was extremely 
likely that if it were carried out she would live an essentially normal, worthwhile life. 
The judges were unanimous in holding that the operation was in her best interests. 
The operation would extend Jodie's life expectancy from six months to that of any 
ordinary child - essentially saving her life. Most people would consider this an 
acceptable reason for saying that the operation is in her best interests.91 However, the 
judges go further than this and judge the value of her life - asking essentially whether her 
life is worthy of saving. 
87 Re A at 188 per Ward LJ citing Bland at 894 (AC). 
88 Re A at 188. Ward LJ clearly takes the moral high ground, yet does so on shaky premises,_given that a 
reversal of position between the judges is evident in the discussion of their overall interests, with Walker LJ 
vehemently objecting to evaluating life with a view to deciding whether it is worthy of living, and Ward LJ 
balancing the quality of one girls life against the quality of the others. See the discussion below, pp 28-34. 
89 Although this is the same question which is asked when considering the withholding of life prolonging 
treatment from a single patient, it should be noted that Jodie's situation differs somewhat: it is clear that her 
life is worth saving and the treatment is worthwhile for her, the doubt over whether to give treatment 
emerges because it will kill Mary. 
90 Re A at 164. 
91 Alternatively it could be implied that the judges value a long life more than a short life, that length of life 
is a quality factor. For a discussion on this issue see Chapter V, pp 69 -71. 
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Johnson J says that for Jodie 'separation means the expectation of a normallife'.92 'In 
medical terms Jodie's life would be virtually as long and would have the quality ofthat of 
any ordinary child' 93 . The emphasis on normality was echoed by all the court of appeal 
judges.94 
Ward LJ says that prolonging Jodie's life is of obvious benefit to her. He found that she 
would live a fairly normal life, have good intellectual functioning, every chance of 
gaining normal motor skills, satisfactory sexual functioning, and some extent of control 
over her toileting.95 He said that 'in the context of the argument which has dominated 
this case, namely the sanctity of life and the worthwhileness of life, it seems impossible to 
say that this operation does not offer greater benefit to Jodie than is offered to her by 
letting her die if the operation is not performed.' 96 
Ward LJ consistently maintains that his approach upholds the intrinsic equal value of 
each life, and it is assumed that in his analysis of Jodie's quality oflife he intends to focus 
on the worth of the treatment, not of her life. However, the difference between his 
approach and that of the other judges in this case and in previous cases is hard to see. In 
fact a quality of life assessment has real impact in Ward LJ' s decision. Like the other 
judges, he seems concerned with the fact that the operation can give Jodie a worthwhile 
life. He says that the 'doctors are convinced they can carry out the operation so as to give 
Jodie a life which will be worthwhile.' 97 This may be an echo of the doctors' sentiments, 
but Ward LJ is still using the terminology of worth, which perhaps shows his true attitude 
to valuing life. 
92 Central Manchester Healthcare Trust v Mr & Mrs A and Re A Child. 
93 Central Manchester Healthcare Trust v Mr & Mrs A and Re A Child. 
94 Re A at 205 per Brooke LJ and 245 per Walker LJ. 
96 Re A at 183. It is unclear exactly what Ward LJ intends by saying 'worthwhileness of life;~ Possibilities 
include that the sanctity of life and the worthwhileness of life are synonymous; or that this is another 
example of Ward LJ not expressing himself with his usual felicity, and he means to say worthwhileness of 
treatment; or that, most likely, he is saying that the argument is over how to value life - the sanctity of life 
(where life is considered intrinsically valuable), or the worthwhileness of life (where the worth of life is 
assessed according to its quality). 
97 Re A at 155. 
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It is understandable that the judges all focus on Jodie's potential for normality. However 
there are other factors that different decision-makers may have taken into account in 
assessing Jodie's best interests. Barbara Hewson is of the opinion that 'the Court of 
Appeal erred in concluding that killing M to save J was in J's best interests.' Her 
reasoning was based on the fact that it could 'never be in one twin's best interests 
deliberately to kill its sibling. ' 98 It is possible that there would be psychological 
consequences for Jodie from the operation - she may experience extreme loss and guilt in 
later years. This is obviously uncertain, however it is a factor that some people may find 
influential in making such a decision. 99 Another factor that could have been taken into 
account is the affect of the parents' attitude on Jodie's well being after the operation. 
They had serious misgivings about their ability to cope with Jodie's disabilities at their 
home on the Maltese island of Gozo, and spoke of leaving her behind in England. In Re T 
the views of a mother were considered decisive to her child's best interests. In this case 
C, a baby, was born with a life threatening liver condition; he would not live beyond two 
and a half years without a liver transplant. His mother, against medical advice, refused to 
give consent for the transplant, due to the pain and distress caused by such invasive 
surgery. The court took her views into account and gave the order for the treatment not to 
be given. It was stated that '[t]his mother and this son are one for the purpose of this 
u~usual case ... the welfare of this child depends upon his mother.' 100 This case was 
considered unusual because 'T.'s problems require[d] complicated surgery and many 
years of special care from the mother' .101 The mother had a deep seated concern 'as to 
the benefits to her son of the major invasive surgery and post-operative treatment, the 
dangers of failure long term as well as short term, the possibility of the need for further 
transplants, the likely length of life, and the effect upon her son of all these concerns.' 102 
The court also considered that a court order for the operation could cause financial stress 
for C's parents, and also require that at least the mother return to England103 (the family 
98 Barbara Hewson "A (Children)- cruel and unnatural" (2000) 150 NLJ 1562. 
99 This is a good example of how subjective a 'best interests' assessment can be. 
100 Re Tat 251. 
101 Re Tat 252. 
102 Re Tat 250- 1. 
103 Re Tat 252. 
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had recently moved to a 'distant Commonwealth country.l04). Similar concerns were 
raised by the parents in Re A, 105 however the court of appeal did not take these into 
account in assessing Jodie's best interests. 106 
(iii) What is wrong with judging the quality of life? 
All the judges decide that Jodie's life is worth living. Perhaps the harm in such a 
judgement is not obvious on first sight, indeed it is a far cry from allowing intentional 
active killing on the basis that a life is not worth living. However judging a life to be 
worthwhile of saving is simply the converse of judging a life unworthy of saving. It is 
true that the courts often make such decisions, 107 and often it seems the compassionate 
course of action. However the harm is clear - whether the patient's life is prolonged will 
depend on the decision-maker's idea of a worthwhile life, therefore the quality of life, not 
the inherent value of life, dictates the decision. 
Luckily Jodie had the attributes that led the judges to value her life. But what if she 
didn't? What if she was born with a 'primitive' brain similar in abnormality to 
Mary's? 108 Ward LJ says that her 'present intellectual functioning is good and there is no 
reason to think that she will not have the mental capacity fully to enjoy her life.' 
109 This 
emphasis is hardly surprising from a person who judges 'intellectual function to be a 
hallmark of our humanity', 110 that the higher functions of intellect 'make human life 
distinguishable, perhaps, from other forms of life.' lli An 'acceptable' standard of 
intellectual functioning is implicit in a normal life, referred to by all the judges. If Jodie's 
intellectual functioning fell below the standard held acceptable by these judges, the 
104 Re Tat 245. 
105 ReA at 171-3. 
106 As was noted earlier in fn 65, C's mother was a trained medical professional, which could have affected 
the courts decision. This was not the situation in Re A. 
107 As was seen in the cases discussed in the previous chapter. 
108 Or if any of the attributes the judges mentioned- for example mobility - were severely impaired. 
109 Re A at 182. 
110 Re Cat 35. 
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verdict on her best interests, and thus the result of the case may have been different. If 
life is judged on extrinsic qualities like intellectual functioning, this would surely 
undermine the intrinsic worth of life, and 'would forfeit any principled basis for objecting 
to intentional killing.' 112 
Using this approach for Jodie also highlights another problem. In the withdrawal of 
treatment cases where this approach is usually employed, the best interests assessment of 
the patient only affects the fate of that patient. However in the conjoined twin's situation, 
the assessment of Jodie's best interests affects Mary's life profoundly. 113 If the quality of 
Jodie's life is not taken into account at all in assessing her best interests, then the result 
would be consistent - the operation would be in her best interests because it will save her 
life. However, when the quality of her life is at issue, the result will depend on whether 
her life comes up to standard. If Jodie only had a life of pain and misery with little 
intellectual development to look forward to, it is possible that the treatment would not be 
considered in her best interests because her life was not worthwhile. In such a situation 
Mary's fate would depend on her sister's quality oflife. Clearly the judgement of Jodie's 
quality of life leaves no room for respecting the inherent value of either girl's life. 
3 .1.2 The girls' overall best interests 
Walker LJ's judgment on the girls' individual best interests cannot be reconciled with the 
intrinsic equal value of life, because it is based on quality of life assessments. However 
can the same be said of Ward LJ' s judgment? 
Ward LJ said that 'the sanctity of life doctrine compels me to accept that each life has 
inherent value in itself and the right to life, being universal, is equal for all of us.'
114 As 
can be seen from his approach to Mary's individual best interests, he clearly upholds the 
sanctity of life and believes that decisions cannot be made on the basis of the patient's 
111 Re Cat 34. 
112 John Keown "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" at 485. 
113 In resource constraint situations, one patient's quality oflife may affect the medical decisions made for 
another patient. It could be argued therefore that Mary's interests being affected by Jodie's quality of life is 
no different from this accepted practice. 
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quality of life. However his assessment of Jodie's interests casts doubt upon his 
consistency in his stated approach. This doubt is cemented as he goes on to assess the· 
overall interests of the twins. The practical effect of this assessment is that the judgment 
is more true to the approach that values life according to its quality, than that which 
values life because of its intrinsic worth. 
( i) Ward LJ and the balancing exercise 
Ward LJ found that separation was in Jodie's best interests, but not in Mary's best 
interests. He points out the acute conflict between the girls' interests, and their respective 
rights to life. 115 The conflicting choices indeed leave the decision-maker sitting on 'the 
sharpest horns of dilemma' .116 Yet dilemma or not this is a real situation that involves 
real children, and as Ward LJ points out, the Court has to make a decision. 
117 
Ward LJ sees the only way forward is to choose the lesser of the two evils, as ascertained 
by balancing the interests of one girl against the other. He affirms that all human life is 
intrinsically and therefore equally valuable, but he finds it is justifiable to balance the 
quality of one girl's life against the other's. He reached the conclusion that overall it was 
in the twins' best interests to be separated. 
Ward LJ strikes a balance in the following manner: 
(i) The right to life goes into each side, and the scales remain evenly balanced. 
(ii) To ascertain the worthwhileness of the treatment, one can place each girl's 
quality oflife in the scales: 'That balance is heavily in Jodie's favour.' 
(iii) It must be emphasised that in (ii) one life is not being valued above another. 
114 Re A at 186. 
115 Re A at 192. 
116 Re A at 190. 
117 Re A at 192. 
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(iv) The way they exercise their right to life must be placed in the scales.
118 
All the judges in Re A agree that the family court is frequently presented with a clash of 
interests between children, and that they balance the interests of one against the other to 
choose the least detrimental altemativeY9 However, as Ward LJ asks- is it right that 
they do so? He admits that there is no clear authority on the point; however he proceeds 
with the balancing act on the authority of the Court of Appeal's judgment in Birmingham 
City Council v H (No. 2).120 
In that case the court was presented with the conflicting interests of a mother ("M") and 
her baby ("R") - both of whom were children whose interests must be considered 
paramount under the law. M's volatile behaviour paced R's safety at risk, and he was 
placed in foster care. The issue giving rise to the case was whether to terminate contact 
between M and R, such action opposed by M and considered to be beneficial for R. The 
approach of the Court of Appeal was that the welfare of two individuals cannot both be 
paramount. It was found that the way to reach a decision was to start with an evenly 
balanced pair of scales and then weigh the things that are relevant to each child against 
each other. 121 The case proceeded to the House of Lords; however they expressed no 
view on this approach and made their decision on another basis. 122
 Ward LJ found the 
authority of the Court of Appeal at least persuasive, if not binding. However, even if 
such an approach is accepted, previous conflicts of interests have arisen only in the 
118 Re A at 196-7. 
119 Re A at 190 per Ward LJ and 242-3 per Walker LJ. 
120 Birmingham City Council v H (No. 2) [1993] 1 FLR 883. 
121 The Court of Appeal balanced the respective interests of M and R. They considered the benefits that 
contact with a birth parent could bring to a child, as well as the risks; physical harm and emotional distress 
caused by M's behaviour. It was concluded that these risks were in the short term unlikely to arise since 
contact would take place in a secure environment, but that contact was unlikely to confer any benefit on R. 
It was noted that the position might be radically changed when permanent care was found for R, dependent 
on the reactions of all the parties. It was considered that contact would be beneficial to M. Given her past 
behaviour it was thought likely that upon termination of contact with her son she may try to hurt herself. 
Also it was thought that she might benefit from seeing that her own unhappy history was not repeating in 
her son. After weighing all these factors, it was concluded that it was premature to terminate contact. See 
Birmingham City Council v H (No. 2). · 
122 Birmingham City Council v H (a minor) [1994] 2 AC 212. The House of Lords decided that only the 
interests of one child was before the court, and therefore did not have to address the question of conflicting 
interests. This has also been the approach adopted in other cases - see Re T and E (Proceedings: 
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context of decisions on matters such as residence and contact. 123 Where life is at issue 
there is no authority that this balancing exercise can be undertaken, and there are 
consequences upon the way that life must be valued. 124 
(ii) The quality assessment 
Ward LJ believes he can 'consider and place in the scales of each twin the 
worthwhileness of the treatment,' and that in doing this it is legitimate to 'bear in mind 
the actual quality of life each child enjoys and may be able to enjoy.'
125 Clearly under 
such an approach it would be possible to take a wide range of factors into account; but 
how does Ward LJ in fact assess the quality of each girl's life? 
He shortly states Jodie's position; 'the operation will give Jodie the prospects of a normal 
expectation of relatively normal life.' 126 Plainly Jodie will have a normal life both in 
quality and in length if she has the operation, but looks forward to the opposite - a short 
life of low quality - if she does not. 127 
There are three aspects to Ward LJ's assessment of Mary's condition; the length of her 
life, the manner in which she can exercise her right to life, and her claim to bodily 
integrity. 
Conflicting Interests) [1995] 1 FLR 581. Given the situation ofMary and Jodie, a similar argument would 
be unfeasible in Re A. 
123 As Walker LJ points out in Re A at 243. 
124 Andrew Bainham submitted that the 'Court's conclusion- that it must balance the welfare of one child 
against the other with the scales starting equal - is . . . a more respectable and intellectually convincing 
approach' than that taken by the House of Lords in Birmingham and by the Court of Appeal in Re T and E. 
He sees the balancing act as a principle which will have wider application in family law cases. Andrew 
Bainham "Resolving the unresolvable: the case of the conjoined twins" at 52. 
125 Re A at 196- 7. 
126 Re A at 197. 
127 Note that a different decision-maker using the same approach may have focused on the fact that Jodie 
currently has an abnormal life with a short life expectancy, and that the operation would give her a much 
better life. In such a case there would be a similar judgment of the worth of her life to that which Ward LJ 
employs, yet it would be more obvious. 
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He says that Mary 'has a full claim to the dignity of independence which is her human 
entitlement.' 128 This is contradictory to his earlier approach when he rightly said that the 
benefit in gaining bodily integrity was 'wholly illusory'. 129 
In his discussion on the way she is able to live, Ward LJ describes Mary as a parasite, 
sucking the lifeblood from Jodie. He says that 'Mary may have a right to life, but she has 
little right to be alive.' 130 He uses this factor to support the operation, emphasising the 
fact that Mary is beyond help, but that conversely Jodie can be saved. However a 
different decision-maker may have drawn different meaning from the way Mary is able to 
live. The fact that Mary can only survive joined to Jodie could be seen as a factor against 
separating them, because it takes away any chance of Mary's survival- whether that be 
for the long or short term. 
Life expectancy is a decisive factor in Ward LJ's scales of justice. He highlights Jodie's 
potential for life through his emphasis on the fact that Mary is beyond help, destined to 
die. 131 Ward LJ does acknowledge that the operation 'will shorten Mary's life', but 
immediately qualifies this by saying she 'remains doomed for death.' 132 
Clearly Ward LJ does judge the girls lives according to their quality, and suchjudgements 
are potentially very personal and arbitrary. He justifies this judgement of quality by 
referring to Keown's interpretation of the approach governing the withdrawal of life-
prolonging treatment. 133 Ward LJ denies vigorously that this involves valuing one life 
128 Re A at 197. Clearly this indicates an attitude that life as a singleton is better than life as a conjoined 
twin. For a discussion of bodily integrity see above, pp 20- 1. 
129 See above, p 21 - 2. 
130 Here Ward LJ seems to be blaming Mary, and judging her for killing her sister- this attitude is seen 
more clearly in his application of self-defence, discussed in Chapter VI. Surely a more viable way of 
looking at this situation is not that Mary is killing her sister, but that Jodie is keeping Mary alive; as Barbara 
Hewson points out, anatomically, 'Mary was not sucking anything from Jodie. Rather the reverse: Jodie's 
heart was responsible for circulating blood around both of them.' Barbara Hewson "Killing off Mary: Was 
the Court of Appeal Right?" at 294. 
131 A theme that Brooke LJ takes up in his discussion on necessity- see Chapter V, pp 64-74. 
132 Re A at 197. In ascertaining her best interests earlier in his judgment, Ward LJ emphasised the fact that 
the operation would kill Mary, without taking even mentioning the fact that she would die anyway; the 
operation will'bring her life to an end before it has run its natural span', Re A at 190. 
133 As is explained in the previous chapter, p 11 - 2. 
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over another. He maintains that the focus throughout is on whether the treatment is 
worthwhile, not whether the person's life is worthwhile, and that the sanctity of life is 
respected. Ward LJ also cites the withdrawal of treatment cases covered in the previous 
chapter as authority for his assessment of the girls' quality of life. He says that asking 
whether the treatment is worthwhile, not whether the patient's life is worthwhile, was 
essentially what the court was doing in Re J and what he was trying to do in Re C. He 
says that the same point is made in Bland where it was found that the treatment was futile 
because it was not in the best interests of the patient. However the reality is, as is shown 
in the previous chapter, that these cases make decisions upon the worth of the patient's 
life. 134 
However, even if it were accepted that the worth of the treatment is the focus in the 
withdrawal of treatment cases, it must be remembered that in Re A, considering whether 
the life prolonging treatment is worthwhile, is only half of the equation - that which 
concerns Jodie. 135 From Mary's perspective, the same approach is being used to justifY 
the giving of treatment that will kill. 136 The fact that Mary is a conjoined twin, and that 
there are two people's interests at stake, confuses this issue. So imagine child A. She is 
terminally ill. The doctors have no way of prolonging her life beyond four months. 
Should she be immediately and painlessly put to death, thus saving her from a short life 
of constant pain?137 If the approach based on the worth of treatment were used to justifY 
life ending treatment in this situation, it would be said that because A's life is so painful, 
and she is destined to die regardless, that the treatment is worthwhile. It is unlikely that 
the reasoning Ward LJ claims is used in the withdrawal of treatment cases could preserve 
any integrity in such a situation. It is very hard to maintain that the worth of the 
treatment, not of the life is being assessed, if that treatment will in fact end that life, and 
134 Ward LJ himself stated that the quality of life approach raises as many questions as it can answer; see Re 
A at 185. 
135 Johnson J at flrst instance preferred the view that the separation operation would withdraw the supply of 
oxygenated blood which Mary receives from Jodie. The situation would be analogous to withdrawal of 
treatment cases such as Bland, and considering whether life-prolonging treatment is worthwhile would be 
the question appropriate for both girls. However Johnson J's approach was rightly rejected by the Court of 
Appeal judges. 
136 The only other possibility is that the whole balancing act is concerned with the worth of treatment that 
could save Jodie's life. If this were the case, then Mary's quality of life would be sidelined- taken into 
account in the assessment of Jodie's interests, but there would be no real assessment of her own interests. 
137 The fact that this is against the law is ignored for the current purpose. 
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the treatment can only be worthwhile if the life is not considered worth living. Thus 
Ward LJ's claim that assessing the qualities ofthe girls lives in this balancing act does not 
involve any judgement about the worth of their lives, loses its power. 138 
(iii) Trading one life against another 
Ward LJ is adamant that his approach of balancing the interests of the girls against one 
another accords with the respect for the intrinsic equal value of life properly held by the 
law. But in fact the opposite appears to be the case. He asks whether 'one's right to life 
[can] be traded against another's'. 139 This is a crucial question yet he does not give a 
satisfactory answer. 140 The simple answer should be no. The sanctity principle leaves no 
room for choosing one person's life over another, no matter how that choice is made, 
because each life is inherently equal. The balancing exercise performed by Ward LJ 
offends the sanctity principle because it involves comparing one life to another, and 
essentially making a decision in favour ofthe life with the highest quality. 
When the quality of one girl's life is balanced against the others, each girl's fate depends 
not only on the decision-maker's opinion of the quality of her own life, but also on the 
assessment of the quality ofher sister's life. Each girl's life is used as a yard stick against 
which the other can be measured, their lives ranked according to their quality. 
Under Ward LJ's analysis a short life is valued less than a long one. The logical 
extension of such an approach is that those people with shorter life expectancies would 
always be sacrificed to save those people who are expected to live longer. It is possible 
that a minimal difference in life expectancy may be the difference between life and death: 
138 It may be inferred from his judgment that Ward LJ is aware of this problem in the assessment of the 
quality ofMary's life. Theoretically, given the approach he took to assessing Jodie's life, which is based on 
quality of life judgments, Ward LJ should have made a similar assessment of the quality ofMary's life. He 
could have said that Mary at present looked forward to a short abnormal life, and if the operation were 
performed she would have no life. However Ward LJ does not directly assess the quality ofMary's life to 
the extent that he is entitled under his chosen approach. 
139 Re A at 190. 
140 All he does to answer this question is to pre-empt the objection by reiterating that he is not considering 
the worth of one life compared with the other. Note that the very fact he asks this question indicates that 
this is in fact what he is doing - trading one life against another. 
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Could we still kill Mary to save Jodie if Jodie would only live two more months? Would 
it be acceptable to sacrifice Mary for Jodie if Mary had two years to live, and Jodie 
ten?l41 
A key part of Ward LJ's analysis is that Jodie has the potential to develop into a normal 
woman. Yet if Jodie had severe intellectually and physically disabilities, and her life was 
expected to be of intolerable quality to some decision-makers, it may be considered equal 
in worth to Mary's. This would affect the balancing exercise and perhaps Mary's fate; in 
terms of Ward LJ's trade off of one life against another, the odds would be more even. 
Ward LJ asserts and reasserts that in performing the balancing exercise he is not 
comparing the worth of one life with another; he places the right to life in each side of the 
scales, and states that the girls' lives are of equal intrinsic value. 142 However, stating the 
intrinsic value ofthe girls' lives is not enough. It is simply lip service, embarrassed by its 
very use within a balancing exercise, and by the subsequent evaluation of the quality of 
lives. It is difficult to see any effect in stating the intrinsic value of the girls' lives. The 
inherent good in each life cancels each other out, and we are simply left with quality 
compansons. This is indicated by the clear separation between intrinsic value and 
quality of life considerations. Section (i) in the balancing act upholds the intrinsic value 
of each girl's life, whereas (ii) is the main exploration of the quality of their lives. 
Despite the fact that Ward LJ emphasises the inherent value of life, on a practical basis he 
is in fact undermining the intrinsic value of life, and judging the worth of lives according 
to their quality. In the words of Walker LJ: 
The notion that the court should ever undertake the evaluation of the lives 
of two innocent human beings, with a view to deciding which should live 
and which should die, could not be reconciled with the law's respect for 
the sanctity (or inviolability) ofhuman life. 143 
141 This approach is made even more arbitrary by the fact that how long a person will live is never certain. 
For a more extensive examination of the length oflife issue, see Chapter V, pp 69- 71. 
142 Re A at 197. 
143 Re A at 243. In this issue Walker LJ takes over Ward LJ's role of proclaiming the high moral ground. 
He is able to do this because since he found that the twins' best interests do not conflict, he has no need to 
fmd that it is lawful to balance their interests against one another. But Walker LJ is revealed as hypocritical 
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3.2 WHAT IS A LIFE OF WORTHY QUALITY? 
All the judges in Re A, and those in the withdrawal of treatment cases explored in the 
previous chapter, assess the quality of life in order to make a decision. There are some 
practical difficulties that arise from this approach. In any quality of life assessment, 
whether there be one life involved or two, there must be some benchmark or threshold 
below which life is not of sufficient value to be sustained. The quality of life stretches on 
a continuum, where and how the benchmark of a worthwhile life is placed, is crucial. 144 
Ward LJ himself points out the analytical difficulty of determining what may be taken 
into account in the balancing exercise, and what weight to give to each factor. 145 No 
definitive guidelines as to what quality factors may be taken into account in future cases 
can be drawn from Ward LJ's judgment. 146 It seems that life expectancy will play an 
important part in deciding who is to be saved and who is to be killed. Yet levels of 
'normality' of life are also influential, and it is possible that tP. a different situation 
considerations of normality may override life expectancy factors. There is huge scope for 
the influence of the decision-maker's discretion. Ward LJ refers to 'my scales of fairness 
and justice,' 147 and it is clear that what is placed in his scales may differ markedly from 
what is placed in yours or mine. Potentially any quality factor could be taken into 
account. 
Clearly allowing extrinsic criteria to enter the method of valuing life unrestricted has a 
dangerous potential for exploitation. 148 However, it is likely that such criteria would be 
by his earlier approach to Mary's best interests where he judged her life upon its quality, and by his later 
approach to lawfulness - see Chapters IV and V. 
144 Keown criticises the approach based on quality judgements because it 'engages in discriminatory 
judgments, posited on fundamentally arbitrary criteria ... about whose lives are "worthwhile" and whose 
are not.' John Keown "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" at 487. 
145 Re A at 196. 
146 Indeed it may be undesirable and impossible to do so. 
147 Re A at 197, my emphasis. 
148 It could create a breeding ground for eugenics or genocide. This is illustrated by the Nazi attitude 
towards the value of life in WWII. The concept of "life unworthy of life" used by the Nazis to justify the 
killing millions of innocent people in WWII, was derived from the work by two German professors. This 
work defended the theory that worthless people - such as those who were mentally and physically 
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based upon a compassionate decision about which lives were bearable and which were 
not. 149 Yet even in that case, the problem would still remain; how would a decision-
maker know when a particular quality of life is sufficient to support a finding that the life 
is worthwhile? 
... the point at which life becomes "worthless," and the point at which the 
means necessary to preserve it become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," 
are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of 
this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random 
from the Kansas City telephone directory ... 150 
Where the standard of a worthless life should be set is obviously going to be an extremely 
difficult question to answer with any uniformity across the medical and legal professions, 
and across society. It is obviously open to the influence of individual ideas. Potentially 
any quality factor could be given whatever weight the decision-maker sees fit, and could 
thereby deny the worth of lives that do not meet their privileged hopes and 
expectations. 151 
It would be better to base decisions upon policies, which concur with societies views, 
rather than upon the individual intuitions of decision-makers. 152 The objective 
'reasonable person' test could be employed here to ascertain a general view. In deciding 
whether the exception would allow life prolonging treatment in a particular example, 
Keown speaks of 'a fair measure, that is, one commonly used by people in relation to 
their own situation - the benefits promised by the treatment . . . would significantly 
outweigh any burdens' 153 Yet what is this fair measure; what is the point at which the 
handicapped - should be killed, and regarded the killing of these segments of society as a "healing 
treatment"; Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens (F. 
Meiner, 1920). Fear of a regime similar to the Nazis, and basic respect for humanity, is likely to ensure that 
any guidelines would not encompass considerations of race or social utility. 
149 This is most likely, given that already some people, in the name of compassion, practise euthanasia on 
their loved ones. 
15° Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990) 497 US 261 at 293; cited in Re A at 155. 
151 For example, a decision-maker who is an elite athlete may decline to give a person paralysed from the 
neck down life prolonging treatment, on the basis that treatment is not worthwhile because the life to be 
endured would be of an unbearable quality. 
152 This would guard against personal prejudice and the influence of the interests of the family or of society. 
153 John Keown "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" at 487. 
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reasonable person would consider that life is of such a poor quality that it should not be 
prolonged? There seems to be no consensus on the question of when it is better to die, 
indicating perhaps that establishing the 'reasonable person view' on this issue is an 
impossible task. 154 
A life that is not worth living may be a concept that has to be built up gradually as cases 
are decided. Some guidelines can be extracted from the existing case law. 155 Various 
withdrawal of treatment cases establish that life must be intolerable, however, what 
makes life intolerable will differ for different people. Re A gives some guidance on the 
standard of life worth living: Clearly Jodie's life is worth living, due to its potential 
normality. Equally clearly Mary does not. Walker LJ openly judges that Mary's life is 
not worth living, largely because of the level of pain and discomfort she had to bear. All 
three judges believed that Mary, if she were a singleton, would not have been given life 
support, or ifit had been given, it would have been withdrawn shortly after. 156 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
As Ward and Brooke LJJ acknowledge, there was clearly a conflict between the best 
interests of the girls. The operation was not in Mary's best interests because it would kill 
her, while Jodie's best interests would lie in the performance of the operation because it 
would save her life. This conflict, as is evident from the judgments, makes it extremely 
difficult to resolve the situation. 
However, difficult though resolution may be, in this situation, which could give rise to the 
deliberately inflicted death of an individual, the primary guiding principle must be that 
each life has intrinsic equal value. Despite the conflict of interests, this principle could 
determine resolution. If the sanctity of life had been respected properly, the operation 
separating Mary and Jodie would not have been performed. Acting in Mary's best 
154 Ronald Dworkin discusses the various attitudes that different people have to life and death; Ronald 
Dworkin Life's Dominion (HarperCollinsPublishers, 1993) at 199 - 213. 
155 See the previous chapter, pp 11 - 7. 
156 Re A at 171, 239 and 246. 
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interests by performing the operation would be an act of intentional killing, which would 
infringe the sanctity oflife, conversely, acting in accordance with Jodie's best interests by 
not operating would be consistent with the sanctity of life. 
It could be argued that if the operation were not carried out, Mary's life must be valued 
more than Jodie's. However, the principle of the sanctity of life does not require that 
everyone who can be saved must be saved, it does not direct that a person must be saved 
regardless that this can only be done by killing another person. Surely the stronger 
argument is that if the operation is not performed, this would enable life to take its natural 
course, no life would be deliberately ended, and the sanctity of life would not be 
infringed. 
Properly respecting the sanctity of life was not the path followed by any of the judges in 
the present case. Instead, at times, they measure the worth of each life according to its 
quality. They do not go as far as saying that people whose lives are not worthy can be 
killed. However in practice, the deliberate ending of Mary's life was considered 
allowable because of judgements about the worth ofher life, and Jodie's life. 
There are indications in the judgment of Ward LJ 'that the 'intolerability' quality of life 
oriented approach to welfare and treatment ... must be replaced with a more sensitive 
analysis that acknowledges the equal worth of every life in principle' 157. However, as this 
chapter reveals, in practice Ward LJ's approach is no more mindful of the sanctity of life 
than the approaches of Walker LJ or Johnson J. 158 It is even possible that his approach is 
more harmful, simply because if the quality assessment is masked, it is less likely to be 
subject to criticism, making it more likely that the prejudices of the individual decision-
maker will be influential. Given the significant rights at issue, and the difficulty of the 
situation, it is essential for the decision to be made in a transparent manner. Perhaps a 
157 David Bumet "Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) Conjoined twins, sanctity and quality of life, 
and invention the mother of necessity" (2001) 13(1) CFLQ 91 at 97- 8. 
158 As Charles Foster says: 'The court has shown itself prepared to weigh one life against another. 
Although Ward and Brooke LJJ tried to avoid language which suggested that the value of a human life 
consisted in an outside observer's assessment of its worth and likely duration, there is no escaping the fact 
that two short, frustrating and possibly painful lives have been found in a fundamental way to be worth less 
than one normal, relatively long life.' Charles Foster "Rocks and Hard Places" (2000) 144 SJ 922 at 923. It 
is doubtful whether Ward LJ's approach is on an operative level any different from that employed by 
Walker LJ. Indeed in the Australian conjoined twins case Queensland v Nolan at [15], Walker LJ's 
approach on best interests is equated with that of the other judges. 
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frank summary of the judgments on the best interests issue, is that in these extreme 
circumstances a long, potentially normal life is of more value than a short, abnormal life. 
The approach taken to valuing life in this case is important not only in England. Other 
common law countries find English case law very good guidance on best interests and 
end of life decisions. 159 In the Australian case of Queensland v No/an, the approach of 
the judges in Re A on the best interest issue was accepted without question. 
This chapter has shown that although the judges acknowledge that each life has equal 
intrinsic worth, this is undermined in their assessment of the girls' best interests, which 
rests upon judgements about the quality and worth of their lives. As will be seen in 
Chapters IV, V and VI, the acknowledgement that each life is intrinsically valuable is 
equally uninfluential upon the issue of whether the operation was unlawful. 
159 For example, see Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd v L (1998) 17 FRNZ 376 at 381. 
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IV 
KILLING BABY MARY: 
WAS IT UNLAWFUL? 
It is well established, and acknowledged in the present case, that the lives of all innocent 
people are considered equally valuable and given equal protection in law against 
intentional killing. However because the actual approach taken to the value of the girls 
lives in the best interests assessment was based on quality assessments, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that all of the judges went on to justify the killing of Mary. As will become 
evident from this chapter and those following, each judge followed a unique and 
. questionable route to proclaiming that the separation operation was within the law. 
The operation could only be lawful if the requirements of murder160 were not met, or if it 
were properly justified by some defence. 
4.1 ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF MURDER 
MET? 
To be murder, the operation resulting in Mary's death would have to be both the cause of 
her death, and intended to cause her death. 161 In England murder is a common law 
160 Here I am not concerned with whether it may constitute some other criminal offence, or with any 
possible civil liability. 
161 Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, ed in chief Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edn reissue, 
Butterworths, 1990) volll(l) para 426. 
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offence. Although in New Zealand the offence IS created by statute, the basic 
requirements are for current purposes the same. 162 
4.1.1 Ward and Brooke LJJ 
Ward and Brooke LJJ apply the law in an orthodox and straightforward manner on these 
points, and come to reasonable conclusions. 
They hold that 'the operation will be an active invasion of Mary's body and by that act 
the doctors will kill her.' 163 Ward LJ acknowledges that in one sense she will die because 
she is simply incapable ofliving. However he concludes by saying: 'I do not see how, in 
law, the severance of the artery will not be treated as a cause of her death' 164 
On the issue of intention Ward and Brooke LJJ both apply the test set in R v Woollin. 165 
Where 'a man realises that it is for all practical purposes inevitable that his actions will 
result in death or serious harm, the inference may be irresistible that he intended that 
result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen.' 166 They conclude that 
'an English court would inevitably find that the surgeons intended to kill Mary' .167 
4.1.2 Walker LJ 
Walker however takes a different stance from the other judges. There is some doubt as to 
exactly why he justifies the operation. It is clear that he would apply the defence of 
necessity to the situation, as is discussed in the following chapter. However it is also 
162 See the Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand), ss 158, 160 and 167. 
163 Re A at 199 per Ward LJ; see also 215 per Brooke LJ. 
164 Re A at 199. 
165 R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82. 
166 Woollin at 96, quoting from R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 at 1028. Note that all the judges reject the 
argument that art 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 requires a change to the defmition of intention; Re A at 198 per Ward LJ, 238 per Brooke 
LJ, 256- 7 per Walker LJ. 
167 Re A at 216 per Brooke LJ; see also 199 per Ward LJ. 
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possible to conclude from his judgment that he finds the requirements of murder are not 
met. 168 His final sentence is that 'Mary's death would not be the purpose or intention of 
the surgery, and she would die because tragically her body, on its own, is not and never 
has been viable.' 169 
Although what basis he claims this on is unclear, in this context he does discuss the 
doctrine of double effect, necessity, and the principle that the bona fide exercise of a 
doctor's clinical judgment is a negation of the guilty mind. 
(i) The doctrine of double effect 
The doctrine of double effect instructs that it is morally permissible to take action for a 
good purpose, despite the fact that the good purpose cannot be achieved without negative 
consequences. It is used to validate the giving of large doses of painkillers to terminally 
ill patients, despite the fact that it may shorten their life. 170 
This doctrine, which has been described as 'morally questionable', 171 has found some 
favour in the courts. In Re J Lord Donaldson said that 'the use of drugs to reduce pain 
will often be fully justified, notwithstanding that this will hasten the moment of death.' 172 
In Bland Lord Goff spoke of the 'established rule' that life shortening palliative care was 
justified. He says that because it is in the patient's best interests then the treatment will 
168 Re A at 258- 9. It is unclear whether Walker LJ fmds the requirements of murder are not met, or that 
they are met but for some reason the crime is not blameworthy. Due to the fact that he does go on to 
discuss necessity and fmds it applies, it may be more likely that the second option is correct. 
169 It is possible that Walker LJ is treating 'purpose' and 'intention' as identical concepts. However as can 
be seen from the discussion above, intention is the crucial concept in establishing liability, and a result can 
be intended regardless of whether it is the desire or purpose of the action taken. 
17° For some discussion of this doctrine see Philippa Foot "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of 
Double Effect" in Philippa Foot Virtues and Vices (Basil Blackwell, 1978) at 21; and Suzanne Uniacke 
"Was Mary's Death Murder?" (2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 208 at 217-220. Also see John Finnis "Intention 
and side-effects" in RG Frey and Christopher W Morris eds Liability and Responsibility: Essays in law and 
morals (Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 32- 64. 
171 Mirko Bagaric states that Walker LJ invokes the 'morally questionable' doctrine of double effect as the 
basis for declaring that the operation would not be unlawful; Mirko Bagaric "The Jodie and Mary (Siamese 
Twins) Case: The Problem with Rights" (2001) 8 JLM 311 at 319. 
172 Re J at 46. 
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be lawful, and that 'the patient's death will be regarded in law as exclusively caused by 
the injury or disease to which his condition is attributable.' 173 
So the doctrine of double effect may 'avoid' the requirement of intention, or establish that 
the action is lawful and thus negate the action as the cause. Walker LJ says that in 
situations such as the giving of painkillers, double effect prevents the doctor's foresight 
from counting as guilty intention. 174 This is despite his acceptance of the formulation of 
intention in Woollin, where, he holds, nothing is said about the doctrine of double 
effect. 175 
Ward and Brooke LJJ do not decide authoritatively on the operation of this principle. 
Walker LJ seems to think that the principle is good law, and given the dicta in previous 
cases, it appears that it would be accepted in life shortening palliative care situations. 176 
However, it is very doubtful that it is applicable to this situation. 
Application to Mary's situation177 
If the doctrine of double effect were to justify the operation on Mary, the negative effect 
is obvious - it would cause her imminent death. However it is harder to pin down a 
positive effect for Mary. 
173 Bland at 867; see 895- 6 per Lord Mustill for a discussion on the illogic of the causation submission put 
forward in that case. 
174 Re A at 251. 
175 Re A at 251. However surely an argument may be made that accepting the doctrine of double effect is 
contrary to the generally accepted defmition of intention which encompasses foresight. Denise Fitzpatrick 
asserts that the doctrine of double effect 'does not apply when the undesired consequence is a moral 
certainty which the law takes to be intended.' Denise Fitzpatrick "Right to Life: Is it Just to End the Life 
of One Siamese Twin to Enable the Other to Live?" (2001) 165 JPN 247 at 248. 
176 In situations where the negative effect is accelerated death, as in the painkiller cases, surely applying the 
doctrine of double effect offends the sanctity of life because the quality of life is considered more important 
than simply being alive. Also, it is possible that the doctrine of double effect could be used to justify the 
administration of pain relief intended to end the life of the patient, rather than to ease their pain. 
177 The doctrine could be applied to Jodie; the negative effects -the trauma of operation, the difficulties 
encountered in recovery, and being separated from her twin, would be foreseen but not intended, the true 
purpose and positive effect being to save her life. But this application really is of no consequence because 
proving the doctors are protected from liability in this way would not mitigate their responsibility for 
Mary's death. 
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Walker LJ says that double effect 'cannot be relevant to conduct directed towards Mary 
unless the mere fact of restoring her separate bodily integrity, even at the moment of 
death, can be seen as a good end in itself and as something which ought to be achieved in 
the best interests of Mary as well as Jodie.' He does not reach a conclusion on this, 
however it could be construed that because in his judgment he does place great weight on 
the fact that she would obtain bodily integrity, 178 his logical conclusion should be that 
double dilemma applies. 
Ward and Brooke LJJ reach a more appealing conclusion in their finding that the doctrine 
of double effect is not applicable to the proposed operation on Mary. Ward LJ finds that 
'the treatment cannot have been undertaken to effect any benefit for Mary.' 179 Brooke LJ 
holds that 'by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that the surgeons would be 
acting in good faith in Mary's best interests' .180 
If we accept however that gaining bodily integrity is a viable positive effect, a problem 
arises out of the condition on double effect that, 'the good effect is not produced through 
the bad effect' .181 This condition is implicit in the doctrine. It would be nonsense to hold 
that one intended a good effect but not a bad effect, if the good effect could only be 
produced from the bad. 182 
However in some situations it may be unclear whether the bad effect is strictly a means to 
produce the good effect, or should simply be treated as a foreseen and unwanted effect. 
Philippa Foot addressed this point using the story 'of the fat man stuck in the mouth of a 
cave.' 183 Several people are trapped in the cave behind him and floodwaters are rising. 
They have a stick of dynamite, and can either save themselves by blasting the man out of 
178 See Chapter III, pp 20 -1. Note however that the gaining of bodily integrity is only one factor which 
Walker LJ relies on. 
179 Re A at 199. 
180 Re A at 218. 
181 Re A at 199. 
182 See Suzanne Uniacke "Was Mary's Death Murder?" at 219- 220; George J Annas "Siamese Twins: 
Killing One to Save the Other" at 28. 
183 Philippa Foot "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect" at 21. 
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the mouth ofthe cave, or allow themselves to drown. Would killing the man blocking the 
cave entrance be justified under the doctrine of double effect? The positive effect would 
be that the trapped people would be saved. But is the negative effect - the mans death -
the means to producing this, or is it viable to say it is not the means, the trapped people 
did not intend his death, only to blow him to pieces, or even to blow him out of the cave? 
Foot rightly rejects that this situation could justify an application of the doctrine - the 
killing of the man is the only means to clearing the cave entrance, and cannot be properly 
distinguished from the fact of blowing him up. Yet Foot, again rightly, acknowledges 
that it would be very difficult to explain where the line is to be drawn between situations 
where the bad effect is strictly a means to produce the good effect, and situations where 
the bad effect should be treated as simply foreseen but unwanted. 
In the palliative care example, clearly the good purpose (pain relief) is achieved by the 
conduct in question (giving a large dose of medicine), not from the death of the patient. 
In the present situation, is the good effect - giving Mary bodily integrity, only able to be 
produced from the bad effect - Mary's death? It may be argued that bodily integrity 
arises from the separation surgery, not from Mary's death, which is simply an unwanted 
consequence of the operation. However, can her killing really be distinguished from the 
operation? Can it be said that they did not intend to kill her, only to separate her from 
Jodie, to separate her from her source of oxygen? As in Foots example, this is unviable; 
it would be like saying that the people in the cave only intended to move the fat man from 
the mouth of the cave, when this could not be done without killing him. The separation 
surgery is so closely linked with Mary's death that double effect is unlikely to be 
applicable, even if bodily integrity were accepted as a viable positive effect. 184 
If such an illusory positive effect as gaining bodily integrity in death were adequate to 
invoke the doctrine of double effect, other flimsy positive effects may also suffice. 
Perhaps the fulfilment of the right to autonomy may be enough to justify voluntary 
euthanasia, the preservation of human dignity or the elimination of suffering suffice to 
184 This point is of course arguable. It could be said that the good effect does not depend on the bad effect-
it only depends on the separation; the good effect will still happen whether or not there is a miracle and 
Mary lives. It may also be argued that the only reason that death here is seen as a means to achieve bodily 
integrity is that they would happen almost simultaneously, and that the timing should not be determinative; 
what if the action would have a good effect now, but would cause death in a few hours, days, weeks, or 
years? There may be a few seconds where Mary enjoys bodily integrity before she dies. However that is 
unlikely to be enough to establish that her bodily integrity arises from the surgery, but not from her death. 
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justify involuntary euthanasia? The latter two would probably not be allowed because 
these positive effects can only be achieved through the negative effect - death. However, 
the bestowing of autonomy comes before the death - autonomy is arguably gained when 
the patient is given the choice of whether they want to die, not by the death itself, and 
could possibly give rise to an application of the doctrine. 185 
Application when the effects are upon two different people 
Walker LJ talks of two classes of case where the dilemma of double effect may arise. 
The first is discussed above - where the good and bad effects are directed at the same 
person. The second is where the effects are upon different people. Such an application 
may arise in the conjoined twins' situation where the good effect is that Jodie's life is 
saved and the bad effect is Mary's death. Walker LJ says that if a person 'acts with the 
intention of saving his own life (or the life of others) it may be said that that leaves no 
room for guilty intention to harm or even kill the third person.' 186 Another way of putting 
this, according to Walker LJ is that although the person must '(on R v Woollin principles) 
be taken to have intended the death which he foresaw as virtually certain, he has a 
defence of necessity.' 187 Walker LJ goes on to discuss the doctrine of necessity, not 
following through on this application of double effect. 
Ward LJ failed to see how the doctrine could apply when the side-effect to the good cure 
for Jodie is another patient's, Mary's, death' .188 Similarly Brooke LJ did not consider 
that 'this method of applying the doctrine of double effect would have any prospect of 
acceptance in an English court.' 189 
Instinctually it does seem wrong to apply the doctrine when the effects are upon two 
different people. Yet it is hard to find any logical reason for avoiding such an extension. 
185 Of course issues concerning the sanctity of life would also arise. 
186 Re A at 252. 
187 Re A at 252. 
188 Re A at 199. 
189 Re A at 218. 
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It may be argued that to do this would involve valuing one life over another, and that this 
would therefore undermine the inherent equal value of each life. However if the doctrine 
is applied to a single person with the negative effect of hastening death, it could similarly 
be argued that the inherent value of life is undermined because quality of life is 
considered more important than actual existence. Such an argument may not be 
persuasive since the application of the doctrine to justify life shortening palliative care is 
established and accepted in our society. 
Suzanne Uniak:e says that 'the doctrine of double effect does not require that the intended 
good effect and the foreseen bad effect happen to one and the same individual. On the 
contrary, the doctrine has its origins in Aquinas's justification of homicide in self-
defence, where the use of lethal force in self-defence clearly benefits and harms different 
people.' 190 In the well-known Catholic justification of action to save a pregnant woman's 
life which will kill the foetus, 191 the doctrine is similarly applied to a situation where the 
good and the bad effects are not related to one person. The good effect benefits the 
mother- saves her life - and the bad effect - the killing- applies to a different 'being', 
the unborn child. 
Regardless of whether we reach the conclusion that the doctrine can be applied when the 
effects are upon two different people, it is not applicable here because the bad effect -
Mary's death, is the means to achieving the good effect- saving Jodie's life. It is difficult 
to distinguish Mary's killing from the operation. The natural interpretation of the 
situation is that Mary's death is the means by which Jodie's life can be saved. 
(ii) Bona fide exercise of clinical judgment 
Walker LJ maintains that Mary's death would not be caused by the separation surgery, 
nor would it be the intention of such surgery. One possible ground for holding this - the 
application of the doctrine of double effect, has been discussed above and found wanting 
190 Suzanne Uniacke "Was Mary's Death Murder?" at 219. See also Suzanne Uniacke Permissible Killing: 
The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide (Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 92- 155. 
191 See Glanville Williams The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Faber and Faber, 1958) at 177 - 8. 
See also Philippa Foot "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect". 
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in this situation. However there is a second basis upon which Walker LJ made this claim. 
It is founded upon the principle set out in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority, that the 'bona fide exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgment must be 
a complete negation of the guilty mind' .192 Walker LJ says that this is applicable to the 
'wholly exceptional case of these conjoined twins' .193 
Walker LJ refers to the Court of Appeal judgment in Bland where Bingham MR said that 
a doctor who 'discontinues artificial feeding of a P.V.S. patient ... in pursuance of a 
conscientious and proper judgment that such discontinuance is in the patient's best 
interests, is ... guilty of no crime. ,t94 Bingham MR was of the opinion that it did not 
greatly matter whether 'one simply says that that is not an unlawful act, or that the doctor 
lacks criminal intent, or that he breaches no duty or that his act did not cause death.' 195 
According to all the three judges who decided the conjoined twins' case, the operation 
was allowable in terms of the girls' best interests. 196 This, together with the fact that the 
doctors treating the twins were united in support of the operation, 197 indicates that the 
court would consider the doctors decision to perform the operation a bona fide exercise of 
clinical judgment.198 So on first sight it appears logical to accept Walker LJ' s application 
of this principle to confer immunity upon the surgeons in this case. However this 
situation, unlike the circumstances in Gillick, 199 involves the active intentional killing of 
an innocent person, which is prohibited by law for all people, including doctors. 
192 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112 at 190. 
193 Re A at 258. 
194 Bland at 815. 
195 Bland at 815. 
196 It does not make a material difference here that Ward and Brooke LJJ did not think it was in Mary's 
individual best interests. 
197 As far as can be established from the judgements in Re A. 
198 It is interesting to note that Ward LJ may also consider not performing the operation a bona fide exercise 
of clinical judgment. He accepted that it would have been a 'perfectly acceptable response' for the hospital 
to act in accordance with the parent's wishes in this case and to not perform the operation; that 'there could 
not have been the slightest criticism of them for letting nature take its course'. Re A at 173. 
199 Gillick involved the supply of contraceptives and advice from a doctor to a girl under the age of sixteen 
without parental consent. 
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It may be argued that in Bland the exercise of proper clinical judgment led to the 
justification of intentional killing. The judges in that case do admit that the death must be 
intended. However withdrawal of treatment was under consideration there, something 
which has long been allowed under our law. As was set out in Chapter II, allowing the 
fatal withdrawal of treatment often undermines the sanctity oflife,
200 especially so in this 
case, because no pretence is made that the intent is anything other than to cause death. 
The reasoning in Bland is a result of the approach taken in the withdrawal of treatment 
cases.201 However if the conjoined twins' situation were sanctioned on a similar basis, as 
it appears Walker LJ is advocating, this would logically lead to allowing medical 
euthanasia, or the compulsory harvesting of organs from terminally ill patients.
202 
Re A involves an act intended (in the legal sense) to kill, and rejecting the application of 
the 'bona fide' principle to these circumstances preserves the integrity of the murder laws, 
and protects against the expansion of situations where active killing is allowable. Ward 
LJ expresses a sound view, saying that 'whatever immunity doctors do enjoy, they have 
no complete immunity.' Hanging over this case is the 'spectre of murder' and not even 
the claim of bona fide exercise of clinical judgment can negate liability in these 
circumstances for an act which will foreseeably result in death. 
Walker LJ puts forward two possible avenues by which it may be held that the 
requirements of murder are not met. As has been shown above, neither is persuasive. It 
is possible that Walker LJ himself is aware of this, since he goes on to explore and apply 
the defence of necessity, an exercise that would be unnecessary if the requirements of 
murder were not fulfilled. 
200 This is because it necessarily involves judging lives upon their quality. 
201 See Chapter II. 
202 It would need to be proved that such actions were in the patients best interests; in euthanasia cases 
Walker LJ's approach could be applied, and for killings involving organ donations, Ward LJ's approach to 
best interests could be adopted. In Re A at 258 Walker LJ does attempt to limit the application of the 
principle by saying that it applies in the 'wholly exceptional case of these conjoined twins'. However it is 
questionable whether there is anything exceptional about this case which is relevant. 
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4.2 SURGICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
AUSTRALASIA 
In Queensland v Nolan, the case concerning Australian conjoined twins Alyssa and 
Bethany, a similar sort of approach to Walker LJ's 'bona fide' principle was adopted as 
one of the reasons for the conclusion that the operation was legal. 203 However in 
Queensland the criminal law is set out in statute, not governed by the common law.204 
Section 282 of the Queensland Criminal Code provides that: 
A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good faith and 
with reasonable care and skill a surgical operation upon any person for the 
patient's benefit, or upon any unborn child for the preservation of the 
mother's life, if the performance of the operation is reasonable, having 
regard to the patient's state at the time and to all the circumstances of the 
case.205 
Chesterman J held that the section applied to the situation where the patient and the 
person were two different people. In this situation Alyssa could be regarded as the 
patient, and Bethany as the person upon whom the operation was being performed. He 
said that it 'may be taken as certain that Sir Samuel Griffith did not have the present sort 
of case in mind when drafting that section but his terms are wide enough to encompass 
it. ,206 
However as Colleen Davis points out in her comment on the case, the original wording of 
the section was not, 'upon any person for the patient's benefit', but rather 'upon a person 
for his benefit'. Apparently it was recently changed 'as part of the process removing 
sexist language from the Code. '207 The original purpose of the section was to justify 
'what would otherwise be a criminal assault on a patient where, inter alia, the surgical 
203 The other reason it was held legal was the conflict oflegal duties; see Chapter V, pp 80- 3. 
204 The Queensland Criminal Code sets out the criminal law. For the provisions governing murder, see ss 
291, 293, 300 and 302. 
205 The Australian approach is not as wide-ranging as Walker LJ's, as it applies only to surgical operations. 
206 Queensland v No/an at [24]. Sir Samuel Griffith was the draftsman of the Code. 
207 Colleen Davis "Case and Comment; Nolan" (2001) 25 Crim L J 348 at 350. 
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intervention is for that patient's 'benefit'. ' 208 It is unlikely that the change in wording 
was intended to alter the effect of the section. 209 
Chesterman J also emphasises that the section expressly covers one situation where the 
loss of a life (of the unborn child), is justified to save another life (that of the mother). 
Presumably he sees this as support for the fact that the section may cover other situations 
where a fatal operation is performed on one person for the benefit of another. However 
as Davis points out, the principles of statutory interpretation indicate the specific 
inclusion of one means the other is intended to be excluded.Z10 
If we do accept that the section can apply to this type of situation, the requirements of the 
section must still be fulfilled.Z 11 It is assumed that the operation is performed in good 
faith with reasonable care and skill. However it is not at all clear that the performance of 
the operation is reasonable.Z12 The section directs us to have regard to both the patient's 
state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case.213 Clearly, given only Alyssa's 
state, the operation is entirely reasonable - she will die within days if the operation were 
not performed. However regard must be had to the circumstances of the case - the 
operation will certainly result in Bethany's death. Chesterman J says that the 'operation 
is one to save the life of Alyssa. The circumstances, including the loss of Bethany, would 
... make the operation reasonable for the purposes of the section. ' 214 He does not discuss 
208 Andrew Grubb "Conjoined Twins: Re A Down Under" (2002) 10 Med L Rev 100 at 101 - 2. Also see 
RS O'Regan QC "Surgery and Criminal Responsibility under the Queensland Criminal Code" (1990) 14 
Crim LJ 73 at 75. 
209 Although it is possible that the current wording can indeed cover situations where the patient and the 
person are two different people, as Colleen Davis says, 'the principles of statutory interpretation require that 
the section be given a meaning consistent with its original form.' She supports this statement by reference 
to the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld); Colleen Davis "Case and Comment; Nolan" at 350. 
21° Colleen Davis "Case and Comment; Nolan" at 351. 
211 Although there is no requirement for consent, it is surely implicit through the common law that the 
section could not give protection in the face of refusal of consent. 
212 For a discussion of the reasonableness provision in this section, see RS O'Regan QC "Surgery and 
Criminal Responsibility under the Queensland Criminal Code" at 82-3. 
213 Whether 'the performance of an operation is reasonable will generally involve looking at a body of 
relevant professional opinion': Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry Principles of Criminal Law (LBC, 
2001) at 333. In a situation that involves only one patient this may be acceptable. Yet perhaps where two 
patients and deliberate killing is involved, the decision should rely on more than a body of medical opinion. 
214 Queensland v Nolan at [25]. 
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at any length the implications of allowing an innocent person to be killed to save another. 
However, of course this would offend both the murder laws and the sanctity of life, and 
would have similar repercussions as Walker LJ's 'bona fide' argument set out above-
there would be no logical reason to prohibit compulsory organ donation. The 
performance of such operations seems entirely unreasonable. Disregarding the 
ramifications, Chesterman J employs a questionable interpretation of the relevant 
legislation. 
New Zealand has similar statutory provisions to Queensland. However it is doubtful 
whether they could apply to a situation such as that in Re A or Queensland v No/an. 
Section 61 of the Crimes Act 1961 ("Crimes Act") holds that: 
Every one is protected from criminal responsibility for performing with 
reasonable care and skill any surgical operation upon any person for his 
benefit, if the performance of the operation was reasonable, having regard· 
to the patient's state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case.215 
The wording of this section clearly does not allow for the type of interpretation that 
Chesterman J applies to the Australian provision.216 This section could apply to Jodie or 
to Mary as individuals. It would only apply to Mary ifWalker LJ's unappealing approach 
on best interests were adopted- the gaining ofbodily integrity in death seen as a benefit, 
and Mary's life acknowledged to be worth nothing to her. In application to either Jodie 
or Mary, the requirement of reasonableness would again need to be fulfilled. The 
relevant wording is identical to the Queensland provision and the same discussion is 
applicable here, with the same result, that the performance of such an operation does not 
seem at all reasonable. 
New Zealand has a further provision concerning responsibility for surgical procedures. 
Section 61A of the Crimes Act holds that: 
215 The original purpose of the section was probably to protect doctors from liability for assaults. It can also 
be read as protecting doctors in circumstances where the patients consent could not be obtained, and there 
was no reason to assume that it would be withheld. However it does not give protection against liability for 
surgery undertaken despite refusal of consent. This is especially so given s 11 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 which provides that 'everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment.' 
See The Honourable J Bruce Robertson ed Adams on Criminal Law (Student Edition, Brooker's, 1996) at 
137-8. 
216 Although it does not have the 'good faith' or the 'abortion' requirements, this provision is otherwise 
materially similar to the Australian provision. 
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(1) Every one is protected from criminal responsibility for performing 
with reasonable care and skill any surgical operation upon any person if 
the operation is performed with the consent of that person, or of any 
person lawfully entitled to consent on his behalf to the operation, and for a 
lawful purpose. 
(2) Without limiting the term "lawful purpose" in subsection (1) of this 
section, a surgical operation that is performed for the purpose of rendering 
the patient sterile is performed for a lawful purpose. 
Under this section the operation need not be for the benefit of the patient. It may be used 
to justify the operation on Mary given there is consent and it is for a lawful purpose. In 
the conjoined twins case consent has been given by the court based on their best interests 
evaluation. However under s 63 of the Crimes Act, people cannot consent to themselves 
being killed; this would surely extend to people who were authorised to give consent on 
behalf of another. A crucial question in the application of this provision is whether the 
operation is to be performed for a lawful purpose.217 It is possible that the purpose of the 
operation is to save Jodie's life, and that this is a lawful purpose.218 However, it could be 
argued that because under Woollin principles the operation is intended to kill Mary, this 
would constitute another purpose, one that is not lawful.219 
Although the New Zealand surgical operation provisions do not seem to encompass the 
sacrificial separation of conjoined twins, it is always possible that an imaginative judge 
could find their way to sanctioning such action. For example under s 61A, Walker LJ's 
attitude to intention could be used to conclude that the operation was for a lawful purpose, 
regardless that it is clearly inevitable that the operation would kill Mary. Similarly if 
Walker LJ's attitude to what is best for Mary, and Chesterman J's approach to 
217 The section gives no guidance on what a lawful purpose is, other than specifically holding that an 
operation performed with the purpose of sterilisation is performed for a lawful purpose. In Re X [1991] 2 
NZLR 365, an amenorrheoa operation upon an intellectually disabled girl was allowed. At 369 it was 
stated that the operation was 'for the purpose of preventing menstruation. It is not an operation for the 
purpose of sterilisation.' Although Hillyer J in that case did not comment on the interpretation of 'lawful 
purpose', it has been stated that 'even if the wording ofs 61A(2) does not apply to such an operation, the 
immediate purpose of which may not be to sterilise the patient, a Court would still be likely to hold that it 
was performed for a lawful purpose, in terms of s 61A( 1 ). ' The Honourable J Bruce Robertson ed A dams on 
Criminal Law at 139. 
218 It is likely that a lawful purpose would include providing medical treatment for other persons - for 
example through organ donation; see The Honourable J Bruce Robertson ed Adams on Criminal Law at 
139. 
219 Similarly, in the situation of a single patient, s 61A surely could not justify the performance of an 
operation which has the primary purpose of straightening a patient's spine, but that is known to result in the 
death of that patient. 
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reasonableness were adopted, s 61 may be applied to Mary's situation. This is made more 
likely given the encouragement implicit in Re A that the ends justify the means, and the 
way that that has been taken up with gusto by Chesterman J in the Supreme Court of 
Queensland. 
4.3 JUSTIFICATIONS: CONDONING MURDER 
On an orthodox reading of the law, and according to a majority of the judges, the 
operation to separate Mary from Jodie constituted intention killing, prima facie prohibited 
by the murder laws. However, it was unanimously decided that the killing was justified. 
Ward LJ' s main basis was self-defence, while Brooke and Walker LJJ relied upon 
necessity. Johnson J at first instance had found a completely distinct way to reach the 
same end. He held that the operation was lawful because it was an omission, simply an 
interruption or withdrawal of the supply ofblood Mary received from Jodie. He said this 
situation was analogous with the withholding of food and hydration, which are not 
positive acts, and are lawfu1.220 
Classifying an invasive operation which serves to cut off a naturally occurring supply of 
blood as an omission, is farfetched; all the Court of Appeal judges disagreed with this 
categorisation. Walker LJ states that the judge erred in law in equating the proposed 
surgical operation with the discontinuance of medical treatment (as by disconnecting a 
heart-lung machine)?21 Ward LJ, with the agreement of Brooke LJ, applied a laudable 
common-sense approach when he stated that to classify the operation as an omission 
would be 'utterly fanciful'. 222 
However despite rejecting this contorted view of the operation, the Court of Appeal 
judges showed the same inventiveness and determination as Johnson J in finding 
justifications for the operation. As Justice Michael Kirby respectfully allowed, none of 
the legal reasons put forward to justify the separation surgery leave one wholly 
220 This was made clear in Bland. 
221 Re A at 258. 
222 Re A at 189. 
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satisfied. 223 The next two chapters will explore these justifications. Each approach 
employed will be shown to have fatal problems, and the attitudes to valuing life revealed 
in the previous chapter will be seen to resurface in the form of utilitarian judgements and 
conclusions which undermine the sanctity of life. 
223 The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC, CMG "Law, Human Life and Ethical Dilemmas" (2000) 12 Bond L 




Necessity is a common law doctrine which justifies an illegal act if it is undertaken to 
avoid a greater evil. 224 
All three judges considered whether necessity could defend the killing of Mary. Brooke 
and Walker LJJ found that the separation surgery was justified by necessity. Ward LJ, 
although finding no unlawful act would be committed since it is the lesser of the two 
evils, preferred to rely on self-defence to justify the operation. 
Until this decision, the doctrine of necessity was not generally available to defend 
murder. R v Dudley and Stephens, 225 decided in 1884, is the leading case on necessity 
and murder. 226 In that case it was held that necessity was not available to justify the 
homicide that was before the court. 
The Judges distinguished this case, finding that the special circumstances of the twins 
were not something envisaged by the Judges who decided Dudley and Stephens.
227 This 
chapter will investigate whether this distinction is valid. 
224 Necessity is closely related to the defences of self-defence and duress. 
225 R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273. 
226 For extensive background on this case see A W Brian Simpson Cannibalism and the Common Law; A 
Victorian Yachting Tragedy (The Hambledon Press, 1994). 
227 Re A at 225. 
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5.1 DOES THE DEFENCE APPLY TO MURDER? 
5 .1.1 Dudley and Step hens 
Dudley and Stephens were two sailors convicted of murder on the high seas in 1884. 
They had survived a shipwreck along with Parker the ships boy, and the last member of 
their crew, Brooks. It was freely admitted that Dudley killed Parker with the consent of 
Stephens, and that the three men used his body for sustenance until they were rescued. 
The real question in this case was whether the killing in these circumstances was murder, 
the only possible defence being necessity. 
Lord Coleridge CJ who delivered the judgment of the court, 
228 said that the contention 
that killing an innocent may not be murder was 'both new and strange', and appeared to 
be 'dangerous, immoral, and opposed to all legal principle and analogy'.
229 He found 
nothing helpful in the decided cases or commentaries, and ultimately decided to 'apply 
the principles oflaw to the circumstances of the particular case'230 
(i) The essence of the judgment 
The essence of the decision is that it is the highest duty to sacrifice your life for others. 
So if you are presented with a choice between your life and someone else's life, you must 
favour the other, emulating the 'Great Example' of Christ. Lord Coleridge CJ holds this 
out as the universal moral standard, endorsed by heathens and Christians alike.
231 
228 Which comprised of himself, Grove and Denman JJ, Pollock and Huddleston BB. 
229 Dudley and Stephens at 281. 
230 Dudley and Stephens at 286. 
231 Dudley and Stephens at 287. 
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What he draws from this is that there is no 'unqualified necessity to preserve one's life.'232 
Therefore there are limits on what you can do to save your own life, and killing 'an 
innocent and unoffending neighbour'233 is in Lord Coleridge CJ' s view certainly beyond 
the limits. 
He believes that allowing necessity to defend murder in this case would create an absolute 
divorce of law from morality which would be of fatal consequence. 
Undoubtedly Lord Coleridge CJ's judgment is not entirely satisfactory, and contains 
some inconsistency.234 Also, the argument may be made that the case should be 
interpreted as holding that there was no necessity on these particular facts, rather than that 
necessity could never apply to any killings. There may be some support for this argument 
in the judgment. Lord Coleridge CJ does say that the shipwreck survivors 'might 
possibl~ have been picked up next day by a passing ship; they might possibly not have 
been picked up at all; in either case it is obvious that the killing of the boy would have 
been an unnecessary and profitless act. ' 235 However this was only said in the context of a 
discussion of the jury's findings, and as has been shown above, '[o]ther parts of the 
judgment ... reject uncompromisingly the notion that the killing would have been legally 
justifiable in any circumstances. ' 236 
232 Dudley and Stephens at 287. 
233 Dudley and Stephens at 286. 
234 Some of these inconsistencies are pointed out by Glanville Williams in "A Commentary on R. v. Dudley 
and Stephens" (1977) 8 Cambrian Law Review 94. In Dudley and Stephens at 287 Lord Coleridge CJ says 
that the highest duty is to 'sacrifice' your own life to save others. He points to the soldier sacrificing 
himself for his country, the sacrifice of captain and crew to save passengers of a shipwreck. The argument 
has been posed that these examples are not related to the situation in Dudley and Stephens; if the men 
sacrificed themselves by starving to death, then this would not have saved Parker - he would have died 
anyway. (See Glanville Williams "A Commentary on R. v. Dudley and Stephens" at 95). However, it 
could be argued that the boy's life would have been saved- at least for a little longer. Similarly if the twins 
were not separated, if Jodie 'sacrificed' her life, Mary would have lived at least six months - she would 
have been saved from immediate killing. 
235 Dudley and Stephens at 279. 
236 Glanville Williams "A Commentary on R. v. Dudley and Stephens" at 96. SeeR v Pommel! [1995] 2 Cr 
App R 607 at 613, Howe at 429, 439 and 453, Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 
734 at 744, and Perka v R (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 1 at 36, for support of the view that Lord Coleridge CJ's 
judgment held that necessity can never be a defence to murder. 
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(ii) The awful danger of allowing necessity to defend murder m this 
situation 
Lord Coleridge CJ sets out what he sees as the awful consequences of admitting necessity 
as a defence in these circumstances. He is concerned that it would become the 'legal 
cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime.'237 He gives several related reasons for 
this. 
Firstly he asks: 'Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity?'238 His problem is that 
the person who determines whether killing is necessary, and who it is necessary to kill, 
will be the person who will profit from it. This is certainly so in the circumstances he is 
presented with. 
Secondly he asks how the comparative value of lives are to be measured - citing strength 
and intellect as two possible influential factors. He clearly disapproves of judging the 
worth of lives according to their extrinsic qualities. This, as was discussed in Chapter Ill, 
has the potential to be a very unfair method of deciding, since each decision-maker would 
decide according to their own criteria. 239 
In the circumstances as they arose it was no more necessary to kill Parker than any of the 
other survivors- any one of them could have been sacrificed to sustain his fellows.
240 
(iii) Interpretation of Dudley and Step hens 
As is clearly established above, the essence of Dudley and Stephens is that you cannot kill 
an innocent person to save yourself. 241 This fundamental proposition is the basis of 
237 Dudley and Stephens at 288. 
238 Dudley and Stephens at 287. 
239 See Chapter III, pp 3 5 - 7. 
240 Dudley and Stephens at 287 - 8. 
241 Apart from the incidents of wartime which is left as an exception. 
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prohibiting the defences of necessity and duress from justifying murder.242 It was stated 
by Hale in 1736,243 reiterated in Dudley and Stephens in 1884 and again emphasised by 
the judges in R v Howe in 1987.244 
Howe concerned the possible application of duress by threat to murder. Duress by threat 
may defend an accused if they are compelled to perform an illegal act through fear; such 
fear arising from the threat of another person. The House of Lords in Howe held that 
duress by threat was not available as a defence to murder. Lord Halisham says that 'ifwe 
were to allow this appeal [and allow duress by threats to defend murder,] we should, I 
think, also have to say that Dudley and Stephens was bad law.'245 Lord Griffiths says that 
the reasoning that underlies Dudley and Stephens 'is the same as that which denies duress 
as a defence to murder. It is based upon the special sanctity that the law attaches to 
human life and which denies to a man the right to take an innocent life even at the price 
ofhis own or another's life.'246 
Ward LJ discusses the policy of the law behind the prohibition of killing innocent people 
to save others, and emphasises that 'the sanctity of life and the inherent equality of all life 
prevails'. 247 
It is the logical extension of such a way of valuing life, that not only is killing an innocent 
to save yourself prohibited, but also doing this to save another person is prohibited. 
242 There is a difference between duress and necessity, however the courts often blur the line between 
necessity and duress of circumstances - this is discussed further below at pp 88 - 91. 
243 Sir Matthew Hale The History of the Pleas of the Crown (Professional Books Limited, 1971) Volume 1 
at 51; 'if a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and cannot otherwise escape, unless to satisfy 
his assailant's fury he will kill an innocent person then present ... he ought rather to die himself than kill an 
innocent:' 
244 In this case the defendants were charged with murder. The defence put forward was that they acted 
under duress - out of the fear that another person would kill them if they did not do the illegal acts. 
245 Howe at 429; see also 453 per Lord Mackay. 
246 Howe at 439. 
247 Re A at 200. 
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5 .1.2 Can the present case be distinguished from Dudley and 
Step hens? 
There is no doubt that Dudley and Stephens holds that necessity could not justify the 
homicide in the particular facts assessed. It may also be seen as authority that necessity 
can never justify the killing of an innocent person to save another. However it is relevant 
to explore the possibility that there are some situations, such as the present, that can be so 
distinguished from Dudley and Step hens that the reasoning is inapplicable. 
None of the judges claim that Dudley and Stephens was wrongly decided. Instead they 
seek to establish a distinction between the facts in the two cases. They find that there is 
something special about Re A which makes it different enough from the situation in 
Dudley and Stephens to justify the application ofnecessity.
248 
So what was it about this case that made these judges overcome the 'very great reluctance' 
shown by common law judges to extend defences when an innocent life has been taken 
deliberately?249 
Ward LJ states two features of the case, each of which in his judgement alone condones 
the operation as lawful. The second feature is the fact that 'Mary is killing Jodie' and that 
the intervention is therefore lawful because it is motivated by 'self-defence'.Z
50 The first 
feature is relevant to necessity - it is the conflict of legal duties which the doctors owe to 
the twins. 'They are under a duty to Mary not to operate because it will kill Mary, but 
they are under a duty to Jodie to operate because not to do so will kill her. '
251 
Walker LJ considers little is to be gained from the decided case law because the facts in 
this case are so different from any to come before the court in the past. He describes the 
clinical dilemma thus: 'The special features of this case are that the doctors do have 
248 Note that Ward LJ seems to think that the application of necessity is legally justified, but not morally 
justified; see Re A at 202- 3, and the discussion below on proportionality, at pp 86-7. 
249 Re A at 201. 
250 See Re A at 203 - 4, and Chapter VI below. 
251 Re A at 201. 
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duties to their two patients, that it is impossible for them to undertake any relevant 
surgery affecting one twin without also affecting the other, and that the evidence indicates 
that both twins will die in a matter of months if nothing is done.'252 
The conflicting legal duties will be discussed below. However there is real doubt as to 
whether the other 'special features' to which Walker LJ refers, make this situation unique. 
The essence of the first of these other features is that it was impossible to do any relevant 
(presumably this means life saving) act for one twin, without affecting the other. 
However, this. is the core of any necessity situation which involves the competing 
interests of two people. If the situation in Dudley and Stephens is simplified for 
comparison, say there were only two survivors, it would be impossible to do any relevant 
act (provide food) for one, without affecting the other (by killing them to provide that 
food). 253 The other special feature was that both would die soon if nothing is done. This 
is the exact situation in Dudley and Stephens - but even more pertinent since without life 
saving action the shipwreck survivors were likely to die within days rather than 
months.254 
Brooke LJ thinks that Dudley and Stephens is no obstacle because in that case and in 
Howe, where they seem to interpret Dudley and Stephens as holding that necessity can 
never provide a legal justification for murder, they were not thinking of this particular 
situation, or anything comparable. His main bases for the distinction is that Mary is 
designated for death - therefore problems of choice do not arise, and that the two options 
in the present case both have moral merit, and therefore do not cause a divorce of law and 
morality as is seen in Dudley and Stephens. 255 
Are these valid ways of distinguishing Mary and Jodie's situation from the circumstances 
in Dudley and Stephens? The four main ways of distinguishing Dudley and Stephens that 
emerge from the judgments in Re A are explored below. Firstly, allowing the separation 
252 Re A at 254. 
253 It is unlikely that changing this feature would have made any difference to Lord Coleridge CJ's decision. 
254 The fact that the twins' deaths were a virtual certainty, yet there was always hope of rescue for the 
shipwreck survivors, is not relevant here. 
255 Re A at 239. 
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surgery would not create an absolute divorce of law from morality; secondly, the concern 
over who is to judge the necessity does not arise; thirdly, Mary is destined for death; and 
finally, there is a conflict of legal duties. 
(i) Would allowing the sacrificial separation operation create an absolute 
divorce of law from morality? 
In Dudley and Stephens one concern was that allowing necessity to defend the killing 
would create an absolute divorce oflaw and morality.256 
Brooke LJ finds that this objection is not dispositive of the present case. He sets out the 
two moral sides to the present issue in an attempt to show that this is not at all the clear 
cut sort of case, marking an absolute divorce of law and morality, which was of concern 
in Dudley and Stephens. 
The moral conflict he points to is that on one hand it's immoral to save Jodie ifby doing 
so you have to shorten Mary's life, and on the other hand it's immoral to not save Jodie 
with such a good chance she will have a 'normal' life. However, the same could be said 
about the situation in Dudley and Stephens - it is immoral to kill an innocent person to 
save others, but it is also immoral to let several people die who could have been saved 
and lived fulfilling lives. 
The present situation cannot be distinguished from Dudley and Stephens on the grounds 
that it would not create an absolute divorce of law and morality. The main tenor of Lord 
Coleridge CJ's concern is that it is immoral to kill an innocent person to save yourself (or, 
impliedly, another); and if we allow necessity to defend such killing, the consequential 
absolute divorce of law and morality would be of awful consequence. The sacrificial 
killing ofMary would indeed have been of concern to Lord Coleridge CJ if he were to be 
consistent with his basic premise. 257 
256 Dudley and Stephens at 287. 
257 In A W Brian Simpson's Cannibalism and the Common Law, it is shown that Dudley and Stephens arose 
from a desire of the authorities to generate a leading case condemning maritime cannibalism, rather than 
from an affirmation of the worth of life. Whether or not this is so, in order to maintain the integrity and 
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(ii) Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? 
Another concern expressed in Dudley and Stephens was 'to prevent A being judge in his 
own cause of the value of his life over B's life or his loved one C's life, then being 
executioner as well. ' 258 
Brooke LJ says that this is a very rare operation, which is to be avoided at all costs in the 
neonatal stage, and that therefore there usually will be an opportunity for the doctors to 
come to the court for a decision before operating. 259 
A surgical operation undertaken with the approval of the court is indeed a very different 
situation from the facts presented in Dudley and Stephens. The Court acting as decision-
maker may prevent a person playing judge and executioner over innocent lives. However 
the court is likely to bow to the opinion of the medical professionals in such cases, and a 
court being the decision-maker is not guaranteed to confer impartiality and consistency on 
the process. The present decision is a case in point - as has been shown in the earlier 
examination of the best interests issue, there is hardly consistency within each judges own 
decision, let alone between the three.260 
Nonetheless, regardless of who is making the decision- be it the court, the doctor, or one 
of the people whose lives are at stake, such a decision would always involve choosing one 
innocent person over another, and this is the essence of the concern in Dudley and 
Step hens. 
(iii) Mary is destined for death 
In the situation which gave rise to Dudley and Stephens, it was no more necessary to kill 
Parker than any of the other shipwreck survivors - any one of them could have been 
consistency of the legal system, it is crucial when following precedents to largely separate the subjective 
intentions of the judges from the legal concepts confirmed. 
258 As stated in Re A at 200 per Ward LJ. 
259 Re A at 240. 
260 See Chapter IlL 
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sacrificed to sustain his fellows. However if such a sacrifice was allowed, the awful 
question would arise - who should be killed?261 These circumstances led Lord Coleridge 
CJ to expound the awful dangers of how such a decision would be made. He clearly 
holds that it could not rest upon the extrinsic qualities of the people's lives. The natural 
extension of such an approach unbridled, would be that any impairment no matter how 
slight, could be license to sacrifice. 
Brooke LJ saw the problems arising out of choosing the victim, as one of the 'two 
insuperable objections' to the proposition that necessity might be available to defend the 
actions of Dudley and Step hens. 262 It is logical that such an objection may also apply if 
there were only two people involved, yet Brooke LJ holds that this problem does not arise 
in Mary and Jodies situation.263 He does not clearly set out his reasoning, but it is based 
on the fact that Mary is self-designated for a very early death: Because nothing can save 
Mary, there is no choice to be made?64 It appears that Brooke LJ believes that because 
Mary is designated for death, the decision to kill her does not involve any human 
judgement of the quality of life, and is therefore not contrary to the judgment in Dudley 
and Stephens. However, as is revealed below, it is probable that the opposite is in fact the 
case, and that Brooke LJ's approach is indeed contrary to the principles advocated by 
Lord Coleridge CJ. 
The destined for death argument: supporting analogies 
Brooke LJ does not expand on how and why Mary is destined for death, or explore the 
implications of deciding this. The only support he gives for his argument is mentioning 
261 Dudley and Stephens at 287 - 8. 
262 Re A at 239. The other objection according to Brooke LJ was that justifying the sailors actions under 
necessity, would mark an absolute divorce oflaw and morality- see the discussion above, p 63. 
263 Re A at 239. 
264 Justifying killing on the basis that the victim was going to die anyway, could be seen as a way of 
avoiding the reality that an innocent person has been intentionally killed; society is likely to feel more 
comfortable with the killing if it is in accordance with fate, or an "act of God". This idea is drawn from 
George J Annas "Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other" at 29. 
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several theoretical situations in which he believes similar reasoning had been used, a 
couple of which are in fact based on different principles.265 
He refers to J. C. Smith's Hamlyn Lecture where the possible application of necessity to 
the Zeebrugge disaster was discussed. 266 In this situation a ferry capsized, leaving a 
number of people in the water and in danger of drowning. They were near a rope ladder 
up which they could climb to safety. However a young man was immobile- from fear or 
cold - halfway up the ladder, and was preventing any other people from climbing up. A 
corporal in the army was in the water, and eventually instructed someone to push the 
young man off the ladder, an act which was done and is presumed to have killed the 
man.267 
Smith believed that such an act should be justified by necessity, and states that if such a 
case ever did come before a court, it would not be too difficult for the judge to distinguish 
Dudley and Stephens because the question of choice does not arise: 'The unfortunate man 
on the ladder chose himself by his immobility there'.268 
Smith here makes no mention of whether or not the man on the ladder will die regardless 
of whether he is pushed off the ladder.269 He may not be destined for death- allowing 
the others to die may save him. In time - during which the others may perish in the water 
below - he may unfreeze and climb up, or a helicopter may rescue him. If it is presumed 
that he was not destined for death, this is a situation where either the man or the people in 
the water could be chosen to die. The basis of the distinction from Dudley and Step hens 
would not be that the man is destined for death, rather it would be that because the man is 
265 Re A at 229 - 30. 
266 J C Smith Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (Stevens &Sons, 1989) at 73-79. 
267 So far as is known he was never seen again. 
268 J C Smith Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law at 77. Smith also distinguishes the situation 
from Dudley and Stephens on the basis of a self-defence analogy; the man on the ladder is obstructing the 
passage of the people in the water, who thereby have a right to use reasonable force to ward off the danger 
he created. 
269 Note that at the tail of his discussion Smith asks: 'What would we think of a law which said that all the 
trapped passengers, including the man on the ladder, were bound to die, rather than knock him to his 
death?' J C Smith Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law at 78 (emphasis added). This may indicate 
that he was proceeding on the basis that the man was destined for death. 
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the cause of the situation,270 the choice ofwho to kill to resolve the situation is so obvious 
that it is considered not a choice at all. 271 
Brooke LJ however appears. to think that an important part of Smith's reasoning is the 
destined to die analysis. He says that the same considerations apply when a plane which 
is about to crash, is brought down early272 in an uninhabited area to avoid crashing into a 
densely populated town. His reasoning was that which he applied to the situation of the 
conjoined twins, not that which lies behind Smiths endorsement of the Zeebrugge 
situation: since the people inside the aircraft were destined to die, there would be no 
question of human choice in selecting the candidates for death. 
Brooke LJ holds that it was an argument along those lines that led the rabbinical scholars 
involved in the Philadelphia 1977 conjoined. twin situation to conclude that the sacrificial 
operation was morally justifiable. He refers to an article by George Annas written in 
1987, quoting his description of two analogies which were reportedly relied upon by the 
rabbis in their destined for death argument. 273 Annas however has himself commented on 
the Re A case and rightly finds that Brooke LJ's use of these analogies is problematic.274 
He cites a 1977 newspaper report as his source,275 and points out that 'expert commentary 
on these examples has since been published, and the court seems unaware of it. ' 276 
One analogy involved 'a caravan surrounded by bandits. The bandits demand a particular 
member of the caravan be turned over for execution; the rest will go free. Assuming that 
27° Focusing on him as the cause becomes problematic if the reason he is stuck is examined: If he has 
stopped because he used all his energy saving a child who is now safe, could he be in good conscience 
pushed off? He remains the 'cause' of the danger, but does not seem at all blameworthy. 
271 This may have a utilitarian basis- see the discussion below at p 72. 
272 Thus hastening the deaths of those on board. 
273 George J Annas "Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other" at 27. 
274 George J Annas, "Conjoined Twins- The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life" (2001) 344 N Engl J 
Med 1104 at 1107. 
275 George J Annas "Conjoined Twins- The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life" at 1107. The newspaper 
report was; Donald C Drake "The Twins Decision: One Must Die So One Can Live" (see fn 13 above). 
276 George J Annas "Conjoined Twins- The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life" at 1107. The expert 
commentary that Annas is referring to is; Bleich ID "Conjoined twins" (1996) 31 Tradition at 92. 
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the named individual has been "designated for death", the rabbis concluded it was 
acceptable to surrender him to save everyone else.'m7 This is a clear application of the 
destined for death reasoning that Brooke LJ employs. However within Jewish thought, 
there is disagreement over whether this reasoning is only applicable if the named person 
is guilty of some crime.278 It was apparently because of this that the Rabbi deciding this 
case in fact rejected the destined for death argument - not wanting to rely on disputed 
reasoning in a life and death situation. 279 Instead, the decision was based on the idea that 
the twin who was reliant on the other was a rodef or pursuer in the same way as an 
unborn child, and could therefore be killed to remove the threat to the other twin. 280 
The other analogy which Brooke LJ mentions in fact is closer to the reasoning actually 
relied upon by the rabbis. It involves two men who jump from a burning aeroplane. 'The 
parachute of the second man does not open, and as he falls past the first man he grabs his 
legs. If the parachute cannot support them both ... the first man [is] morally justified in 
kicking the second man away to save himself ... since the man whose parachute didn't 
open was "designated for death."' 281 Rather than being a destined for death example, it is 
more likely that this is a self-defence argument. 282 
However, regardless of whether the examples that Brooke LJ points to are indeed true 
applications of the destined for death analysis, it is clear that he believes that since Mary 
is destined for death, the problems with choice that Lord Coleridge CJ identifies do not 
arise.283 Yet it is unlikely that Brooke LJ's judgment sits comfortably with Lord 
277 George J Annas "Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other" at 27. 
278 See; Rav Moshe Feinstein "So One May Live- Siamese Twins" Unpublished Responsum translated and 
annotated by Rabbi Moshe David Tendler, the Internet, http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/ravmoshe.html 
information accessed 11 June 2003. 
279 Rabbi Chaim Steinmetz "Separating Conjoined Twins", the Internet, 
http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/cojoinedtwins.html information accessed 11 June 2003. 
280 Rav Moshe Feinstein "So One May Live - Siamese Twins": Rabbi Chaim Steinmetz "Separating 
Conjoined Twins". This is the approach taken by Ward LJ, see Chapter VI below. 
281 George J. Annas "Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other" at 27. 
282 As leading U.S. rabbinical authority, Rabbi J. David Bleich points out; see Bleich ID "Conjoined twins". 
It is possible that this sort of attitude influences Brooke LJ's judgment. He says that Mary is self-
designated for a very early death, which implies that the situation is somehow her fault; Re A at 239. 
283 It should be noted that Brooke LJ does not refer to these examples as explicit support of his stance, 
rather he discusses them at an earlier point in his judgment; Re A at 229 - 230. 
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Coleridge CJ' s. There are two questions that arise in this context. Firstly, does Brooke 
LJ's approach avoid judging lives upon extrinsic qualities? And secondly, is the 
approach consistent with the sanctity of life and with Lord Coleridge CJ' s overall premise 
that an innocent cannot be killed to save another. 
Valuing life upon its length: Evidence of human judgement? 
The logical extension ofBrooke LJ's claim is that because one party is destined for death, 
the awful fear of judging according to extrinsic factors is avoided. But is this so? 
On first glance it makes sense to say that there is no real choice because one person is 
going to die anyway. Yet not performing the operation would have preserved Mary's 
short life, and both Mary and Jodie, like all people, were destined to die. The essential 
difference is that Mary's life would be short, whereas Jodie's life had the potential to be 
long. Under this analysis, it emerges that Brooke LJ is really making a choice based on 
length of life. 284 
Using the fact that a life is expected to be short as a reason to allow the sacrifice of that 
life, suggests that the corresponding value of the life is likewise smaller. 
285 Yet is it really 
fair to say that short lives are less valuable than long lives?28
6 And if the value of life is 
dependent on length, would it increase correspondingly to life expectation, and how 
would this be measured? 287 What would have been the value of Mary's life if she had 
five years to live? Or ten? At which potential length would her life become of equal 
value to Jodie's? The answer to these questions is dependent on the decision-makers idea 
284 John Harris discusses the destined for death and the length of life of life elements; John Harris "Human 
Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgement in Re A" at 230- 2. 
285 Glanville Williams suggests that because the victim in Dudley and Stephens had a minimal chance of 
remaining alive for more than a short time, his right to life was of very small value. However he does not 
allow that this reasoning can be applied in the situation where one life can be sacrificed to save one other. 
In this context he holds that all lives must be equal in the law, denying that an organ could be taken from a 
dying patient to save another person. The only explanation he gives for this inconsistency is that few 
people are wholly consistent utilitarians, and our thinking is tinged with notions of human rights and 
absolutes. Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, Stevens and Sons, 1983) at 606-7. 
286 It is possible to argue that the person with a short life expectancy values life more because they know it 
is going to be cut short, and that the amount a person values their own life should influence the amount of 
value that others place on it. 
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of a valuable life, and so it becomes apparent that the length of life is a quality factor. 
Therefore under Brooke LJ's reasoning, the inherent equality of all life would be denied. 
The lives of the old and the terminally ill could be sacrificed to save those with longer life 
expectancies. 
It is important to acknowledge the possibility that being destined for death involves 
something more than simply having a short life expectancy. Perhaps the reason that 
death is destined is important. Possibly Brooke LJ would distinguish between someone 
dying as a result of 'natural process' -for example old age, and someone who is destined 
for death because of particular unusual circumstances - for example an impending plane 
crash. However under this analysis Mary's imminent death could surely be considered to 
result from a natural process?288 
The most natural conclusion is that Brooke LJ is choosing between the girls according to 
the length of their lives, and that in essence this is a quality of life judgement. 
There is nothing convincing in the judgment of Dudley and Stephens to indicate that those 
who are destined for death should be afforded any less protection against intentional 
killing than those with average life expectancies. Parker was described as weak and 
incapable of resistance. The Jury289 found that 'the boy being in a much weaker condition 
was likely to have died before them.' He may have been in the worst shape, apparently 
having drunken seawater, but it could not be said without doubt that he was beyond help. 
Nothing specific in the judgment suggests that if Parker were destined for death Lord 
Coleridge CJ would have allowed him to be chosen as the sacrifice. Lord Coleridge CJ 
does say that the killing gave the men only a small chance of survival but prevented the 
boy any possible chance of survival. 290 It is likely to be too broad an interpretation, to say 
287 Problems of predicting the length of lives could also arise; note the different estimates given for Mary 
and Jodie's survival without surgery, Re A at 162-4. 
288 And where would the line be drawn between someone who dies of old age, and someone who is old who 
dies because of some unusual disease? 
289 Note that the jury made factual fmdings but did not come to a conclusion. 
290 Dudley and Stephens at 279. 
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that this statement implies that if the boy already had no chance of survival the outcome 
would have been different. 
Lord Coleridge CJ has rejected choosing a sacrifice according to the quality of their life. 
Therefore it stands to reason that he would regard all life as equally valuable, regardless 
of the potential length of that life. It is likely that whether Parker was destined for death 
or not, the decision handed down would have been the same. This is supported by Lord 
Coleridge CJ' s basic principle - that a person can never sacrifice the life of an innocent to 
save their own or any other life. 
Utilitarianism 
Whether or not one is convinced that Brooke LJ's destined for death analysis brings to 
life Lord Coleridge CJ's fear of judging life upon its extrinsic qualities; it is probable that 
the analysis offends on a grander scale -by relying on utilitarian principles. 
Jeremy Bentham described utility as 'that principle which approves or disproves of every 
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or 
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question' .
291 This principle can 
apply not only to individual interests, but also to the interests of communities, such an 
application thus dictating the laws.292 Different decision-makers can, however, follow 
different paths when applying utilitarianism to the same situation. In a life and death 
decision, this type of approach is contrary to that which is based on the intrinsic value of 
life, because intrinsic value is essentially irrelevant. 
Both Brooke LJ's argument, and Smith's analysis of the Zeebrugge disaster, attempt to 
argue that there is no choice in the matter of who is to die. However even in a situation 
where the choices are to kill one person and save several, or to let everyone die, there is 
still a choice to be made. In such a situation, if the single person is killed, utilitarian 
291 Jeremy Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (The Athlone Press, 1970) 
at 11-2. 
292 Jeremy Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation at 12-3. 
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principles are evident - saving as many people as possible is the underlying aim. It is 
likely that there is a utilitarian basis to Brooke LJ and Smith's approaches. 
Smith's reason for believing that the man on the ladder is the one who must be chosen to 
die, is that he has forfeited his rights because of his immobility - that he has caused the 
situation. However it is unlikely that causation would be decisive of 'choice' if there 
were 20 people frozen on the ladder and two waiting in the water. The underlying 
reasons for Smith believing that there is essentially no choice may be that it is the most 
appealing utilitarian option. Smith does not even seem to give thought to the fact that one 
could choose to allow the one person on the ladder to live,
293 and let the many people in 
the water die. This may be indicative that utilitarian ideals are strongly influencing his 
analysis. 
Similarly it is likely that Brooke LJ is influenced by utilitarian principles. In none of the 
examples that he referred to, did those who were destined to die outnumber the people 
who could be saved. In discussing the plane crash example he says that bringing it down 
early would save 'the lives of countless other innocent people' in the 'densely populated 
town. ' 294 It is questionable however whether Brooke LJ would endorse the destined for 
death approach if it involved killing countless people in a densely populated town to save 
a few innocent lives. 
Is utility a viable approach? 
Utilitarianism may be an appealing guide for making difficult decisions, but it is 
unhelpful in deciding some situations. Take conjoined twins who will both die within 
weeks if they are not separated. They share a heart and during the separation only one 
can be given the heart, and thus survive. It is clear that under a utilitarian approach the 
separation operation would be undertaken - it would be considered preferable for one 
person to die rather than two. However utilitarian principles would not be of conclusive 
help in deciding which twin is to receive the heart and live. If one had a condition that 
ensured she would live only two years after separation, it may be considered that she is 
293 At the least for a short while. 
294 Re A at 229. 
72 
destined for death, and therefore giving her the heart would not be saving her life. In that 
case, giving the heart to the twin who is likely to live longer, would be the action 
favoured by utilitarianism. However, at what point is the predicted death so far removed 
from the action, that the death is not considered in the utilitarian calculation?
295 The 
answers will depend on the individual decision-makers views towards life. 
A utilitarian approach is based on achieving the greatest good for the greatest number. A 
decision-maker may apply this principle in a wider manner than above, and decide that 
not only should length of life be taken into account, but that the potential to contribute to 
society should also be considered. There may be room for disagreement here, with some 
decision-makers considering that perhaps the twin with the greater likelihood of leading a 
normal life should be saved. If one twin had intellectual disabilities, saving their life may 
be considered to make a smaller contribution to the greater good of society than saving a 
child who is likely to have normal intellectual ability. Further there may be many other 
factors that decision-makers choose to consider, which could affect the conclusion 
reached. 
Clearly an application of utilitarianism may admit human choice and judgement -
something Lord Coleridge CJ warned against, and Brooke LJ claims to avoid. Such an 
approach, besides being indecisive in some situations,
296 clearly does not afford life the 
respect traditionally demanded. 297 Utilitarian principles are contrary to Lord Coleridge 
CJ's main premise- that an innocent life could never be intentionally ended. In Dudley 
and Stephens utilitarianism is not directly discussed, but the result reached is clearly not 
that which would have preserved the most lives possible, so plainly the decision in 
Dudley and Stephens does not advocate utilitarian ideals. If utilitarianism is used, 
295 Brooke LJ takes into account the fact that Jodie will die in six months if the separation surgery is not 
performed. There may be problems in drawing the line if one takes into account deaths which are not the 
immediate result of a choice. 
296 Utilitarianism is unhelpful if an equal number of lives are at stake in both choices. It is also unhelpful in 
a situation like that in Dudley and Stephens, where the preferable action in terms of utility is clear, yet there 
are several means by which to take this action - one sailor needs to be killed, but it could be any one of 
them. 
297 See Mirko Bagaric "The Jodie and Mary (Siamese Twins) Case: The Problem with Rights" at 318-9, 
for support of the application of the utilitarian approach in this situation. 
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especially to justify murder, it should be done with the conscious awareness that it is 
contrary to the inherent equal value of life. 
How helpful is this for later cases? 
It is probable that Brooke LJ's destined for death distinction is based on utilitarian 
principles, which cannot co-exist with the sanctity of life or the fact that you cannot kill 
an innocent. As shown above, the distinction does not avoid that fear of Lord Coleridge 
CJ's of judging lives on extrinsic factors. Not only is this approach contradictory to 
Dudley and Stephens, it is also unhelpful as a precedent for deciding cases which differ 
slightly. 
If there were conjoined twins who were equal in all respects, would die if not separated, 
and either could be saved by the death of the other during separation; the destined for 
death approach could not be invoked to distinguish the situation from Dudley and 
Stephens.298 What if Mary were not destined for death, but had kidney failure and was 
reliant on Jodie's kidneys until a donor became available; the problem being that in the 
ensuing time Jodie's whole body would give out due to the overwork, and she would die, 
at which point Mary could be separated and given a transplant. Since Mary would not be 
destined for death, the basis on which Brooke LJ is relying to invoke necessity and 
distinguish the judgment in Dudley and Stephens would not be applicable and presumably 
the operation would not be performed.299 This is the logical extent of Brooke LJ's 
approach, and one is left to wonder whether it would be an outcome that he would 
sanction. 
298 This indicates that the crucial point in Brooke LJ's analysis is not that Jodie's life could be saved, but 
that Mary's life cannot be saved so it is disposable. 
299 Similarly, the destined for death distinction is not helpful ifthere were two people destined for death. In 
the Zeebrugge example, if we assume that the man on the ladder is destined for death, but there is a second 
rope ladder also blocked by a person who is destined for death; necessity could not justify removing either. 
Choosing either because both are destined to die, would involve human choice, and defeat the purpose of 
the destined for death focus- the elimination of human choice and judgment. 
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(iv) Conflict of legal duties 
It is well settled that doctors owe a fundamental common law duty to patients who have 
come under their care. They must act in the best interests of their patient, which is 
established in England by compliance with a body of medical opinion.300 
Both Walker and Ward LJJ found that the doctors in this case owed conflicting legal 
duties to Mary and Jodie. Ward LJ stated that the doctors 'are under a duty to Mary not to 
operate because it will kill Mary, but they are under a duty to Jodie to operate because not 
to do so will kill her.' 301 So because the operation is in Jodie's best interests, the doctors 
have a duty to her to do the operation. Because the operation is not in Mary's best 
interests, the doctors have a duty to her not to operate. Further, Ward LJ found that the 
conflicting duties were equal, each involving killing an innocent person, and that 
therefore the principle preventing necessity defending murder - that you cannot kill one 
innocent to save another- was impossible to apply.302 Because of this he argued that the 
doctors must be allowed to make a choice, and concluded that the performance of the 
operation was the lesser evil, and that therefore no unlawful act would be committed.303 
Walker LJ viewed the conflicting duties as a feature of the situation enabling it to be 
encompassed by the doctrine of necessity.304 He states that the 'doctors ... are faced 
with the anxious dilemma of trying to perform the professional duties which they owe to 
300 See Bolam v Friern Hospital management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 at 7. This was applied in Re J 
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) at 41. And in Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical 
Treatment) [1993] Fam 15 at 27 it is said that the fundamental duty which a doctors owes a patient is 'to 
treat the patient in accordance with his own best clinical judgment'. Note that in the situation of the 
competent patient, 'the doctor's duty to act in the best interests of his patient must ... be qualified' by the 
patients right to self-determination; Bland at 864 per Lord Goff. 
301 Re A at 201. 
302 Walker LJ says that the duties are conflicting, but does not say that they are equal; Re A at 255. For his 
opinion on which course of action is the lesser evil, see the discussion below on p 86. 
303 It does not make sense to say that both are equal, yet still fmd that one option can be favoured over the 
other. It should be noted that Ward LJ ultimately justified the operation under the doctrine of self-defence, 
not necessity. 
304 The other factors being that it is impossible for any relevant surgery to be undertaken on one twin 
without also affecting the other, and that the evidence indicates that both twins will die in a matter of 
months if nothing is done. See the discussion of these factors above on p 62. 
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their two infant patients', it is 'a case of doctors owing conflicting legal ... duties'. 
305 
Clearly, as Ward LJ thinks, so Walker LJ holds that because the operation is in Jodie's 
best interests, there is a duty to her to perform it. However Walker LJ has previously 
decided that the operation is in the best interests of not only Jodie, but also Mary. 
Therefore it is difficult to see, under Walker LJ's analysis, why there is a conflicting duty 
to Mary. If the operation is in her best interests, then surely there is a duty owed to her to 
perform it, and that this is consistent with the duty to Jodie, rather than contradictory. 
One explanation may be that the duty owed to Mary arises out of the murder laws - the 
duty not to kill her, even though it is in her best interests. However, this may be 
complicated if it is accepted that Walker LJ thinks that the requirements of murder are not 
met. In light of these difficulties, the remainder of this discussion on legal duties will 
focus on Ward LJ's approach, although naturally some argument can be applied to 
Walker LJ's judgment. 
Without a doubt the doctors prima facie owe duties to both girls to give them the medical 
treatment which is in the best interests of each. The question is just how far these duties 
extend. 
The extent of the duties 
The duty to Jodie 
Although the doctors do owe a duty to Jodie, this must be taken in context. It is likely 
that the duty only extends to taking reasonable action. Such duties have always been 
tempered by the availability of resources - it is never held that a doctor has breached his 
duty to act in his patients best interests for failure to provide treatment which was not 
accessible. Similarly the duty of care has never been held to be breached through failure 
to administer treatment which would involve the intentional killing of another person. 
Imagine patient A who needs a heart transplant within two days or they will die. If they 
have a transplant they can look forward to a near normal life span. Patient B is in hospital 
for a routine check up - they are terminally ill and have a life expectancy of six months. 
305 Re A at 254 and 255. 
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The doctor has duties to do what is in the best interest of both patients. A conflict of 
these duties occurs because B is a perfect transplant match for A - and there is no other 
way A can obtain a new heart (due to preparation time and other factors). So the doctor 
has a duty to A to act in their best interests - the only way she can do that is by killing B. 
Yet the doctor also has a duty to act in B's best interests and this means not killing B, 
which will result in A's death. 
There is surely no doubt that the doctor would not be justified in killing B to save A, and 
it seems unlikely that the doctor would have breached her duty to A by not killing B, the 
duty is unlikely to be held to extend that far. If organ harvesting from the terminally ill is 
not imposed on doctors through their duty to act in their patients best interests, why 
should the duty in the conjoined twins' situation extend to killing an innocent person?
306 
Parents also have a duty to act in the best interests of their children.3
07 Ward LJ refers to 
R v Gibbins where a seven-year-old girl was starved to death by her father and his 
partner.308 He equates this with the omission to perform the operation in the present 
circumstances, and asks why this would not be the culpable killing of Jodie.
309 Clearly 
the duty owed to Jodie is the same as that which was owed to the girl in Gib bins - all 
parents are under an obligation to provide the necessaries of life to their children, and this 
includes supplying appropriate medical attention. However if the operation had not 
proceeded, it is unlikely that the twins' parents would have been liable for any breach of 
duty towards Jodie. The fact that the operation could not be performed without killing 
Mary would have provided either lawful excuse or a limit on the extent of the duty owed 
to Jodie. Indeed Ward LJ himself, surely in contradiction with his view that omitting to 
perform the operation would be the culpable killing of Jodie, considers that it would 
306 Glanville Williams reiterates the point that a doctor could not take blood from an unwilling patient even 
to save the life of another; Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law at 602. Barbara Hewson says that 
the 'common law has never required a person to undergo bodily invasion to save another's life.' She draws 
authority from St George's Healthcare NHS Trust vS [1999] Fam 26 at 46- 7; and the American case of 
McFall v Shimp (1978) 127 Pitts LJ 14 where the right of a defendant to refuse to submit to a bone marrow 
transplant that would save the life of the plaintiff was sustained. Barbara Hewson "A (Children) - cruel and 
unnatural" at 1562. 
307 Ward refers to Gillick as authority for the premise that parents have a duty to do what is in the best 
interests of their child; Re A at 199. 
308 R v Gibbins (1918) 13 Cr App R 134. 
309 Re A at 199- 200. 
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'have been a perfectly acceptable response for the hospital to bow to the weight of the 
parental wish' and not perform the operation.310 The decision of the twins' parents may 
indeed be seen as reasonable and understandable. Clearly they should not be placed in 
the same moral category as the parents in Gib bins. 311 
It cannot be doubted that both parents and doctors are under a duty to act in the best 
interests of children in their care. However there is surely a limit on both these duties to 
only do what is reasonably possible. Parents would not be liable in the event of a famine 
or disaster which meant there was no food available to give their children. The parents in 
Gibbins would not breach their duty if the only way to feed their child were to kill 
another person and steal their food, or to kill one of their other children for food. The 
duty would simply not extend that far. 312 
The doctors have a duty to act in Jodie's best interests; they must feed her, clean her, and 
give her the medical treatment which accords with a body of medical opinion. However 
it is unlikely that the duty to act in Jodie's best interests extends to compelling the 
intentional killing of another person. 
The duty to Mary 
The duty to act in Jodie's best interests does not extend to compulsion of the operation, 
because it will lead to Mary's death. The duty to act in Mary's best interests however, 
extends to the prohibition of the operation, regardless of the fact that it leads to Jodies 
death. Why should there be a difference, when each duty leads to the death of a person? 
The answer lies in the legal distinction between acts and omissions. 
310 ReA at 173. 
311 Similarly, the twins' parents cannot be legitimately compared to the parents in the heartbreaking case of 
R v Moorhead and Moorhead unreported, HC Auckland, T011974, 13 June 2001, Harrison J, who 
essentially starved their baby, Caleb, to death. His prolonged painful death was due to a deficiency in his 
Mothers breast milk, and his parent's defiance of repeated medical advice that his life could be saved with 
simple treatment. At 14, Harrison J attributed Caleb's death to the 'uncompromising, dogmatic self-belief 
held by the parents, and found it was irrelevant that this was based on genuine faith in natural remedies and 
beliefs in God's healing power. What was relevant was their blind and deliberate determination to breach 
their lawful duty to obtain medical treatment for their son. 
312 Another explanation for the lack of liability for breach of duty may be the defence of impossibility. 
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The premise that we cannot kill is firmly established in law - you simply cannot actively 
kill an innocent for any reason. However, the premise that we must preserve life is not on 
a practical basis as far reaching. Since the law places a premium on the value of personal 
freedom and autonomy, a person is not considered culpable for omissions unless they had 
a duty to act. 313 
Ward LJ found that the conflicting duties were equal because each involved killing an 
innocent person. He stresses that 'it makes no difference whether the killing is by act or 
by omission.' 314 However this is only true ifthe omission is required by a duty. Ifthere 
is no duty to perform the operation then the failure to do it is not culpable. In this 
situation there is no duty. There is no general duty imposed on people to save others/15 
and as is seen above, the duty imposed on the doctors to act in Jodie's best interests does 
not encompass the separation operation. Neglecting to perform the operation would not 
involve a breach of duty owed to Jodie, nor would it result in the culpable killing of Jodie. 
Therefore the duty to Mary is not restricted in the same way as the duty owed to Jodie; it 
would extend to the prohibition of the operation. 
Further, not only do the doctors have an extensive duty of care to Mary, but also as Ward 
LJ acknowledges, the operation will be an active invasion of Mary' s body and by that act 
the doctors will kill her.316 Regardless of the duty to act in her best interests, it can be 
assumed that there is a general duty upon everyone not to kill innocent people; the law 
holds that intentional killing is illegal. 
313 The reluctance in the common law tradition to penalise omissions is shown by the language used in the 
legislature, which suggests action rather than inaction; Finbarr McAuley Criminal Liability: A Grammar 
(Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 177- 8. 
314 Re A at 201. In apparent support of his position, Ward LJ quotes excerpts from Bland which establish 
that the ethical status of allowing a patient to die and killing a patient are for all relevant purposes the same. 
However it is doubtful whether the quotes he uses are actually supportive of what he is saying. In Bland, it 
was concluded that despite the ethical equivalence of killing by act and omission, the former was illegal 
while the latter was permissible. If Ward LJ's conclusion were followed through to its logical conclusion, 
both act and omission, because of their ethical similarity, would give rise to liability, and Bland would be 
considered wrongly decided. 
315 Barbara Hewson discusses this, and in support refers Home Office v Dorset Yacht Club [1970] AC 1004 
at 1042; Barbara Hewson "A (Children) - cruel and unnatural" at 1562. There is provision made for 
specific circumstances, such as the duty on parents to provide the necessaries of life. 
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Application of the conflicting duties distinction 
Establishing a conflict of duties may be an attractive way to establish that there is a 
necessity to make a decision in such situations. An approach similar to Ward and Walker 
UJ' s may be possible in other common law jurisdictions, based upon either the common 
law duty, or duties established by statute. 
The conflict of legal duties angle was taken up in Queensland v Nolan, as a means of 
justifying the separation of the Australian twins. However this was applied in a manner 
even more dubious than that adopted by Ward U. Chesterman J found that the conflict of 
duties approach had a counterpart in s 286 of the Queensland Criminal Code which 
provides that: 
( 1) It is the duty of every person who has care of a child under 16 years to 
(a) provide the necessaries of life for the child; and 
(b) take the precautions that are reasonable in all the circumstances to 
avoid danger to the child's life, health or safety; and 
(c) take the action that is reasonable in all the circumstances to remove the 
child from any such danger; 
and he or she is held to have caused any consequences that result to the life 
and health of the child because of any omission to perform that duty, 
whether the child is helpless or not. 
(2) In this section "person who has care of a child" includes a parent, foster 
parent, step parent, guardian or other adult in charge of the child, whether 
or not the person has lawful custody of the child. 
He held that the hospital and doctors with the responsibility of caring for the babies were 
covered by this section, and that they had an obligation to provide 'such medical and 
surgical care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances to prevent them coming to 
harm. ' 317 There certainly is a duty to the girls under this section. It would impose upon 
the doctors a duty to the weaker twin Bethany under either subs (1)(b) or (c) to take 
action that would avoid the operation.318 Whether there is also a duty to Alyssa 
concerning the separation surgery under subs (1)(b) or (c), depends largely on whether it 
is reasonable in the all circumstances. The discussion above is applicable - it is unlikely 
316 Re A at 199. 
317 Queensland v Nolan at [22]. 
318 It is assumed that it is reasonable in all the circumstances, including that it will allow Alyssa to die. 
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that surgery that will involve killing another person would be considered reasonable. 
Subsection (1)(a) imposes a duty to provide the necessaries of life, and does not require 
that this provision be reasonable in all the circumstances. However it is unlikely to 
impose a duty in this situation; given that the operation is considered a necessary of life, it 
is probable that this section only requires provision of necessaries which are reasonable. 
As is discussed above, it is unlikely that the provision of food or any other necessary 
would be required if that inevitably involved killing another person. 
Even if it is accepted that the section does impose two conflicting duties, Chesterman J, 
while meaning to apply Ward LJ's approach, in fact only focuses on the duty owed to 
Alyssa. He says that the 'operation which is compelled by law is a justification for the act 
which ... [will result in the death of Bethany]. The killing is therefore not unlawful. '
319 
He fails to recognise that the law also compels the operation not to be performed. Also, it 
is unclear why the killing would not be unlawful. The simple fact that the doctors have 
complied with the duty imposed on them by this section with regard to Alyssa is of no 
effect if the action satisfies the requirements of murder. 
320 
In New Zealand s 151 ofthe Crimes Act may be relevant. Section 151 holds that; 
(1) Every one who has charge of any other person unable, by reason 
of detention, age, sickness, insanity, or any other cause, to withdraw 
himself from such charge, and unable to provide himself with the 
necessaries of life, is (whether such charge is undertaken by him under any 
contract or is imposed upon him by law or by reason of his unlawful act or 
otherwise howsoever) under a legal duty to supply that person with the 
necessaries of life, and is criminally responsible for omitting without 
lawful excuse to perform such duty if the death of that person is caused, or 
if his life is endangered or his health permanently injured, by such 
OmiSSIOn. 
(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 
years who, without lawful excuse, neglects the duty specified in this 
section so that the life of the person under his charge is endangered or his 
health permanently injured by such neglect. 
319 Queensland v No/an at [22]. 
32° For more on this section see Colleen Davis "Case and Comment; No/an" at 351 - 2. 
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Assuming that the surgery can be considered a necessary oflife,
321 this seCtion establishes 
a legal duty to Jodie to perform this operation; unless it can be implied that it does not 
extend to unreasonable actions.322 There would not be a duty to Mary not to do the 
operation under this section because it is difficult to categorise not performing an 
operation as providing the necessaries of life. However, the doctors do have a general 
duty of care towards her, and also it may be implied that there is a general and 
overreaching duty upon every person not to kill others. 323 So on the face of it there would 
be conflicting duties upon the doctors if the conjoined twins' situation occurred in New 
Zealand. 
However while a breach of the duty owed to Mary would result in culpable killing, the 
same could not be said of a breach of the duty owed to Jodie. Under s 151 a person is not 
criminally liable for a breach of duty if there was a lawful excuse for the breach. 
324 It is 
likely that the fact that complying with the duty would result in the killing of another 
person would be considered a lawful excuse. 325 It could be argued that since the breach 
of one duty is not culpable, then it is clear that the law does not need to provide an escape 
from the conflict of duty- an application of necessity is simply not necessary. 
Clearly however, the conflict of duties approach has potential application throughout the 
common law world. Yet in Re A the approach is not carefully thought through. Ward LJ 
himself says that if the parents and the doctors in the present case did not act and by their 
omission the person they had a duty to protect died, surely 'no prosecutor would dream of 
321 Necessaries of life includes 'medical intervention necessary to prevent, cure or alleviate a disease that 
threaten[s] life or health'; Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General at 249. 
322 See the discussion above on s 286(1)(a) of the Queensland Criminal Code. 
323 The New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 also imposes a legal duty of reasonable care upon people doing 
dangerous acts or people in charge of dangerous things; see ss 155, and 156. 
324 In Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General at 252, it was said that 'a doctor acting in good faith and 
in accordance with good medical practice is not under a duty to render life support necessary to prolong life 
if that is, in his or her judgment, contrary to the best interests of the patient.' A doctor in such a position is 
considered to have a lawful excuse in terms of s 151. This approach could not be used to establish a lawful 
excuse for not providing treatment to Jodie, because, looking only from her point of view, the treatment is 
clearly in accordance with good medical practice and in her best interests. 
325 It is reasonable to assume that when the provision of treatment would amount to a criminal offence, there 
is a lawful excuse for omitting to provide it; see The Honourable J Bruce Robertson ed Adams on Criminal 
Law at 281. 
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prosecuting. ' 326 He even says that it would have been perfectly acceptable for the 
hospital to carry out the parent's wishes and not to perform the operation. 
This is acceptable because the duty owed to Jodie does not extend as far as compelling 
murder, whereas the duty to Mary does extend as far as allowing Jodie to die. It has been 
shown that the duties are not equal, nor do they conflict, therefore this means of setting 
the situation apart from Dudley and Stephens does not stand up to scrutiny. 
(v) Dudley and Stephens should be upheld 
The conflict of legal duties, Mary being designated for death, the lack of need to judge the 
necessity, and the lack of distinction between law and morality; all are ways the judges 
attempted to distinguish the conjoined twins' situation from that in Dudley and Stephens. 
327 None however are flawless, and further, none actually overcome the essential basis of 
the decision in Dudley and Stephens: No matter what the special circumstances of the 
case, killing an innocent to save another will always be prohibited if all life is valued 
equally. 
So there has been no convincing reason presented in support of the proposition that the 
moral position in Dudley and Stephens should not be upheld, and necessity allowed to 
defend murder. As Lord Griffiths said in Bland: 'We face a rising tide of violence and 
terrorism against which the law must stand firm recognising that its highest duty is to 
protect the freedom and lives of those who live under it. The sanctity of life is at the root 
ofthis ideal and I would do nothing to undermine it, be it ever so slight.'
328 
Lord Mackay in Howe says that we should not allow someone to choose one life over 
another, and that no development of the law or progress in legal thinking have taken place 
326 Re A at 200. 
-
327 The judges approaches conflict with one another; the importance Brooke LJ places on the fact that Maty 
is destined for death conflicts with Ward LJ's view that the legal duties owed to each girl are equal, because 
their lives are equally valuable - despite the fact that Mary's life will be so short. 
328 Bland at 443 - 4, per Lord Griffiths. 
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since Hales day to demonstrate a reason to change this fundamental statement.329 Has 
there been any development of the law or progress in legal thinking that has taken place 
since Howe which would cause us to change this fundamental statement? This seems 
unlikely,330 unless it is that the very approach to valuing life has changed. As has been 
seen in earlier chapters, judicial opinion on the valuing of life has been increasingly 
revealed as far from centred on the inherent equality of life.331 However, this is only a 
possible explanation of why the principle in Dudley and Stephens has been held 
inapplicable in this case; it is not justification for doing so. 
5.2 THE REQUIREMENTS OF NECESSITY 
Despite precedent to the contrary, this sacrificial operation was justified by a majority of 
the judges on the basis of necessity. If it is accepted that necessity can be applied to 
murder, before it can defend the particular murder in this situation, the requirements of 
necessity must be satisfied. 
Brooke LJ set out three requirements of necessity:332 
(i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; 
(ii) no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be 
achieved; 
(iii) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided; 
and concluded that these requirements are satisfied. 
329 Howe at 456. 
330 It could be said that since Howe was decided in 1987, necessity has 'been given a new lease oflife' (Re A 
at 219 per Brooke LJ), by the House of Lords in In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 
74, and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; that 
therefore there is a trend towards allowing the defence of necessity to apply to all offences, and that Dudley 
and Stephens is simply an outmoded specialised exception. 
331 Illustrated by the judgments in Bland and Re A. 
332 Re A at 240. Brooke LJ drew the requirements of necessity from Sir James Stephen's comments on 
necessity in his Digest of the Criminal Law (4th ed, 1887). 
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5 .2.1 Do the circumstances of the twins fulfil the requirements of 
necessity? 
The first requirement is undoubtedly met since the operation is the only way to avoid the 
inevitable and irreparable evil that is Jodie's early demise.
333 
The second requirement, that no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the 
purpose to be achieved, may give rise to a problem concerning the time the operation is to 
be performed. The surgery that was justified in Re A was elective separation. However 
there was another option, that of urgent separation which would be performed only in the 
event of an acute catastrophe, such as Jodie's development of progressive heart failure.
334 
It may be argued that necessity should only be available if the operation were performed 
at the last possible moment- directly before Jodie's heart gave out. Yet as Brooke LJ 
rightly concludes, an emergency is not an essential prerequisite of necessity,
335 and it is 
likely that the second requirement is satisfied. 
However, there is real doubt as to whether the third requirement, that of proportionality, 
is satisfied. 
(i) Proportionality 
The doctrine of necessity can only defend a proportionate response; the action taken must 
be the lesser evil. This requirement shows that necessity is an expression of the 
philosophy of utilitarianism - attaining the greatest good is the ultimate aim of necessity. 
This utilitarian approach may be straightforward in situations which do not involve life 
and death. However in the situation of the conjoined twins, when a choice between lives 
333 Barbara Hewson asks how 'the death of conjoined twins from natural causes [can] be an evil' saying it is 
not, and to 'suggest otherwise smacks of hysteria about death, which seems to permeate cases about forced 
medical intervention nowadays.' Barbara Hewson "A (Children)- cruel and unnatural" at 1562. 
334 See Re A at 164. 
335 Re A at 239. Brooke LJ's view on this point fmds support in Re Fat 75. This is likely to be the accepted 
view, despite previous suggestion that a key factor for a plea of necessity to succeed was an urgent situation 
of imminent peril; see Southwark London Borough Council v Williams at 7 46. 
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is involved, where life and death is at issue, the sanctity of life must be considered. 'The 
assessment [of proportionality] cannot entail a mere utilitarian calculation of, for 
example, lives saved and deaths avoided in the aggregate but must somehow attempt to 
come to grips with the nature of the rights and duties being assessed. This would seem to 
be consistent with Lord Coleridge CJ's conclusion that necessity can provide no 
justification for the taking of a life, such act representing the most extreme form of rights 
violation. ' 336 
The utilitarian approach in assessing proportionality may not allow sufficient notice to be 
taken of the sanctity of life.337 This is borne out by the approaches taken to 
proportionality by the judges in Re A, all of whom, in finding the operation is the lesser 
evil, do not respect the sanctity of life. 
WalkerLJ 
Walker LJ says that the present situation 'is a case where the test of proportionality is met, 
since it is a matter of life and death, and on the evidence Mary is bound to die soon in any 
event. '338 It is true that it is a life and death situation, but it is life or death not only for 
Jodie, but also for Mary. Walker LJ's assumption of proportionality seems to rest on the 
quality judgement that a longer life is more worthwhile than a shorter one. This is fully 
discussed above in the context of Brooke LJ's approach concerning Mary's destiny for 
death.339 
Ward and Brooke LJJ 
To establish proportionality both Ward and Brooke LJJ rely on the balancing act 
performed by Ward LJ to discover the overall best interests of the twins. Brooke LJ says 
that since 'the principles of modem family law point irresistibly to the conclusion that the 
336 Perka at 36 per Wilson J. 
337 Glanville Williams acknowledges that sometimes fundamental values such as the respect for life not 
only enter into the utilitarian calculus, where they may be given 'special weight', but sometimes supersede 
it; Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law at 602- 3. 
338 Re A at 255. 
339 See above at pp 69 - 71. 
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interests of Jodie must be preferred to the conflicting interests of Mary,' the requirements 
of necessity are met. 340 
The application of the balancing act here is no different from its application in the best 
interests issue; in each case the choice depends on quality and utilitarian considerations, 
and results in the undermining of the sanctity of life. 341 In analysing the girls' best 
interests, Ward LJ asserted that the balancing act respected the sanctity of life. Yet his 
attitude in assessing proportionality indicates that he realises that in fact the inherent 
equality of all lives is undermined by the balancing act.342 He explicitly states that the 
sanctity of life is a factor which is taken into account for each girl, yet he says that a 
'resort to the sanctity of life argument does not enable both rights to receive equal 
protection the doctrine is supposed to provide each of them equally.'
343 He teims the 
choosing of the lesser evils as an 'escape' from the quandary created by the sanctity of 
life. Further, he does not in fact rely upon necessity to establish the legality of the 
surgery, but goes on to establish self-defence, saying that therefore 'the proposed 
operation would not in any event offend the sanctity of life principle. '
344 
If the law's traditional interpretation of sanctity had been applied, performing the 
operation would have been categorised as the greater evil; intentional killing being 
considered more offensive than allowing someone to die. 
5.3 APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Despite contrary precedent and the inherent equal value the law traditionally sees in all 
human life, a majority of the English Court of Appeal invoked the doctrine of necessity to 
justify the killing of an innocent person. 
340 Re A at 240; see also 203 per Ward LJ. 
341 See Chapter Ill, pp 28- 34 for an overview of the balancing act and its treatment ofthe sanctity of life. 
342 The other judges seem to have little awareness of this although they do maintain that sanctity is not 
infringed because bodily integrity is given to the children. 
343 Re A at 202 - 3. 
344 Re A at 203. 
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Clearly, this approach could be adopted in other common law countries. In Queensland v 
Nolan Chesterman J did not rely on necessity to justify the separation surgery because its 
legality was governed by the Queensland Criminal Code. He said that the doctrine of 
necessity is 'a creature of the common law and finds only a very limited role in the 
Code. '345 However in other jurisdictions necessity may be generally available as a 
defence. 346 
In New Zealand the criminal law is governed by the Crimes Act. The general defence of 
necessity is not specifically covered, however s 20 preserves the common law defences 
which are not provided for in the act.347 Whether the general common law defence of 
necessity is available in New Zealand is not clear. There is a line of cases that do 
tentatively establish the existence of a common law defence; however it seems that this 
defence is duress of circumstances, rather than necessity. 
Duress of circumstances is a relatively recent creation of the English courts. It responds 
to threats which arise from the circumstances, not from another person, as in duress by 
threats. However both forms of duress have the same requirements. In England, R v 
Martin348 contains 'the clearest and most authoritative guide to the relevant principles and 
appropriate direction in relation to both forms of duress':349 
'[T]he defence is available only if, from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said 
to be acting reasonably and proportionately in order to avoid a threat of death or serious 
345 Queensland v Nolan at [17]. 
346 For example in Canada- see Perka; and in Victoria- seeR v Loughnan [1981] VR 443. However note 
that it would still have to be established that necessity could defend murder in these jurisdictions. 
347 The Crimes Act also makes some provision for specific situations related to necessity; s 24 compulsion, 
ss 61 and 61A for surgical operations. Other statutes also make some provisions for situations of necessity; 
s 53 Transport Act 1962 (NZ), exemption of police, traffic officers, and ambulance and fire brigade drivers 
from speed limits when on duty. 
348 R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652. This case arose out of disqualified driving. The circumstances were 
that the accused's wife had suicidal tendencies and on this occasion was threatening suicide if her husband 
didn't drive their son to work as he was late and may run the risk of losing his job. The Judge at first 
instance had pre-empted the defence of necessity and not allowed it to be put to the jury. The court of 
appeal found that necessity could have applied to driving while disqualified, and held that the defence 
should have been put to the jury. 
349 R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570, proposition 10. 
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injury. ' 350 The jury should be directed to determine two questions; if the answer is yes 
to both questions, then the defence is established: '[F]irst, was the accused, or may he 
have been, impelled to act as he did because as a result of what he reasonably believed to 
be the situation he had good cause to fear that otherwise death or serious injury would 
result; second, if so, would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the 
characteristics of the accused, have responded to that situation by acting as the accused 
acted?' 351 
In R v Abdul-Hussain it was established that '[i]mminent peril of death or serious injury 
to the defendant, or those to whom he has responsibility, is an essential element of both 
types of duress. ' 352 It was said that the 'peril must operate on the mind of the defendant 
at the time when he commits the otherwise criminal act, so as to overbear his will' ,
353 
however, 'the execution ofthe threat need not be immediately in prospect' .
354 
Duress of circumstances and necessity both defend action taken in response to threats 
from circumstances, and many English judges see these as almost the same thing.
355 
However, as Brooke LJ points out in Re A, they do not cover exactly the same ground. 
D_uress of circumstances justifies an action which is otherwise unlawful if the actors mind 
is irresistibly overborne by external pressures, whereas in 'cases of pure necessity the 
actor's mind is not irresistibly overboume by external pressures. The claim is that his or 
350 Martin at 653. 
351 Martin at 653- 4. This is a 'predominantly, but not entirely, objective test, and this Court has recently 
rejected an attempt to introduce a purely subjective element divorced from extraneous influence (see Roger 
and Rose, 9 July 1997).' Abdul-Hussain, proposition 10. 
352 R v Abdul-Hussain, proposition 3. 
353 R v Abdul-Hussain, proposition 4. 
354 R v Abdul-Hussain, proposition 5. It was held that 'the period of time which elapses between the 
inception of the peril and the defendant's act, and between that act and execution of the threat, are relevant 
but not determinative factors'; proposition 6. Also, that although a close nexus between the threat and the 
criminal act should be looked for, requiring a virtually spontaneous reaction would interpret the law too 
strictly. 
355 See Re A at 253, per Walker LJ; R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206 at 2226-7. 
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her conduct was not harmful because on a choice of two evils the choice of avoiding the 
greater harm was justified. ' 356 
In New Zealand the phrases 'necessity' and 'duress of circumstances' are used 
interchangeably.357 The Court of Appeal in Kapi v Ministry of Transport accepted that 
the defence may be available in this country, but did not decide the question.
358 The 
requirements of duress of circumstances were set out in Kapi and have been taken up in 
subsequent cases; 'a defence of necessity ... requires at least a belief formed on 
reasonable grounds of imminent peril of death or serious injury. '
359 
In Police v Kawiti the high court held that 'the defence of necessity of circumstances is 
available in New Zealand, but only where the perceived threat is one of imminent death 
or serious injury to the defendant or some other person. '
360 The existence of this defence 
in New Zealand has gained support in the district court. 
361 
It is uncertain whether New Zealand's defence of duress of circumstances would extend 
to justify murder. In Police v Anthoni the district court said: 'Notwithstanding Dudley 
and Stephens it may be, applying the Kapi test that necessity could be a defence in New 
Zealand to murder, but of course, that comment is subject to there being appropriate 
circumstances. ' 362 More recently the high court in Police v Kawiti implicitly accepted the 
356
' Re A at 236. Chesterman J in Queensland v Nolan at [19] recognises the difference between necessity 
and duress of circumstances. In the Queensland Cr4ninal Code duress of circumstances is provided for in s 
25. 
357 See generally the cases cited below. 
358
· Kapi v Ministry of Transport (1991) 8 CRNZ 49 at 55. 
359 Kapi at 57. 
360 Police v Kawiti [2000] 1 NZLR 117 at 122. 
361 In Police v Anthoni [1997] DCR 1034 at 1050, it was found that necessity is a defence in New Zealand 
provided the appropriate circumstances arise. The defence was applied successfully to negate an assault 
charge. In R v Atojia [1997] DCR 1053 at 1059, the judge concluded that 'under New Zealand law there 
remains a possibility that a defence of necessity can be raised if the accused establishes a subjective honest 
belief based on reasonable grounds of imminent peril or death or serious injury. Secondly, that there was 
no realistic choice but to act in the way she did.' This was a pre trial application in a welfare fraud case, 
opposing the admittance of a psychologist's evidence that the defendant suffered from battered woman's 
syndrome. This evidence was to form the basis for the defence of necessity. The judge decided that 
although the evidential basis for necessity in this case was very weak, the Crown had not established that 
the defence was not possible, and the evidence was therefore admitted. 
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observation that the defence is not available to murder. 363 However it is possible that the 
New Zealand courts will find Re A influential on this issue. 
Not only may Re A affect the law of necessity in other jurisdictions, it may also influence 
the development of other defences. 
The policy of the law behind the prohibition of killing innocent people to save others is 
general, and covers both necessity and duress.364 In Howe the application of duress by 
threats to defend killing was denied. It was said that the reasoning that underlies Dudley 
and Step hens 'is the same as that which denies duress as a defence to murder. '
365 
Since the ban on defending killing for both necessity and duress have the same basis, and 
because the lines between the defences are blurred, it makes sense in light of the decision 
in Re A for duress of circumstances to also be extended to defend murder. If this happens, 
it would be inconsistent not to extend that to duress by threats; it would also seem very 
strange for duress to have adopted the blanket ban on defending killing from necessity, 
and to keep it, in the face of necessity rejecting it. This extension would of course be 
impeded by Howe, and it may be very difficult to avoid the precedent set by this case.
366 
Due to the decisions made by the judges in Re A, the sacrificial killing of an innocent, 
something long prohibited by law and morality, may potentially be justified by two 
defences -necessity, and duress. Perhaps even, as is explored in the next chapter, it may 
be justified in a third way, through Ward LJ's unique application of self-defence.
367 
362 Police v Anthoni at 1050. 
363 The observation that the defence was not available to murder was made in A P Simester and Warren J 
Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (Brooker's, 1998). The analysis of duress of circumstances at para 
11.3 in that text was considered by the high court in Police v Kawiti to be 'comprehensive and most useful'; 
see Police v Kawiti at 120 and 123. 
364 Ward LJ discusses this; Re A at 200- 1. 
365 Howe at 439 per Lord Griffiths. 
366 Further there may be specific legislation in other countries that prevents duress from applying to murder; 
see for example s 24 of the Crimes Act (NZ). 





Mary is killing Jodie.368 This is the reality as Ward LJ sees it.
369 He declares that the 
availability of a 'plea of quasi self-defence . . . makes intervention by the doctors 
lawful. ' 370 Yet does the application of this defence to the twins' situation properly lie 
within the existing constraints of the law? 
It has long been recognised that every person is justified in using, in defence of himself, 
herself, or another, such force as is reasonable to use in the circumstances.
371 The fact 
368 The fate of the Philadelphia twins in 1977 was fmally decided on the basis that the weaker twin was a 
pursuer and action taken to protect the other twin would be a legitimate defence. See above, p 68. 
369 Re A at 203. Walker LJ at 255 also mentions the issue of protecting Jodie against an 'unnatural 
invasion'. He is careful to say that this must not be overstated, yet further states; 'the doctors' duty to 
protect and save Jodie's life if they can is of fundamental importance to the resolution of this appeal.' 
370 Re A at 204. As Suzanne Uniake points out, self-defence gives permission to do an action, but does not 
impose an obligation to do that action; Suzanne Uniacke "Was Mary's Death Murder?" at 215. Presumably 
therefore under Ward LJ's judgment it would have been permissible for the doctors not to perform the 
separation surgery, and this may affect the outcome oflater similar cases. 
371 This is some of the wording used in s 48 of the Crimes Act (NZ), which provides comprehensively for 
self-defence. The English law is of the same general effect, however defence of ones own person and of 
others remains a defence in common law, with the related defence of the prevention of crime being 
established by statute ins 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK). 
Whether the force used is reasonable is an issue that frequently arises in self-defence cases. If the present 
situation fell inside the ambit of self-defence, killing Mary would be considered to be reasonable force in 
the circumstances: This would be the only way that Jodie could be defended. 
The threatened danger must be reasonably imminent; see Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, ed in chief 
Halsbury's Laws of England vol11(1) para 456. Although the threat to Jodie will only reach culmination 
six months into the future, it should be considered reasonably imminent. An analogy on this aspect may be 
found in the situation of a person who is being intentionally poisoned by another over a long period of time 
- the more poison they ingest, the less likely it is that they will survive. The victim could surely act in self-
defence to stop the poisoning before it reached a near. fatal level. Allowing self-defence to justify 
eliminating the threat to Jodie's life should not widen the scope of self-defence to encompass threats which 
are only likely to arise in the far off future. 
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that the doctors, rather than Jodie herself, are acting in her defence is not an obstacle to 
the application of the defence; it is well established that a person can act in defence of 
another. 372 Use of the term 'self-defence' in this thesis encompasses the defence of 
another. 
It is firmly established that killing in self-defence is acceptable; 'if a man be desperately 
assaulted, and in peril of death, and . . . cannot otherwise save his own life, the law 
permits him in his own defence to kill the assailant; for by the violence of the assault, and 
the offence committed upon him by the assailant himself, the law of nature, and necessity 
hath made him his own protector'. 373 
In the traditional situation where a competent and culpable aggressor attacks an innocent 
person, we seem to instinctually approve that the victim should be able to use fatal force 
in defence if it is the only means of preventing the attack. 
However the present situation is not one which evokes instinctive approval of killing in 
self-defence. The circumstances in which the twins were born are very different from the 
traditional case outlined above. The main distinction is in the threat against which 
protective force is sought to be used. 374 
372 SeeR v DuffY [1967] 1 QB 63, which held that a plea of self-defence was available to a woman who 
wounded a man in the course of defending her sister against him. It was said that 'there is a general liberty 
even as between strangers to prevent a felony.' DuffY at 67. Note that the outcome is unlikely to be 
affected if the defence is expressed as the prevention of crime, or as self-defence; see J C Smith and Brian 
Hogan Criminal Law (lOth ed, Butterworths/LexisNexis, 2002) at 280. 
373 Sir Matthew Hale The History of the Pleas of the Crown Volume 1 at 51. Note the use of the word 
necessity. This may illustrate that self-defence and necessity were very close in origin. 
374 One aspect that is not discussed in this thesis is whether the 'separation surgery [can] plausibly be 
characterised as defensive conduct'; see Suzanne Uniacke "Was Mary's Death Murder?" at 210 - 3 for a 
discussion of this aspect. Also see Suzanne Uniacke Permissible Killing at 165 - 6. 
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6.1 IS THERE A THREAT AGAINST WHICH SELF-
DEFENCE CAN BE INVOKED? 
There is clearly a threat posed to Jodie if she remains joined to Mary. However what sort 
of threat can protective force be used to repel? The present circumstances give rise to· 
questions on two aspects of this threat. Firstly, whether it is required that the threat is 
unlawful, and secondly whether simply existing passively in a situation beyond human 
control poses a sufficient threat. 
6.1.1 Threats which are not unlawful 
As Ward LJ has no difficulty in agreeing, the fact that Mary is being kept alive to Jodie's 
detriment cannot be said to be unlawful. 375 However he asserts that self-defence can 
legitimately be applied against such acts. 376 
The typical situation where self-defence is invoked is where defensive force has been 
used to prevent an unlawful attack. Self-defence is not usually invoked to defend against 
a lawful attack. 
In the Northern Irish case of R v Browne it was held that where 'a police officer is acting 
lawfully and using only such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention 
of crime or in effecting the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders, self-defence 
against him is not an available defence. ' 377 This also seems to be the position in 
England.378 
375 Walker LJ also endorses the view that Mary's dependence on Jodie, however life threatening, could not 
be described as unjust aggression; Re A at 255. 
376 Only the situation where the defender knows that the threat is lawful will be examined here. For a 
discussion of situations where the defender believes a lawful threat is unlawful, see J C Smith and Brian 
Hogan Criminal Law at 281 - 2. 
377 R v Browne [1973] NI 96 at 107. In this case two policemen stopped a car containing four men. 'The 
policemen ordered the occupants out of the car and three complied immediately. The fourth, the accused, 
produced a Browning pistol and fired some 12 or 13 shots. One of the policemen was killed and the other 
wounded. The evidence was that one of the constables, just before the shooting said of the accused "He has 
got a gun" and that the other replied "Shoot him". The first constable, instead of shooting, hit the accused 
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The Australian case of R v Lawson and Forsythe
379 concerned the use of alleged self-
defence against an attack which was lawful because it too was in self-defence. The 
accused ("L") shot dead the victim ("F"). Prior to the killing L lured F to an isolated 
location, with the intent to kill him, confronted him with a shotgun, but couldn't proceed 
with the killing. Then ten days later he did the same thing. F came prepared on this 
occasion and began shooting. L claimed he fired the fatal shot in self-defence and had by 
that time again abandoned the intent to kill. If F was firing in self-defence, then this was 
a lawful attack. The question then was whether L could legitimately kill F in self-defence 
against this lawful attack. The trial judge directed the jury that L's right of self-defence 
was a right to defend himself against what he believed was an unlawful attack. 
On appeal McGarvie J held that 'it is the better view of the law that there are some 
circumstances in which a person is entitled to kill in self-defence where he reasonably 
believes that a lawful attack on him is being or is about to be made.'
380 He decided that 
leave to appeal should be allowed since the judge erred in the direction to the jury. 
Young CJ acknowledged that it 'is not difficult to invent hypothetical situations in which 
it can be said that the requirement that self-defence can only be used to repel an unlawful 
attack might lead to injustice. ' 381 However, he goes on to say that this was not such a 
case because the killer had created the situation - the victim could not be converted into 
the aggressor by so subjective a change of mind on the part ofthe killer. 
Ormiston J, however, preferred the requirement that the act be unlawful. He thoroughly 
sets out the background to this issue. He focuses on the historic distinction between 
killing which is justified in self-defence, and killing which is excused as a necessary and 
reasonable response to a threat to life or limb. The former required an unlawful act, yet 
on the head with his pistol, whereupon the accused started shooting,' later claiming that he acted in self-
defence: Browne at 97. 
378 In R v Mckoy [2002] EWCA Crirn 1628 at [6] - [7] it was accepted that '[i]f a person is properly and 
lawfully arrested, then use of force to free himself is unlawful.' 
379 R v Lawson and Forsythe [1986] VR 515. 
380 Lawson and Forsythe at 527. 
381 Lawson and Forsythe at 523. 
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the latter never had any such requirement. He says that one must be careful not to bring 
into the modem rules of self-defence restrictions or rules which were designed to 
perpetuate the distinction between justifiable and excusable self-defence. He discusses a 
long line of cases in Australia that use 'unlawfulness' as part of the test. He does not 
think that he should here depart from this test. His reluctance to modify the test was 
strengthened by the absence of analysis of authority.
382 He seems to allow that the 
requirement of unlawfulness could be replaced by another test/
83 but says the difficulty 
lies in posing a test which is neither too wide nor too complicated. 
384 He did not think 
that in this situation where the accused has provoked the attack, they should be allowed to 
claim the right to defend against that attack by killing the other person. 
385 
(i) Acts excused by the law 
In his discussion on self-defence, Ward LJ referred to a six-year-old boy who is 
'indiscriminately shooting all and sundry in the school playground'. 
386 He held that 
although the boy is too young for his acts to be considered unlawful, killing the boy 
would still be an act justified by the doctrine of self-defence. Ward LJ does not make it 
clear why we can use self-defence in this situation. However, it is clear from his 
judgment that neither the legal nor the moral guilt of the boy creating the threat is 
decisive. 387 
382 Lawson and Forsythe at 579. 
383 Lawson and Forsythe at 581. 
384 Lawson and Forsythe at 580. 
385 Lawson and Forsythe at 580. 
386 Re A at 203. 
387 Ward LJ defers the judgment of the innocence of the boy to the Archbishop, implying that it is irrelevant 
to the application of self-defence whether he is morally innocent or not; Re A at 203. This makes legal 
sense, because if the moral innocence of the person creating the threat determines whether the threat could 
legitimately be defended against, this could lead to inconsistency and injustice, depending on the decision-
makers personal morality. Basing the applicability of a defence upon a moral judgment is unacceptable in 
the common law world. 
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The six-year-old is not considered to be criminally responsible; his actions are excused 
because of his age. Some other people who also perform an otherwise criminal act may 
similarly be excused, perhaps by virtue of their mental state. However, if their act causes 
a threat to another person, it appears that it is generally considered justifiable to maim or 
kill them in self-defence. 388 According to Glanville Williams, the reason you can defend 
yourself against a 'lunatic' is that his actions are only excused, but not authorised or 
justified by the law.389 If the child can be defended against it would be on a similar basis. 
Whether action taken against excused threats can be accommodated comfortably within 
the doctrine of self-defence is hard to ascertain since the theoretical foundations of self-
defence remain unsettled. 390 
One possible source of a person's authority to use proportionate force in self-defence is 
the right or the instinct to prevent harm to yourself or to preserve your own life.
391 From 
the point of view of the defender it seems only right to be able to protect yourself against 
a threat, whether the threat is unlawful in origin or not. Justifying lethal self-defence 
against the six-year-old boy on this basis conflicts with the premise that each life is of 
equal value. It would allow the choice of one innocent person's life over the life of 
another innocent person. It would also make nonsense of the rule that killing in self-
preservation in situations of duress (and necessity - until this case) is not allowed. If the 
instinct to protect your own life is the basis for allowing self-defence, there is no reason 
for denying action taken under that urge in duress or necessity situations. 
The culpability of the aggressor may be a crucial factor in allowing defensive action to be 
taken. If the aggressor has done something wrong, it may be that they can be legitimately 
hurt or killed because in doing wrong, and thus causing a threat to another person, they 
have forfeited the protection of the law - of their self determination, their body, or even 
388 However the justification for this may be other than self-defence; for example the 'excused aggressor' 
may be forcefully stopped from acting because they were causing a breach of the peace. 
389 Glanville Williarns Textbook of Criminal Law at 502. 
390 Robert F Schopp Justification Defenses and Just Convictions (Cambridge University press, 1998) at 12. 
Also see George P Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown, 1978) at 855. 
391 Presumably this would extend to the instinct to save another person also. 
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their life ("the forfeiture theory"). 392 This may not be applicable to the situation of the 
six-year-old. His actions, being excused, are not considered legally culpable. Similarly, 
his youth may sufficiently alter the quality of his actions, so his right to life cannot be 
considered forfeit. Although his actions may be considered morally wrong, it is not 
appropriate to rely on a moral wrong to ascertain the application of a legal defence. 
However, there may be some persuasion in the argument that because the boy's actions 
are not condoned by the law, there is a 'quasi-legal' wrong that supports the application 
ofthe forfeiture theory.393 
Clearly it is possible that action taken against excused threats could be taken in self-
defence, indeed Ward LJ treats this as a certainty. 
(ii) Mary's situation 
Ward LJ' s conclusion that defensive force can be used against Mary is based on an 
equation of Mary's position with that of the six year old boy, he sees Mary as an 
aggressor, draining the lifeblood out of Jodie.394 However, even if it is accepted that 
excused threats may be defended against, there is a difference between the boy's situation 
and Mary's situation. The reason the situation of the conjoined twins is lawful is more 
extensive than an excuse based on age. Mary, were she a woman in similar 
circumstances,395 wouldn't be guilty of murder. Her 'actions'396 are not merely excused 
392 It should be noted that the use of fatal force in self-defence does not fit comfortably within the concept 
of the sanctity oflife used in this thesis. In Ward LJ's view, killing in self-defence is not an exception to the 
sanctity principle, but rather is built into it. This seems to be because the sacred nature of life only prohibits 
one from aiming 'to cause an innocent person's death'; see Re A at 203. The importance placed on the 
aggressors wrongdoing implies that the value of their life stems not from their intrinsic existence, but rather 
is dependent on attaining a level of conduct which causes no threat to other people. Alternatively, if the 
important factor is considered to be the instinct to save a life in danger, clearly the idea that each life is 
inherently valuable is overpowered. 
393 However it would hardly be in accordance with the sanctity of life if the value of children's lives were 
dependent upon them attaining some level of conduct that they were probably not aware of. 
394 Re A at 203 - 4. Michael Freeman says that comparing Mary to a six-year-old with a gun 'is obtuse and 
morally blind'; Michael Freeman "Whose Life is it Anyway?" at 278. 
395 For example her heart functioned until she was twenty, then gave out and she became reliant on Jodie. 
396 See pp 100- 4 for a discussion of whether she is taking any action at all. 
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by the law; they are simply not culpable at all.397 Her situation is as lawful as a person 
walking down a public street, or lying on the beach. These things certainly lie within the 
law and for present purposes are essentially the same as actions which are justified by the 
law. It does not seem right that these sorts of situations, if they somehow pose a threat, 
should be defended against. As George Fletcher says, the aggression must be unjustified; 
ifthe intruder has a right to use force, resistance is impermissible. 
398 
Perhaps self-defence in situations like the six-year-old boy could be somehow justified by 
the forfeiture theory. But extending this to Mary's situation is far outside the realms of 
self-defence. She has done no legal wrong, even one which has been excused. If the 
basis of the defence were that she had done something wrong to forfeit her right to life, 
then it must be based entirely on the decision-maker's moraljudgement of her innocence. 
Basing the applicability of a defence upon a moral judgement is unacceptable in our legal 
system. 
Perhaps the instinct to respond to a threat could be the theoretical basis for self-defence 
against legally justified threats. However, as was explored above in the context of 
excused threats, this leaves no proper basis for excluding killing from the defences of 
duress and necessity. 
The lawful threat in the conjoined twins' situation cannot be comfortably accommodated 
within the traditional doctrine of self-defence. 
6.1.2 The form and origin of the threat 
Ward LJ refers to the lethal threat of the six-year-old boy to establish that a lawful threat 
may be acted against. He says he sees 'no difference in essence between that resort to 
397 This view is also shared by Suzanne Uniacke who says that 'the common artery that allows Mary to 
receive oxygenated blood at the expense of Jodie's heart might not be positively just; but it is not thereby 
unjust.' Suzanne Uniacke "Was Mary's Death Murder?" at 214. Also see Barbara Hewson "A (Children)-
cruel and unnatural" at 1562. 
398 George P Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law at 869. All the judges use the American terminology 
'unjust aggressor'. Walker and Brooke LJJ's judgments suggest that this is a requirement for an application 
of self-defence (see Re A at 240 and 255), whereas Ward LJ says that Mary does not need to be an unjust 
aggressor to be defended against (see Re A at 203). 
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legitimate self-defence and the doctors coming to Jodie's defence and removing the threat 
of fatal harm presented to her by Mary's draining her life-blood. '
399 However, in addition 
to the difference pointed out above which concerns lawfulness, there is another 
distinction between these situations which may be significant. The boy in Ward LJ's 
example is taking action - he is firing a gun. Mary however is simply living in the 
circumstances in which she was born. 'There is a great difference between the boy's 
active conduct and the pathetic inactivity of [Mary] '.
400 
There is no doubt that there is a serious threat to Jodie's life in this situation. However 
the question is whether the threat is of a type which can be legitimately eliminated in self-
defence. 
(i) The parameters of threats against which self-defence can be invoked 
How must a threat evoking self-defence arise? Must there be an act by the person against 
whom force is used? Or is passive existence in threatening circumstances sufficient? 
These points are important because if the parameters of applicable threats are widened too 
far, it may create a back door to allowing killings that have been traditionally denied 
under the doctrine of necessity and the defence of duress of circumstances. 
This discussion proceeds on the acceptance that force used against a person can only be 
justified in self-defence if that person is the origin of the threat. If this were not so then 
the undesirable result would be that self-defence would apply to almost any situation. For 
instance to ward off a threat from an aggressor, one could take a member of the 
aggressor's family as a hostage, and justify this action as force used in self-defence. The 
family member in no way caused the threat, it originated from the aggressor, but if self-
defence could be used against threats which originated from outside the person acted 
against, then this action would be justified.401 
399 Re A at 204. 
400 J C Smith and Brian Hogan Criminal Law at 282. 
401 Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law at 502. 
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The traditional portrayal of self-defence involves a threat stemming directly from an act 
by the person against whom force is used. Most of the cases and writings refer to an 
'attack' or a conceived attack, or use the word 'force', both of which imply some action on 
the part of the aggressor.402 However, it would be unsafe to infer that use of active 
terminology is intended to lay down the limits of self-defence. It may have been used 
simply because it was appropriate to the situation being considered. 
(ii) The origin of the threat 
In considering whether the threat can be defended against, the point of focus should be 
whether the threat directly originates from the person against whom force is being used. 
However there are problems in assessing where in fact the threat arises from. Deciding 
whether the passivity of a person in a certain set of circumstances constitutes a threat 
emanating from that person, or a threat emanating from circumstances, may be very 
difficult. This is essential however, and enables the line to be drawn between those 
situations which come under self-defence and those which come under necessity. Both 
self-defence and necessity are based on threats. As has been established, in the case of 
self-defence the threat must be created by the person against whom the protective force is 
being used. In necessity the danger can be created by circumstances, by the person acted 
against, or by a person different from the person acted against. In situations like the 
present, because self-defence is a defence to murder but necessity and duress of 
circumstances have not traditionally been, 'the point at which one reaches the boundaries 
of self-defence and enters upon the terrain of necessity may thus be of crucial 
significance. ' 403 
In some situations the origin of the threat is clear. A passive parent who fails to provide 
the necessaries of life to their child is the source of a threat to that child. In a famine 
induced by drought, the threat of starvation is clearly caused by the circumstances. 
402 See Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, ed in chief Halsbury's Laws of England vol 11(1) para 456; and 
Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law at 502 and 603. 
403 In Browne, where self-defence was rejected, the defence of necessity was, without success, 'frankly 
canvassed as a means of reintroducing self-defence by the back door'; Browne at 110. Due to the different 
requirements of the defences, the boundaries between self-defence and necessity remain important even 
though necessity is now allowed to defend murder. 
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In the conjoined twins' situation, both girls exist in threatening circumstances. Mary, 
who Ward LJ considers the aggressor, is being passive in a lawful manner in these 
circumstances. In such a situation it may be arguable whether the person against whom 
action must be taken is simply another victim of circumstance, is an agent through whom 
the threat operates, has magnified the threat, or has actually become the source of the 
threat. From the examples below however, it emerges that in such situations the threat is 
most naturally attributed to the circumstances. 
A person, "A", is caught in a collapsing building. In order to save their own life and 
escape, they have to push an unconscious person out of the way, which would cause that 
person further injury. The most natural analysis is that the threat arises from the 
circumstances and that the person blocking A's esc.ape is a victim of the threat and 
certainly perpetuating it, but is not the source of the threat. 
Think about the situation where a window cleaner has slipped and is in danger of falling 
from the top storey of a very tall building. The only way to get to him is along a small 
ledge. Unfortunately the way is blocked by a person listening to music through 
headphones and enjoying the sun. They do not see the man who has slipped, or the 
people wanting to rescue him. If the person is disturbed he will get such a fright that he 
will fall to his death. If nothing is done then the window cleaner will fall to his death. 
From where does the threat arise? Is it from the fact that the cleaner slipped, or is it from 
the fact that the person is preventing his rescue? The person's very existence on the ledge 
is protecting the operation of the threat, allowing circumstances to umavel without 
interruption. However this is unlikely to amount to posing a threat in itself.
404 
If two people are shipwrecked and only have enough food for one to survive, each is in a 
way presenting a threat to the other because of their need for food. However, surely the 
true threat comes from the circumstance ofbeing marooned with insufficient food to meet 
everyone's needs. 
404 Perhaps if they had been preventing the rescue on purpose, they could be attributed with a secondary 
threat. However it is difficult to distinguish this situation from that where they are an unwitting impediment 
to the rescue, unless omitting to get out of the way of the rescuers could be considered unlawful. 
102 
(iii) The present threat- how can it be classified? 
An understanding of the nature of the threat in the conjoined twins' situation is crucial to 
deciding whether defensive action can be legitimately justified under the doctrine of self-
defence. There seem to be three possible ways of looking at the situation: 
• Firstly that Mary is the source of the threat to Jodie. 
• Secondly that fate may have created the situation, but that Mary is clearly the 
vehicle through which the threat operates - she is therefore the source of the 
threat. 
• Thirdly that the source of the threat is the circumstances, fate, or the will of god -
Mary is simply another 'victim' in this situation. 
Parts in Ward LJ' s judgment imply that Mary is the source of the threat - he says that she 
is killing Jodie, that she is using her heart and lungs to receive and use Jodie's oxygenated 
blood, that she is draining her life-blood.405 But he also refers to the sad and helpless 
position Mary finds herself in, and talks of the exceptional circumstances nature has 
inflicted on the twins, thereby laying the blame on the circumstances. So it seems that he 
would fit the conjoined twin's situation into the second category set out above. 
Is this the most natural interpretation of the situation? The thing that will eventually kill 
the twins is that Jodie's heart is overworking. This is caused by her being born joined to 
Mary in such a way that the blood flows between them, and by the fact that Mary' s heart 
could not sustain her. Neither of these facts on their own would create the threat, 
however together, they create a fatal threat. The threat can most naturally be said to be 
arising from the circumstances in which the twins exist. This, as can be seen from the 
discussion above, does not give rise to a plea of self-defence. 
It may be of assistance to identify the source of the threat to Mary. There is no doubt that 
there is a threat to her life, and that this is simply from fate, god's will, or the 
405 This could also be considered language that implies Mary is taking some action. 
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circumstances- she was born this way. What logical reason is there for not applying this 
approach to ascertain the source of the threat to Jodie? 
If it is accepted that the threat arises from the circumstances, then it is clear that self-
defence is not available to justify the action taken to save Jodie's life. It certainly would 
be unfair and discriminatory if circumstances were allowed to dictate the value of a life. 
If self-defence were allowed in this situation, by virtue of the very manner in which she 
exists, the way she was born, Mary's life would be rendered expendable. 
6.2 SELF-DEFENCE: NOT APPLICABLE 
The impact of Ward LJ's decision to allow Mary to be killed in Jodie's defence can 
perhaps be fully appreciated if we apply the principle to adult conjoined twins. Imagine 
Mary's heart had worked until the twins reached the age of twenty, and had then give_n 
out. Jodie's heart then took over and could sustain them for six months, maybe more.
406 
Under Ward LJ's version of self-defence it is possible that the doctors would be justified 
in separating the women and killing Mary. The refusal by one or both women of the 
separation operation may be a complicating factor.
407 
The threat in the conjoined twins' situation arises from the circumstances in which the 
twins were born, not through anything that Mary has done. There is nothing about the 
situation which is unlawful. The 'threat' - the way the twins exist - is absolutely within 
the law, not merely excused by it. Justifying defensive action through self-defence in 
situations like the present cannot be classified as killing a person to stop the threat they 
are posing to someone else. It is more like killing one innocent person to preserve the life 
of another. If one were to allow self-defence to justify killing Mary, the inherent equal 
value of each life would be lost. 
406 There is no prospect of a heart transplant for Mary. 
407 The lack of consent from either woman is unlikely to affect the application of self-defence. If a person 
kills a man in defence of a woman who he is beating, they may be protected from criminal liability by self-
defence despite both man and woman rejecting intervention. The fact that they have the right to refuse 
medical treatment is irrelevant in the application of self-defence. This extension of Ward LJ' s approach has 
the potential to undermine the autonomy of all conjoined twins. 
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Imagine the behaviour that would potentially be justified by self-defence in the following 
situation. A and B are trapped through no fault of either in a room with an air supply only 
sufficient to sustain one of them until rescue. Each by their mere existence is in the 
circumstances presenting a fatal threat to the other. Neither has acted outside the law in 
any way. Under Ward LJ's analysis, surely both would have the right to use protective 
force against the other. Is this a solution we want to condone- being ruled by the law of 
the land where the strongest person survives and is justified in killing innocent people to 
keep himself alive? This really would involve a complete about-turn from valuing the 
sanctity of each life equally. Rather than each life being equally valuable, each life would 
be equally expendable. 
Further, if a third person could intervene in this situation, and save only one, they could 
choose which one they wanted to save. Their decision may be based on skin colour, age 
or life expectancy, but their actions would be fully justified by self-defence, so the way 
they valued each life would not be revealed. 
Perhaps Ward LJ was aware that this situation could not fit within self-defence as it 
existed, and meant to establish a separate category of 'quasi self-defence' to cover these 
situations. This view gains support from his concluding sentence on self-defence: 'The 
availability of such a plea of quasi self-defence, modified to meet the quite exceptional 
circumstances nature has inflicted on the twins, makes intervention by the doctors 
lawful. '408 However, if this was his intent he should have made this clear and discussed it 
further. 409 
It may be asked why Ward LJ worked so hard to make this operation defendable - he 
created quasi self-defence really with no legal justification. Perhaps the reason behind it 
is that he takes the moral view that this is the lesser of two evils because it will result in 
the most lives, or that life which will last the longest, being saved.
410 If it is accepted that 
408 Re A at 204 (emphasis added). 
409 Uniake discusses Ward LJ's treatment of self-defence and says that: 'Although his concluding remarks 
mention 'quasi self-defence', his reasoning about the surgery's lawfulness invokes the elements of 
legitimate defence.' Suzanne Uniacke "Was Mary's Death Murder?" at 210. The creation of quasi self-
defence is therefore a backdoor method of extending the boundaries of self-defence. 
410 In his only example- which concerns the small boy with the gun- Ward LJ chooses a situation where 
the use of protective force would end one life, but save many. In the traditional self-defence situation it 
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defensive force should be used in such special circumstances, the implications upon the 
way life is valued must be considered: The defence applied in these circumstances would 
allow the preference of one person who is innocent before the law, over another person 
who is innocent before the law. This is definitely contrary to the premise that each life is 
inherently equally valuable. 
In self-defence Ward LJ found means to authorise the killing of Mary. However, as has 
been shown throughout this chapter, the law needs to be stretched in uncomfortable ways, 
and the sanctity of life undermined in order to accommodate this situation. Neither self-
defence as it stands, nor a quasi version of the defence can validly justify the operation 
known to result in the death of baby Mary. At the very least, rather than being baldly 
stated, the application of this defence merited extensive discussion in the judgment. It is 
possible that this decision blurs the line between necessity and self-defence, and may 
allow the killing of innocent people who would previously have enjoyed the protection of 
the law. 
makes sense that several people can be killed to save one. This is certainly justified where a gang of people 
have kidnapped one person, who they intend to kill. If the victim can only escape with their life by killing 
all the kidnappers, this is surely allowed under the principle of self-defence. Theoretically, under Ward 





The Official Solicitor in Re A, although encouraging the judges to 'explore the possibility 
of developi~g the law so as to enable [the] surgery to be undertaken lawfully', 
acknowledged that reconciling such a development of law with Mary's best interests and 
right to life would be a difficult task.411 Difficult it has proven to be, perhaps even 
impossible. 
The law prohibits intentional killing; it is acknowledged that all human life has inherent 
equal value, that this idea underpins the sanctity that is attributed to human life. The 
judges in Re A recognise these principles, yet maintain that the killing of Mary is 
justified. On close examination throughout this thesis, it has become clear that despite 
their supportive rhetoric, the judges adopt approaches based on quality judgements, which 
in fact undermine these principles. 
In his balancing of the girls' best interests, Ward LJ states that he is valuing each life 
equally. However his proclamations are disproved by his reasoning, which relies on 
quality judgements. In his paragraph entitled 'Offending the sanctity of life principle', 
Ward LJ says that the 'the proposed operation would not in any event offend the sanctity 
of life principle.' This was because he considered it fell into the category of self-defence. 
Yet the realms of self-defence do not encompass this situation - the threat to Jodie is not 
outside the law, nor does it originate from any act by Mary. In justifying the operation 
through self-defence Ward LJ does offend the sanctity of life - he allows that one 
innocent person may be killed to save another. 
Walker LJ says it is 'not a case of evaluating the relative worth of two human lives, but of 
undertaking surgery without which neither life will have the bodily integrity (or 
411 Original written argument of the Official Solicitor, quoted by Brooke LJ; Re A at 219. 
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wholeness) which is its due. ' 412 Brooke LJ finishes his judgment with a similar 
sentiment: 'Finally, the doctrine of the sanctity oflife respects the integrity ofthe human 
body. The proposed operation would give these children's bodies the integrity which 
nature denied them. ' 413 In language infused with morality, both judges attempt to link the 
bestowing of bodily integrity with respecting the sanctity of life. This is an integral part 
of Walker LJ's reasoning, but appears to be a last-minute effort for Brooke LJ. Neither 
attempt is convincing, not least because gaining bodily integrity could never be of 
tangible benefit to Mary, being achievable only through her death. 
In their assessments of the girls' best interests, the actual approach of each judge to 
valuing life is exposed. The judges were unanimous in holding that the operation was in 
Jodie's best interests, not only because it would save her life, but also because that life 
would be of a desirable quality and length. With regards to Mary, Walker LJ adopted a 
quality of life approach similar to the trial judge, accepting that her life held nothing for 
her. Ward and Brooke LJJ, although finding that death could not be in Mary's best 
interests because that would deny her inherent right to life, went on to balance the life of 
one girl against the other, finding in favour of Jodie. Factors given critical importance 
were Mary being destined for death, and the normality oflife that Jodie could attain. 
The quality-focused approach evident in the best interests assessment is mirrored in the 
manner in which the judges sought out legal means to sanction the murder ofMary. Each 
followed their own route to confirming the legality of the operation -justifying the action 
by self-defence,414 necessity,415 or because there was no intention to cause death.416 
Whatever the preferred solution, the path to justifying the separation operation is fraught 
412 Re A at 255. 
413 It should be noted that Brooke LJ agreed with Ward LJ that gaining bodily integrity would be a wholly 
illusory goal for Mary because she would die before she ·could enjoy it, which contradicts with his 
sentiment set out here. 
414 Per Ward LJ, see Chapter VI. 
415 Per Walker and Brooke LJJ, see Chapter V. 
416 Per Walker LJ, see Chapter IV, pp 41 - 9. 
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with dubious distinctions from precedent, and depends upon utilitarian and quality 
judgements about the value oflife.417 
Clearly, although the judges in Re A maintained that the sanctity of life was respected 
within their decisions, this is not so. Blindly upholding that the sanctity of life is 
respected when it is in fact being undermined allows for the individual decision-maker's 
idea of a valuable life to become determinative.418 This approach could result in 
discriminatory decisions going unrecognised and unchecked. If it is decided that in some 
situations like that of the conjoined twins it is desirable to deliberately end innocent lives, 
it is of the utmost importance that what these situations are should be determined in 
accordance with dominant thought. For this to happen, honesty and transparency in the 
decision making process are crucial. 
7.1 A MORAL INSTINCT 
The decision in this heartbreaking case was driven by an instinct that saving Jodie was the 
tight thing to do. 'Adrian Bianchi, the consultant paediatrician at St Mary's Hospital, 
Manchester who led the operation to separate, [said] "once you had seen the children you 
knew deep down what was right here".' 419 Indeed Ward LJ felt that Johnson J's attempt 
to justify the operation by classifying it as an act was 'valiant and wholly 
understandable' .420 Walker LJ believed that 'the doctor's duty to protect and save Jodie's 
life if they can is of fundamental importance to the resolution of this appeal. '421 
417 Christopher Sharp regarded all the decisions as 'essentially utilitarian in essence'; Christopher F Sharp 
"The Manchester conjoined twins case" (2000) 150 NLJ 1460 at 1460. 
418 Although it is not coherent to endorse two approaches to valuing life which undermine each other, there 
is a benefit of this approach as opposed to dismissing the idea of the sanctity of life completely. The 
retention of the idea that all life has equal sanctity would act as a brake on allowing the killing of innocents 
in all circumstances. 
419 Denise Fitzpatrick "Right to Life: Is it Just to End the Life of One Siamese Twin to Enable the Other to 
Live?" at 248. 
420 Re A at 189. 
421 Re A at 255. 
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If Mary and Jodie were not separated, the consequences would be dire; both girls would 
die within six months. Standing by and allowing Jodie to die when she could be saved 
may have been simply unbearable for the judges. It is probable that the instinct to save 
those who can be saved is widespread. Many people will appreciate the judges' 
pronouncement, and perhaps agree that they 'employed a compassionate pragmatism in 
coming to a decision which responded to the needs of justice. '422 
However, like Brooke LJ, we must acknowledge that this is not the only moral position 
that could be held. Some people may 'believe ... that it would be immoral not to assist 
Jodie if there is a good prospect that she might live a happy and fulfilled life', yet there 
are also 'those who believe ... that it would be an immoral act to save Jodie, if ... one 
must end Mary's life' .423 Brooke U says that a court is not equipped to choose between 
these competing philosophies. This may be so; however, what the court can and should 
do is apply the law. 
A traditional application of the law would support the moral position which prohibits the 
operation. Innocent life cannot be deliberately ended, because of the special sanctity that 
the law attaches to human life. Yet due to the distinction between acts and omissions, the 
law does not impose a duty to do everything possible to keep a person alive. If Jodie 
were born a singleton there would be no hesitation in giving her life saving treatment, 
however any duty to treat her cannot extend so far as to require the intentional killing of 
another person. 424 
Despite protestations to the contrary, the judges are indeed claiming 'moral 
superiority' .425 Their decision to separate the twins rested upon a moral judgement, one 
which undermined the law. 
422 Denise Fitzpatrick "Right to Life: Is it Just to End the Life of One Siamese Twin to Enable the Other to 
Live?" at 248. 
423 Re A at 239. 
424 See Chapter V, pp 75-83. 
425 Re A at 203. 
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7.2 THE EXTENT OF THE DECISION 
Regardless of the flaws in this decision, it has now become part of the law of England. 
Thus it has the potential to affect decisions made throughout the common law world, 
including New Zealand. The question is in what decisions will its influence be felt- to 
what extent will this case be applied. Differences in law between countries aside, the 
reasoning would obviously be applicable to identical fact situations, as was the case in 
Queensland v Nolan. Yet would it assist in deciding the fate of conjoined twins whose 
situation differed slightly? Could the approach to valuing life and the extension of self-
defence and necessity be applied to cases involving people who are not conjoined? 
Mary and Jodie's situation caused the judges to desire a result that was outside the law as 
it traditionally stood. Due to technological advances, many more situations may arise 
which create a similar desire to allow intentional killing, not only in judges, but perhaps 
in a vast number of people. The conjoined twins' situation was seen as extreme enough 
to exclude the influence of the sanctity principle. It may be difficult to define exactly 
what other situations are similarly extreme. It is possible that new exceptions could be 
created until there were more situations where an innocent could be killed, than where 
their life would be protected. In Re A Ward LJ attempts to limit the reasoning in the 
judgments to situations of conjoined twins of this exact type. However it is doubtful 
whether this should be regarded as a definitive statement on the possible application of 
the case. 
7.2.1 An attempt to limit the scope of the decision 
Ward LJ considers that the unique circumstances for which this case is authority are as 
follows: 
'it must be impossible to preserve the life of X without bringing about the death ofY, that 
Y by his or her very continued existence will inevitably bring about the death of X within 
a short period of time, and that X is capable of living an independent life but Y is 
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incapable under any circumstances (including all forms of medical intervention) of viable 
independent existence. ' 426 
Ward LJ set out this restrictive statement in an attempt to ensure that the decision did not 
become authority for wider propositions, such as justifying euthanasia for the terminally 
ill. However he does not have the authority to limit the application of the decision in this 
way; judges can only decide cases, not limit their later use. It may be tempting to accept 
it as an accurate portrayal of the circumstances for which this case is authority. Yet it is 
probable that it does not accurately reflect the actual judgments, from which the 
circumstances for which this case is authority must be drawn. 
Ward LJ firstly states that it must be impossible to preserve the life of X without bringing 
about the death ofY. This restricts the authority of Re A to situations where the only way 
to save X is by killing Y, thus excluding cases where there is another option (such as 
killing a third person427). 
Secondly, Ward LJ requires that Y, by his or her very continued existence will inevitably 
bring about the death of X within a short period of time. Y causing X's death is crucial to 
Ward LJ' s application of self-defence. However, it is possible to argue that in the 
application of necessity, a threat of death though a cause other than Y's continued 
existence would suffice. This is supported by Brooke LJ's discussion of analogous 
situations where the threat of death arose from causes other than 'Y's' continued 
existence; arising instead from outside events, such as an impeding plane crash, or the 
demands ofbandits.428 
That X's death be inevitable within a short period of time is clearly important throughout 
the judgments.429 However, there is obvious difficulty in assessing whether a certain 
period of time is short. A starting point is of course six months, the accepted time that the 
426 Re A at 205. 
427 As was the situation in Dudley and Stephens. 
428 Re A at 229 - 30. 
429 This is especially evident in Ward LJ's assessment of the girls' best interests. See above, Chapter Ill, p 
31. 
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twins would survive without surgical intervention. Yet it is unlikely that six months 
would be considered a definite cut off point, and there is room for argument in future 
cases. 
Ward LJ' s final requirement is that X is capable of living an independent life, but that Y 
is incapable under any circumstances (including all forms of medical intervention) of 
viable independent existence. The independence he refers to is clearly that between X and 
Y. The inclusion of this requirement appears to be an attempt to constrain the influence 
of this case to situations of conjoined twins, one of whom cannot survive separated from 
the other. 
X' s capacity and Y' s incapacity for independent living certainly form part of the factual 
context of the case. However other than in Ward LJ's statement above, there is no 
indication in the judgments that this in itself is a crucial factor. It is possible to argue that 
the importance of the ability or inability to live independently is that it gives rise to the 
central issue; that Jodie, or X, can be saved, whereas Mary, or Y, cannot be saved, and 
saving X wilf kill Y. 430 This problem could arise in a different situation where the ability 
to live independently was irrelevant. For instance, X and Y are trapped through no fault 
of either in a room with an air supply sufficient to sustain only one of them until rescue. 
Y however, is terminally ill, and will die moments before the air supply gives out, 
regardless of what action is taken. The question is whether one can be killed to conserve 
the air supply for the other. Although the question of their ability to live independently 
from each other does not arise, it is difficult to see why Re A could not be followed, and 
either self-defence or necessity be applied to justify killing Y. 
Further, even if Y's dependent existence is accepted as a requirement, it is arguable 
whether the term dependence would constrain the application of the reasoning to 
conjoined twins. In an example referred to by both Brooke and Walker LJJ,
431 a fallen 
climber, Y, is prevented from falling to his death by a rope attached to a fellow climber, 
X. The weight of Y' s body will inevitably drag both Y and X to their deaths, but the 
430 The importance of these facts is clear in Ward LJ's assessment of the girls' best interests, and in Walker 
and Brooke LJJ's application of necessity. See pp 30-3 above and Re A at 239 and 255 .. 
431 Re A at 229 and 251. 
113 
severing of the rope can save X. Y is undoubtedly dependent for his existence upon his 
fellow. There seems to be no relevant distinction from Mary and Jodie's situation, and no 
logical reason why the same reasoning should not apply in both cases. 
Clearly, and most likely unintended by the judges, the reasoning in Re A may have impact 
in situations outside the restrictive circumstances Ward LJ sets out. 
7 .2.2 The implications of the case on the possible defences to 
murder 
This decision has the potential to dramatically increase the number of situations justified 
by self-defence and necessity. For example either may be pointed to as justification for 
shooting down hijacked planes such as those involved in the World Trade Centre 
destruction.432 The plane passengers are in the same position as Mary; under the only two 
possible options - crashing into the building or being shot down - they are destined for 
death. The people in the trade centre building would be equated with Jodie; they can be 
saved, but only if the plane were shot down, thus robbing the plane passengers of the 
short life they had remaining. 
Ward LJ' s decision that self-defence can be used against an innocent person to eliminate 
a threat which arguably emanates from the circumstances, is not binding, and is deeply 
flawed. 433 However some commentators consider that Ward LJ' s decision was correctly 
decided, and authority for the principle that self-defence can be used against an attacker 
who is not criminally responsible.434 Perhaps, given this case, a person who has 
unbeknownst to herself contracted a contagious disease such as SARS, and is walking in 
a public place, could legitimately be killed by others in self-defence. Clearly it is possible 
432 See J C Smith and Brian Hogan Criminal Law at 273. 
433 The flaws in Ward LJ's argument are shown in Chapter VI. This part of his judgment is not binding 
because he is the minority on the legality issue. 
434 J C Smith and Brian Hogan Criminal Law at 282. 
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and perhaps ungesirable, that in future cases Ward LJ's analysis could be followed, and 
the maiming or killing of a person previously protected by the law may be justified. 
435 
Brooke and Walker LJJ expanded the application of necessity. However, it is likely that 
there would be limits on the application of necessity to justify the killing of an innocent 
person. Killing an innocent person for the purpose of pain reduction should not be 
justified by the reasoning in Re A. It is unlikely to be considered a proportionate response 
in terms of the requirements of necessity. Re A does not extend to the killing of a 
terminally ill person to enable a transplant operation that would alleviate an extremely 
painful, but not life threatening condition in another person. Similarly, killing an 
innocent person to stop their own pain is unlikely to come within the scope of Re A. 
According to Jenny McEwan, the 'Court of Appeal has opened the door to lawful 
acquittal where euthanasia is the reason for a killing, and it can be only a matter of time 
before such cases are before the courts. ' 436 However, Re A involved the competing 
interests of two individuals, and its application should be restricted to this situation. A 
crucial aspect of Mary's and Jodie's circumstances is that there are two people involved, 
one destined for death, one able to be saved, the central question being whether one may 
be killed to save the other. Brooke LJ finds that the requirements of necessity are met 
because Jodie's interests must be preferred to Mary's. This finding resulted from Ward 
LJ's balancing of the girls' best interests, which largely depended on the fact that Jodie 
can be saved whereas Mary cannot.437 Walker LJ is persuaded to apply necessity because 
it was a matter of life and death - action being necessary to avoid a death, and Mary was 
bound to die soon anyway. 438 Euthanasia involves the welfare of only one person, 
distinguishing it from the conjoined twins' situation. If an attempt was made to justify 
euthanasia through necessity, this should be done on its own terms, rather than through an 
awkward adaptation of the reasoning in Re A. 
435 It is difficult to predict which situations may give rise to such an application of this extended form of 
self-defence. 
436 Jenny McEwan "Murder By Design: The 'Feel-Good Factor' And The Criminal Law" (2001) 9(3) Med 
L Rev 246 at 248. 
437 See pp 30 - 3 above. 
438 Re A at 255. 
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Throughout the common law world there are differences in the law concerning the 
illegality of killing. However, the general approach taken to life and the manipulation of 
the defences in this case sends a clear message for all cases decided after this: the end 
justifies the means. Because it is morally correct to kill a person who is doomed for death 
to save a person who looks forward to a long and normal life, it is right to find any means 
to justify doing this. In the Australian case of Queensland v No/an the judge clearly 
adopted the spirit of Re A, applying ss 286 and 282 of the Queensland Criminal Code in a 
unique fashion in order to find a defence. 
7.2.3 The impact of the decision upon other conjoined twins cases 
The reasoning in Re A is not of much help in resolving conjoined twin situations which 
differ slightly from that of Mary and Jodie. Conjoined twin girls Natasha and Courtney 
Smith were born in 2002 in London. They shared one liver and heart, and like the twins 
in Re A, they had not long to live ifthey remained conjoined. If they were separated one 
could have been saved. Their shared heart was more deeply imbedded into Natasha's 
body, and initially it was hoped that they could be separated, and Courtney's life 
sacrificed to save Natasha's. However the complex nature of their heart caused any 
separation plans to be abandoned and sadly the girls died within weeks oftheir birth. 
If it were possible to separate Natasha and Courtney, would the present decision have 
been a helpful precedent in determining legality? This situation differed from the present 
in one crucial way.439 Unlike Mary and Jodie, both these girls had a chance of surviving 
if they were favoured in the separation operation. It was possible to give either Natasha 
or Courtney their shared heart, and for that reason neither was incapable of independent 
existence nor destined for death in the sense that Mary was. 
On the face of it, self-defence appears to be applicable. Under Ward LJ's analysis the 
very existence of both Natasha and Courtney is causing a mortal threat to the other. 
Therefore each would have a right to be defended in self-defence. Theoretically either 
could be chosen, and no reasons would need to be given for that choice. It could also be 
439 Another difference is that neither girl, because of the complex nature of any separation, was considered 
to have the potential for a long and normal life to the extent that Jodie had. 
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argued that the requirements of necessity are also fulfilled. Yet Ward LJ emphasises that 
for a situation to be resolved under the authority of Re A, one party must be incapable of 
independent existence. Even if this restriction is not accepted, the reasoning that allowed 
Mary and Jodie to be separated would not apply to Natasha and Courtney's situation 
because the crucial factor that one party is destined for death is not fulfilled. 
440 
7.2.4 Implications upon the way the courts value life 
This case was decided in an environment which already sanctioned medical decisions that 
undermined the sanctity of life; life prolonging medical treatment was (and still is) 
allowed to be withdrawn on the basis of quality of life evaluations. This decision takes a 
similar approach in that it makes an end of life decision on the basis of the quality of life. 
However, it also takes a new step- allowing the intentional killing of an innocent person; 
prior to this case Lord Goff s Rubicon which runs between allowing to die and intentional 
killing had never been crossed.441 Despite Ward LJ's attempt to limit the scope of the 
decision, it is unlikely that this will have no impact on decision making in this area. The 
conjoined twins' situation may be seen as a unique problem, yet this decision is likely to 
be a further step down a slippery slope to a place where the relative worth of lives in 
many situations is considered according to their quality. If the Court of Appeal takes 
such an approach to the value of life in this situation, surely the way is paved for a similar 
approach to be taken in other situations, such as the removal of vital organs from 
terminally ill people. All the judges in Re A deny that they value life according to its 
quality, a denial that has been shown to be unsubstantial. However this denial may cloak 
the journey down the slippery slope, and society, without realising, may find itself 
allowing life and death decisions to be made purely upon evaluations of the relative 
quality of lives. 
It is possible that the acceptance of intentional killing in this situation is a natural result of 
the gradual erosion of the theological foundations on which the concept of the sanctity of 
440 However the decision in Re A surely leaves open the possibility of later cases being decided on a 
different basis. Since the girls shared heart was more in Natasha's body than in Courtney's, it could have 
been argued that Natasha was naturally born with a greater chance of survival, and that this chance should 
be maximised. 
441 Bland at 865. 
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life was grounded.442 If intentional killing is to be allowed, instead of maintaining that 
sanctity is being upheld, while undermining it, it may be more useful for decision-makers 
to dismiss entirely and openly the idea that each life has intrinsic equal value. This may 
lead to better regulation of the situations in which intentional killing may be allowed, and 
reduce the influence of the decision-maker's opinion about what constitutes an acceptable 
quality of life. However, the judges in Re A did not dismiss the idea that each life has 
equal and inherent value. Rather, they attempted to embrace it, while justifying the 
means- killing Mary- to reach their chosen end- saving Jodie. 
442 SeeP D G Skegg "F W Guest Memorial Lecture 1988: The Edges of Life" (1988) 6 Otago L R 517 at 
532. 
118 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation), Re [2001] Fam 147 
Airedale NHS. Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 
Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd v L (1998) 17 FRNZ 376 
B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), Re [1981] 1 WLR 1421 
Birmingham City Council v H (No. 2) [1993] 1 FLR 883 
Birmingham City Council v H (a minor) [1994] 2 AC 212 
Bolam v Friern Hospital management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 
C (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), Re [1990] Fam 26 
Central Manchester Helathcare Trust v Mr & Mrs A and Re A Child unreported, HC 
Family Division, 25 August 2000 
Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990) 497 US 261 
F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), Re [1990] 2 AC 1 
G, Re at [1997] 2 NZLR 201 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112 
J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment), Re [1991] Fam 33 
J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment), Re [1993] Fam 15 
Kapi v Ministry ofTransport (1991) 8 CRNZ 49 
Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385 
NHS Trust A v M, NHS Trust B v H [2001] Fam 348 
Perka v R (1984) 13 DLR (41h) 1 
Police v Anthoni [1997] DCR 1034 
Police v Kawiti [2000] 1 NXLR 117 
R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 
R v Atofia [1997] DCR 1053 
R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458 
R v Browne [1973] NI 96 
R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 
R v Duffil [1967] 1 QB 63 
R v Gibbins (1918) 13 Cr App R 134 
R v Howe [1987] 1 AC 417 
R v Lawson and Forsythe [1986] VR 515 
R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 
R v Mckoy [2002] EWCA Crim 1628 
R v Moorhead and Moorhead unreported, HC Auckland, T011974, 13 June 2001 
R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 
R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 
R v Pommel/ [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 
R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206 
R v Wool/in [1999] 1 AC 82 
119 
Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734 at 746 
State of Queensland v Alyssa Grace Nolan (an infant, by her Litigation Guardian, Shaun 
No/an) and Bethany Rose Nolan (an infant, by her Litigation Guardian, Shaun No/an) 
[2001] QSC 174 
T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment), Re [1997] 1 WLR 
T and E (Proceedings: Conflicting Interests), Re [1995] 1 FLR 581 




Annas, George J "Conjoined Twins- The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life" (2001) 
344 N Engl J Med 1104 
Annas, George J "Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other" (1987) 17(2) Hastings 
Center Report 27 
Bainham, Andrew "Resolving the unresolvable: the case of the conjoined twins" (2001) 
60(1) CLJ 49 
Bagaric, Mirko "The Jodie and Mary (Siamese Twins) Case: The Problem with Rights" 
(2001) 8 JLM 311 
Bleich ID "Conjoined twins" (1996) 31 Tradition at 92 
Burnet, David "Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) Conjoined twins, sanctity 
and quality oflife, and invention the mother of necessity" (2001) 13(1) CFLQ 91 
Davis, Colleen "Case and Comment; No/an" (2001) 25 Crim L J 348 
Drake, Donald C "The Twins Decision: One Must Die So One Can Live" Philadelphia 
Inquirer, October 16, 1977; republished as, Donald C. Drake "Siamese Twins. The 
Surgery: An agonizing choice- Parents, Doctors, Rabbis, In Dilemma" (2001) 4(1) 
ASS AI. Internet http:/ /www.daat.ac.il/daat/kitveyet/assia englishldrake-1.htm 
information accessed 3 June 2003 
Feinstein, Rav Moshe "So One May Live- Siamese Twins" Unpublished Responsum 
translated and annotated by Rabbi Moshe David Tendler Internet 
http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/ravmoshe.html information accessed 11 June 2003 
Finnis, J M "Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?" (1993) 109 LQR 329 
Fitzpatrick, Denise "Right to Life: Is it Just to End the Life of One Siamese Twin to 
Enable the Other to Live?" (2001) 165 JPN 247 
Foster, Charles "Rocks and Hard Places" (2000) 144 SJ 922 
Freeman, Michael "Whose Life is it Anyway?" (2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 260 
Grubb, Andrew "Conjoined Twins: Re A Down Under" (2002) 10 Med L Rev 100 
Harris, John "Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the 
Judgment in Re A" (2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 221 
Hewson, Barbara "A (Children)- cruel and unnatural" (2000) 150 NLJ 1562 
Hewson, Barbara "Killing OffMary: Was the Court of Appeal Right?" (2001) 9(3) Med 
L Rev 281 
Keown, John "Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland" (1997) 113 
LQR481 
Kirby, The Hon Justice Michael "Law, Human Life and Ethical Dilemmas" (2000) 12 
BondLR 129 
121 
Laville, Sandra "Mary was freed by death, says father" Internet 
http://www .telegraph.co.uk/news/main. jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2000%2F12%2F07 
%2Fntwin07.xml information accessed 15 Apri12003 
O'Regan, RS "Surgery and Criminal Responsibility under the Queensland Criminal 
Code" (1990) 14 Crim LJ 73 
McEwan, Jenny "Murder By Design: The 'Feel-Good Factor' And The Criminal Law" 
(200 1) 9(3) Med L Rev 246 
Steinmetz, Rabbi Chaim "Separating Conjoined Twins" Internet, 
http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/cojoinedtwins.html information accessed 11 June 
2003 
Sharp, Christopher F "The Manchester conjoined twins case" (2000) 150 NLJ 1460 
Skegg, P D G "F W Guest Memorial Lecture 1988: The Edges of Life" (1988) 6(4) 
Otago LR 517 
Uniacke, Suzanne "Was Mary's Death Murder?" (2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 208 
Watt, Helen "Conjoined Twins: Separation as Mutilation" (2001) 9(3) Med L Rev 238 
Williams, Glanville "A Commentary on R. v. Dudley and Stephens" (1977) 8 Cambrian 
Law Review 94 
Books 
Bentham, Jeremy An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (The 
Athlone Press, 1970) 
Binding, Karl and Hoche, Alfred Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens 
(F. Meiner, 1920) 
Bronitt, Simon and McSherry, Bernadette Principles of Criminal Law (LBC, 2001) 
Chew, Shirley ed. Arthur Hugh Clough; Selected Poems, (1987, Carcanet) 
Ronald Dworkin Life's Dominion (HarperCollinsPublishers, 1993) 
Fletcher, George P Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown, 1978) 
Foot, Philippa Virtues and Vices (Basil Blackwell, 1978) 
Frey, RG and Morris, Christopher Weds Liability and Responsibility: Essays in law and 
morals (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
Hailsham, Lord of St. Marylebone, ed in chief Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edn 
reissue, Butterworths, 1990) vol11(1) 
Hale, Sir Matthew The History of the Pleas of the Crown (Professional Books Limited, 
1971) Volume 1 
Keyserlingk; Edward W. Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life (Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, 1979) 
122 
McAuley, Finbarr Criminal Liability (Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) 
Robertson, The Honourable J Bruce ed Adams on Criminal Law (Student Edition, 
Brooker' s, 1996) 
Schopp, Robert F Justification Defenses and Just Convictions (Cambridge University 
· press, 1998) 
Simester, A P and Brookbanks, Warren J Principles of Criminal Law (Brooker's, 1998) 
Simpson, A W Brian Cannibalism and the Common Law; A Victorian Yachting Tragedy 
(The Hambledon Press, 1994) 
Singer, Peter Rethinking Life and Death (The Text Publishing Company, 1995) 
Smith, J C Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (Stevens &Sons, 1989) 
Smith, J C and Hogan, Brian Criminal Law (lOth ed, Butterworths/LexisNexis, 2002) 
Stephen, Sir James Digest of the Criminal Law (4th edn, 1887) 
Uniacke, Suzanne Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
Williams, Glanville Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, Stevens and Sons, 1983) 
Williams, Glanville The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Faber and Faber, 1958) 
Report 
Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics HL Paper 21-1 of 1993- 94 
Legislation and conventions 
Children Act 1989 (Eng), s 1(1) 
Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand), ss s 48 158, 160 and 167 
Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK) s 3 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 
Guardianship Act 1968 (New Zealand), s 23 
Queensland Criminal Code ss 291, 293, 300 and 302, 286(1)(a), 25 
